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This dissertation explores the role of gender in contemporary Islam and the daily lives of 
Muslim minorities in the West.  Specifically, I examine how social constructions of masculinity 
and femininity are manifest in militant jihad, and how young Muslims in America manage the 
stigma placed on them as a result of jihadists’ beliefs and actions.  I asked how jihadists frame 
acts of martyrdom and mass violence, and how young Muslims in America handle the associated 
and ensuing stigma in daily life?  To address these questions, I analyzed statements from militant 
jihadists and conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-six young and devout Muslims living in 
the Midwestern United States.  Using grounded methods, I found that martyrdom acts, which 
include suicide attacks, were framed as self-defense, restorative rituals, and honor displays.  
These frames indicate that such violence—directed at others and the self—enables aggrieved 
men to resist foreign domination, elicit deference from others, and claim gender-based rewards.  
Integrating Symbolic Interactionist and pure sociological perspectives, I argue that martyrdom is 
a form of masculine self-help: a gender-signifying act that expresses a grievance through self-
sacrificial and embodied aggression.  In addition, I found that young Muslim men and women 
cope with collective stigmatization by defining and doing gender in culturally normative ways, 
especially when interacting with non-Muslim publics.  Drawing on dramaturgical and identity 
theories, I conceptualize these stigma management strategies as allaying embodiment, benign 
accommodation, claiming normality, embracing stigma, communicating commitment, and 
claiming exceptionality.  These strategies suggest that gender displays are integral to the stigma 
process and may be strategically deployed to protect the self in mixed-contact situations.  This 
research also indicates that the stigma process can lead to greater commitment to religious role-
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“The fully and visibly stigmatized…must suffer the special indignity of  
knowing that they wear their situation on their sleeve, that almost anyone  
will be able to see into the heart of their predicament” (Goffman 1963: 127) 
 
“Stigma is as much about the resistance of identities as the reduction  
of identities” (Howarth 2006: 450) 
 
 To be Muslim in America is to be a problem.  The cultural and political landscape in the 
United States following the September 11th attacks carried by al-Qa’ida, has led to anti-Muslim 
stereotypes, sentiments, and violence, defined collectively as “Islamophobia” (Gottschalk and 
Greenberg 2008; Love 2009; Perry 2003).  More than a decade after 9/11, this “backlash” against 
Muslims continues (Peek 2011).  At the same time, Islam is one of the fastest growing religions 
in the U.S.  The number of adherents will soon surpass Judaism and all other faith communities 
in the country, save Christianity (Mohamed 2016).  The steady growth of Islam in America is 
contoured by many different ethnicities, nationalities, and ideological schools.  In terms of age, 
an increasing percentage are younger people that are more devout and conservative than previous 
generations of Muslim-Americans (Peek 2005; Hermansen 2003).  This trend is akin to the rise 
of identity politics among other minorities in the U.S. in earlier eras (Anderson and Cromwell 
1977; Nagel 1995; Min and Kim 2000).  It also makes young Muslim-Americans an increasingly 
significant block of the sociopolitical order in the country.  Their experiences and actions will 
inevitably shape the trajectory and impact of Islam in arguably the most religiously diverse 
society in the Western world.   
9/11 was a tragic moment in American history and for Muslim people around the globe.  
The U.S. actions following 9/11, particularly the War on Terror and U.S-led wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, have targeted Muslims in extraordinary and unprecedented ways, and strained 
relations with the Muslim world.  The start of this contentious situation, at least in the eyes of 
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most Americans, remains the actions of nineteen men: the self-proclaimed “men of jihad” (Aaron 
2008).  According to Aslan (2009), these men believed they were heroic martyrs waging a 
“cosmic war” on behalf of Islam.  Their actions have raised questions about the meaning of 
martyrdom in Islam (Ahmed 2003; Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005; Hafez 2007).  While the 
religious views and identities of the 9/11 hijackers have become notorious, what often goes 
unsaid and unexamined is the fact that they were all men, convinced of their actions by other 
men.  This raises the issue of gender and the role that gender plays in militant jihad.  Another 
issue is that of motivation: how can we make sense of jihadist grievances and use of violence?  
More specifically, what do their grievances suggest about the relationship between martyrdom 
and manhood?  Despite a few recent studies that have explored such issues (e.g., Aslam 2012; 
Von Knop 2007; Hafez 2007), these questions remain empirically under-explored and under-
theorized in the sociological literature.  This presupposes further study of the subjective meaning 
and aims of martyrdom.  
The specter of terrorism looms over Muslim communities in the West, even more so after 
the 2015 mass-casualty attacks in Paris carried out by members of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS).  In the U.S., such violence has revived anti-Islamic sentiment, with conservative 
politicians, media personalities, and members of the public calling for significant restrictions on 
Muslim immigrants and communities.  The severity of Islamophobia in America now mirrors, if 
not exceeds, that which immediately followed the 9/11 attacks (Obeidallah 2014; Gallup, Inc. 
2011).  In this “post-9/11” context, Muslim identities continue to be scrutinized and surveilled, 
and so the lives and standpoints of Muslims living in America are shaped by this context.  An 
important aspect of this process is how the younger generation—those who were just kids when 
9/11 happened—deal with collective stigmatization.  How do they reconcile their religious role-
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identities with the views and expectations of various audiences?  What types of coping strategies 
do they use when confronted with negative feedback from others?  To what extent does gender 
influence these strategies?  And what do these strategies suggest about the social construction of 
masculinity and femininity?  To address such questions theoretically, I turn to interactionist 
traditions in sociology, especially the dramaturgical perspective advanced by Erving Goffman. 
Dramaturgy remains a cogent theoretical framework for making sense of what and why 
people do what they do in interaction with others.  This framework is particularly useful for 
delineating the various effects of stigma on individual and collective behavior (Goffman 1963; 
Ryan 2011; O’Brien 2011).  To avoid negative sanctions, individuals manage their impressions 
and define situations in ways that convince themselves and others that they belong.  As a result, 
and as dramaturgical theorists assume, “actors present self in strategic ways” (Turner and Stets 
2006: 26).  Such strategic action not only reflects the agency of individuals—i.e., that we are not 
so “tightly programmed by culture” (p. 26)—but also that problematic identities and situations 
may be manageable with appropriate actions.  This means that Muslim minorities can exert some 
control over the stigma process, for example, by engaging in rituals and behaviors that prevent 
their identities from “looming large” in encounters with non-Muslims, and enable them to “pass” 
off as “normal” members of society (Ryan 2011; Khosravi 2012).  Despite the significance of 
stigma management to the lived-experiences and life chances of Muslims living in the West, few 
studies have theorized the specific ways this process unfolds in everyday life.  This dissertation 
proposes to the fill this gap in the literature by conceptualizing these coping and management 
processes in the context of “mixed-contacts” (Goffman 1963: 12) or, in this case, everyday 
encounters with non-Muslim publics. 
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Gender is a key dimension of identity and stigma management.  How gender is displayed, 
both in appearance and through rituals and gestures, reveals an actor’s alignment with audiences 
and influences the collectively shared definition of the situation (Goffman 1979).  To further our 
understanding of gender as a social construct (e.g., as an avenue of power and source of stigma), 
Schrock and Schwalbe (2009) have called for a renewed emphasis on dramaturgical approaches 
to studies of men and masculinity.  They note the current limitations of the multiple masculinities 
perspective (Connell 1983, 1995), and argue that interactionist analyses of gender are needed to 
develop new knowledge about this key aspect of social relations (p. 278).1  In particular, they 
encourage researchers to focus analytic attention on “manhood acts” or what males actually do to 
claim membership as “men” and reap the associated privileges (p. 279).  For males to claim the 
privileges and rewards of membership in the dominant gender group, they must convince others 
of their manhood.  While having a male body certainly helps in this regard, it is what males do 
with them—their actions—that best explains their positions in society.  For instance, violence 
remains a common way for males to demand recognition and elicit deference from others, and a 
conventional tactic of social movements, like Global Jihad (e.g., see Aslam 2012).  Together, 
these perspectives on gender suggest that displays of masculinity and femininity are integral to 
the experience and effects of anti-Islamic stigma, and that martyrdom acts can be defined as 
manhood acts carried out, in this case, by militant jihadists.  In these ways, gender displays and 
ideologies may help to explain both the meanings of martyrdom and the management of stigma.  
This dissertation thus focuses on the role of gender, especially masculinity, in contemporary 
Islam and the daily lives of Muslims in America.  In particular, this research explores how 
                                                          
1 This argument is detailed in Chapter 1. 
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gender influences the violent acts of militant jihadists and how young Muslim men and women 
manage the stigma placed on them as a result of jihadists’ beliefs and actions. 
Background and Methods 
The first phase of this dissertation research started in September 2011, on the ten-year 
anniversary of 9/11.  At that time, I was awarded a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) 
Fellowship from the United States Department of Education to study the link between gender 
and assimilation in diaspora communities.  This fellowship was renewed the following year and 
over the course of this time period, I identified the population under study, conceptualized the 
research project, and collected and analyzed my data.  These data consisted of twenty-six in-
depth interviews with young Muslims living in the Midwestern U.S.  This decision was based on 
recent calls to examine the formation of ethno-religious identities in new diasporic contexts (e.g., 
Moghissi and Ghorashi 2010; Braziel and Mannur 2003).  Aside from being a new gateway of 
immigration (Waters and Jimenez 2005), the Midwestern U.S. has been an active arena of anti-
Islamic sentiment, including legislative efforts to ban Sharia law and restrict immigration from 
Muslim countries (Hancock 2011; Fantz and Brumfield 2015).  My goal was to understand the 
experience and management of stigma among young Muslims in this particular milieu.   
Participants were drawn from the Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) of two large 
Midwestern Universities, and an Islamic center and mosque.  These social spaces have been the 
focus of media and policy discourses on terrorism, especially the radicalization of young men 
(e.g., Spencer 2014; House Committee on Homeland Security 2011; Post and Sheffer 2006; 
Emerson 2006; Pipes 2003).  Like Peek (2005: 221), I initially relied on a few key informants at 
the MSAs to recruit participants, coordinate interviews, and begin sampling.  The majority of 
both men and women were identified through the MSA network and procured through this type 
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of “snowballing” strategy.  Participants ranged in age from eighteen to twenty-eight years and 
were primarily 1.5 and second-generation Muslim Americans (the complete demographics are 
detailed on pages 61-64 and listed in Appendix B).  I also attended MSA meetings and events, 
attended Friday Prayers and other gatherings at the Islamic Center, and occasionally met with 
small groups of participants for more informal discussions of issues related to the study—e.g., 
breaking news over government spying on MSAs, the hearings on Islamic Radicalization that 
occurred in March 2011, and unrest in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries affected by 
the U.S. War on Terror.  Given the focus on social meanings in this research, I used grounded 
methods to locate, collect, analyze, and interpret the data.  This methodological approach is well-
established and well-suited for qualitative analysis of interviews and extant texts (Charmaz 2006; 
Warren 2002; Johnson 2002; Strauss 1987; Glaser and Strauss 1967).  Decisions about when to 
stop interviewing and what constituted the presumptive findings and conceptual categories were 
all predicated on grounded theory (the entire analytic technique is described in Chapter 2).   
Based on these data and methods, and rooted in critical and dramaturgical perspectives in 
sociology, this dissertation explores three key questions: (1) how are martyrdom acts framed in 
militant jihad? (2) How do young Muslims minorities cope with anti-Islamic stigma related to 
these acts?  And (3) what role does gender play in both of these processes?  I address these 
questions in separate chapters—or studies—of this dissertation.  Although each chapter contains 
an abstract, the main focus and findings are as follows.  The first chapter details the framing 
activities of jihadists in order to explicate the subjective interpretation and aims of martyrdom 
acts.  The crux of this chapter is the conceptualization of masculine self-help and the argument 
that martyrdom and mass violence are gender-signifying acts.  The second chapter elaborates 
dramaturgical theories and the concept of gender displays (Goffman 1979) by illustrating how 
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young Muslim men in America manage encounters with non-Muslim publics in gender-specific 
ways.  This chapter shows how masculinity is integral to stigma management, especially during 
mixed-contacts.  The third chapter draws on Identity theory and Goffman’s (1963) concept of 
“moral careers” to make sense of the coping strategies of young Muslim women.  More broadly, 
this chapter establishes the impact of commitment and identity salience on the coping strategies 
and self-esteem of stigmatized persons.  In addition, I conducted a textual analysis of In Their 
Words: Voices of Jihad (Aaron 2008), a compendium of statements from jihadists compiled by 
the RAND Corporation.  This text contains more than 300 direct quotations and statements from 
contemporary leaders, prominent historical figures, and rank-and-file members of the movement, 
some of whom have successfully carried out suicide attacks and other so-called “martyrdom 
operations” (p. 89).  The quotes were derived from a variety of sources, including books, articles, 
interviews, communiques, and online posts, and translated from Arabic to English (p. xii).  This 
text and the analytic approach toward it are detailed in Chapter 1.  Combined with the in-depth 
interviews, these constituted appropriate data for exploring the social construction of gender in 
contemporary Islam, in particular, and the social meaning of martyrdom and management of 
stigma, in general.   
This dissertation research stands to make several contributions to sociological research on 
gender, violence, stigma, and the self.  First, each chapter builds on and extends dramaturgical 
theories of gender: Chapter 1 conceptualizes martyrdom acts as a form of gender-signification. 
Chapter 2 theorizes the role and influence of gender displays in stigma management, and Chapter 
3 demonstrates the self-protective properties of the stigma process.  The dissertation’s second 
major contribution involves new evidence in two areas: how violence is framed by jihadists and 
how stigma is managed by young Muslims in America.  Considering the limited research about 
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the construction and negotiation of Muslim identities in Western contexts, this project will 
expand what we know—and what we can reasonably say—about these processes.  The third 
contribution of this work is to understanding the link between gender and militant jihad by 
shedding light on the impetus for martyrdom in social movements, as well as the role of gender 
in facing and managing stigma.  Gender is an important factor that remains underappreciated in 
explanations of collective violence and the strategies used to cope with collective stigmatization.  
By illustrating how gender, global jihad, and the everyday experiences of young Muslims are 
intertwined, this research may be used to develop more appropriate and effective interventions 




CHAPTER 1  
 




Martyrdom has a central and increasingly popular role in Islamic social movements, but remains 
undertheorized and empirically underexplored in sociological studies.  In this chapter, I examine 
the social meanings and aims of martyrdom acts by analyzing the statements of jihadists.  I find 
that these violent acts to be framed as self-defense, restorative rituals, and honor displays.  Such 
frames indicate that, in the context of Global Jihad, martyrdom constitutes a violent repertoire of 
contention that enables aggrieved men to resist domination, elicit deference, and claim gender-
based rewards.  Through integrating critical constructionist perspectives on gender and Donald 
Black’s theory of self-help, along with recent critiques of Black’s pure sociology framework, I 
argue that martyrdom is a form of masculine self-help—a gender signifying act that constitutes 
an expression of a grievance through self-sacrificial and embodied aggression.  This conceptual 
approach suggests that gender ideologies are critical to understanding why acts of martyrdom 
and mass violence are advocated over other methods of handling grievances, and that masculine 







The Contested Meanings and Aims of Martyrdom Acts 
Martyrdom has played a significant role in social movements, but only recently become 
associated with mass violence on a global scale.  In Islam, martyrdom (shahadat) refers to self-
sacrifice on behalf of the ummah, or Muslim community, and is deemed an expression of jihad, 
or struggle “for the cause of God” (Allah) (Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005: 11-13; Aslam 2012: 
107-08).  Unlike martyrdom in Judeo-Christian and Eastern religious traditions that equate this 
practice with “bearing witness” to injustice, martyrdom in Islam is a tactic directed at perceived 
enemies (Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005).  To illustrate by contrast: whereas Christian martyrs 
have historically died for refusing to obey restrictions on Christianity (e.g., in ancient Rome), 
Muslim martyrs have often been the initiators of violence.  The purpose of self-sacrifice in the 
latter case is “to annihilate the enemy” (p.6), be they infidels, oppressive rulers, or apostates.  
This form of “offensive martyrdom” (p.6) thus represents a break from other religious and 
philosophical bases for self-sacrificial violence.  The consensus among Islamic scholars is that 
martyrdom is only appropriate in the context of jihad (Ahmed 2003; Aslan 2009), but the rise of 
political Islam and militant jihadist movements have raised new questions about the impetus and 
legitimate exercise of this violence, especially in terms of the line between haraam (forbidden 
acts in Islam) and Istishhad (honorable death in defense of Islam).  In this sense, martyrdom acts 
reveal serious divisions within Islamic theology and among Muslims.   
Along these lines, acts of martyrdom in global jihad are controversial because they target 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  One highly controversial and increasingly popular type of 
martyrdom is the suicide attack, “an operational method in which the very act of the attack is 
dependent upon the death of the perpetrator” (Ganor 2006: 6).  Among jihadists, these violent 
acts are referred to as “martyrdom operations” (Aaron 2008: 89-92; Aslan 2009; Kepel 2004; 
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Ahmed 2003; Chriss 2007: Chapter 9).  This term is used in part to situate such violence in the 
context of “holy war” and distinguish it from suicide and murder, both of which are haraam and 
strictly prohibited by Islamic laws (Aslan 2009: 102; Hafez 2007).  For example, Hafez (2007) 
shows how jihadists use warrior narratives to create images of the heroic martyr so as to justify 
and glorify suicide missions, and to mobilize Muslims to carry them out.  The distinct character 
of martyrdom as a violent “repertoire of contention” (Tilly 2003) in militant jihadist movements 
has prompted scholars to further examine the impetus for these acts, especially the motivations 
of martyrs (Aslan 2009: Chapter 4; Lankford 2013: Chapter 8; David 2013; Khosrohavar and 
Macey 2005: Chapter 3; Kimmel 2005; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003; Freamon 2003). While 
questions of motive are certainly important and warrant consideration, less attention has been 
paid to what martyrdom acts signify about the identities of the men who advocate and commit 
them.  Before proceeding to the latter issue, which is the focus of this research, I briefly review 
some assertions that researchers have already made in relation to both questions.   
In the literature on suicide terrorism, researchers have claimed that martyrdom operations 
are a rational and calculated form of resistance (Pape and Feldman 2010; Sageman 2008; Ganor 
2006; Crenshaw 2006; Pape 2005).  In other words, martyrdom is a form of political protest.  For 
example, through extensive quantitative analyses of suicide attacks around the world, Pape and 
Feldman (2010) conclude that such violence is a direct response to foreign military occupation.  
Their conclusion is supported in part by a pair of striking statistics: (1) all major suicide terrorist 
campaigns between 1980 and 2009, “which together comprise 96% of the 2,188 attacks during 
that period,” are linked to the presence of foreign troops in “territory that the terrorists prize” (p. 
10), and (2) the ratio of suicide bombers per million is ten times higher in Sunni-majority 
countries that are host to American military forces than those without such attacks (p. 186).  For 
12 
 
jihadist movements like al-Qa’ida and the more recent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
these operations have targeted civilians, militaries, and symbolic social institutions with the 
expressed purpose of coercing foreign nation-states to withdraw from Muslim lands and for 
destabilizing local Islamic regimes that are seen as proxies for foreign powers (McCants 2015; 
Hafez 2007; Chriss 2007: Chapter 7; Pape 2005). Geopolitical factors thus appear to shape the 
choice and trajectory of this violence.  In particular, suicide attacks appear to be linked to the 
political autonomy of Muslim communities and perceived efficacy in deterring outside threats 
and/or punishing accomplices.  This work suggests that martyrdom is a manifestation of political 
struggles for self-determination and self-preservation. 
While Pape and fellow researchers make a compelling statistical case about the drivers of 
martyrdom and mass violence, other scholars contend that these acts are not just an expression of 
political grievances, but also of extreme religiosity and sectarianism (Aslan 2009; Atran 2006; 
Moghadam 2006; Crenshaw 2006; Khosrokhavar and Macy 2005; Jurgensmeyer 2003; Stern 
2003).  Through interviews with would-be suicide bombers and their supporters, Atran (2006: 
132-34) found these acts to be inspired by the desire to advance a “Salafist vision of Islam.”  
Salafism is the ideological mainstay of most jihadist groups, emphasizing a utopian vision of a 
unified Islamic nation or “neo-umma” (Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005: 151).  Unlike Islamist 
groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, these Salafi and Wahhabi-inspired jihadists are not content 
with the removal of foreign occupiers from Muslim territories—they seek the “purification” of 
Islam and the resurrection of a Sunni caliphate (McCants 2015; Roy and Boubekeur 2012; 
Khosrokhavar 2009; Gerges 2006; Roy 2004).  In their view, modern nation-states, including 
those with Muslim-majorities, have “strayed from the true path of Islam” (Atran 2006: 128) and 
that “the only way back is through violent jihad” (p. 133).  By relegating the role of religion in 
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explaining the incidence of suicide attacks, Atran accuses Pape and other politically-focused 
scholars of discounting the religious dimensions of these acts and thereby misrepresenting what 
motivates them.  In other words, determining the impetus for martyrdom in jihadist movements 
presupposes an understanding of the aspirations of adherents: how do jihadists define these acts 
and come to see themselves as responsible for carrying them out?  Such questions suggest that 
the meanings attributed to martyrdom are central to explaining why these acts arise in social 
movements like Global Jihad. 
Other recent accounts have linked martyrdom not to political or religious grievances, but 
to mental illness.  From this perspective, attempts to understand what martyrs seek and why they 
seek it distracts from the underlying psychological issues that are manifest in their deadly actions 
(Lankford 2012; Kix 2010).  For example, in The Myth of Martyrdom, Lankford (2012) calls into 
question the experts on suicide terrorism, including Pape and Atran, by arguing that martyrs are 
basically suicidal.  Using a combination of suicide notes and biographical information, Lankford 
claims that individuals who kill themselves in the course of killing others are, above all, driven 
by the desire to end their own troubled lives.  That is, martyrdom is not a political or puritanical 
practice, but rather a pathological one—rooted in the psychological problems of the perpetrators.  
This perspective appeals to Western audiences that may more readily accept assertions that 
suicide bombers are simply sick people (after all, there must be something mentally wrong with 
individuals that hijack planes and crash them into buildings).  However, such arguments are 
often reductionist and ethnocentric.  For instance, Lankford argues that framing of martyrdom in 
Islam as honorable and altruistic is nothing more than propaganda for attracting new recruits and 
encouraging them to carry out suicide attacks.  While this may be true, he then equates legitimate 
self-sacrifice with the actions of American soldiers and other “true martyrs.”  This distinction not 
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only reveals how cultural narratives and political interests influence the meaning of martyrdom, 
but also reinforces normative boundaries around the use of violence (i.e., what forms of violence 
are deemed socially acceptable, in what context, and by whom).  For this reason, explanations of 
martyrdom as psychopathology remain controversial and in the minority.  Still, the competing 
claims of Lankford and other scholars indicate the need to further examine the intended and 
actual aims of martyrdom.  In particular, none of the aforementioned works directly address the 
role of gender in defining, driving, and justifying these acts.  
The Gender of Martyrdom in Global Jihad: Martyrdom Acts as Manhood Acts? 
Whether driven by politics, religion, or illness, what often goes unsaid is that martyrdom 
in global jihad is almost exclusively practiced by men—young men.  The impetus for these acts 
may also be rooted in gender-based grievances and reflect masculine cultural scripts.  Since 9/11, 
a growing number of scholars have started to examine the relationship between martyrdom and 
masculinity in Islam (e.g., Aslam 2012; Rohde 2008; Kimmel 2005; Gerami 2005; 2002).  Their 
research directs our attention to the ways in which martyrdom acts invoke notions of manhood, 
including what Muslim men feel entitled to and obligated to do, and how they collaborate in the 
construction of Islamic masculinity.  For example, Gerami (2002: 267) describes the ideal type 
of Muslim martyr as “a young, unmarried (virgin, innocent) man fearless and strong…with eyes 
cast forward to jihad and the blessed state of martyrdom…He protects the women, children, and 
country’s honor.”  Notions of honor, bravery, glory, purity, and pride not only distinguish the 
identities of these mostly-male martyrs, but also the grievances that prompt their violent acts.  
According to Kimmel (2005), martyrdom operations, like the 9/11 attacks, are a consequence of 
the adverse and gendered effects of globalization on Muslims around the world.  Among these 
effects have been the proletarianization and marginalization of formerly privileged men that, in 
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turn, has motivated oppositional movements that “take the veneer of restoring manhood” (p. 
416).  In examining the biography of Mohammad Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, Kimmel argues 
that suicide missions are embedded in politics of masculinity, including men’s frustration with 
dwindling economic opportunities, resentment over the breakdown of traditional patriarchies, 
and other shifts in the gender order that have accompanied the rise of global capitalism.  The 
resulting inability of men like Atta to claim membership in the dominant gender group thus 
contributes to their radicalization and leads them to see martyrdom as a means to overcome 
feelings of personal defeat and humiliation.  In this sense, martyrdom is a masculine mode of 
recourse for disaffected and downwardly mobile men.   
Recognizing martyrdom acts as a consequence of gender politics is compelling, at least 
for Western feminists and scholars, and yet empirical linkages between the two remains thin.  
For instance, Kimmel’s suggestion that the 9/11 attacks were driven in part by gender-based 
grievances tied to globalization was based on a single case profile of a single individual, Atta, 
and similar claims have been made using limited evidence—e.g., piecemeal biographies and 
general observations (Brison 2009; Gerami 2003; Sarikakis 2002; Lorber 2002).  More empirical 
evidence is therefore necessary in order to assess, let alone advance, claims that martyrdom and 
mass violence in global jihad are also somehow rooted in a crisis of masculinity.  Recently, 
Schrock and Schwalbe (2009) outlined an agenda for future research on men and masculinity 
that may clarify the gender dimensions of martyrdom in the context of global jihad.  They have 
pointed out some limitations of the prevailing “multiple masculinities” perspective and called on 
researchers to refocus their analyses on men’s gendered practices, such as what men actually do 
to achieve dominance.  In their view, too much of the sociology of gender literature has focused 
on cataloging various forms of masculinity or what they refer to as “men-and-(fill in the blank)” 
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patterns (2009:278).  Over time, this has led to “categorical essentialism” (p. 281) in studies of 
different groups of men and yielded diminishing theoretical returns that explain how males 
construct identities as “men” and what men’s practices specifically share that “makes them 
masculinity.”2   In order to avoid the pitfalls of the multiple masculinities approach, they suggest 
revisiting symbolic interactionist perspectives on gender3 by exploring how men, individually 
and collectively, signify masculinity and what consequences these signifying practices present 
for women and other groups of men.  In other words, rather than cataloguing the various features 
of “jihadi masculinity,” scholars should direct analytic attention toward the specific types of acts 
that enable jihadists to signify a masculine self.  Insofar as martyrdom acts are gender-signifying 
acts, they serves as an important and further illustration of doing masculinity. 
Toward this end, Schrock and Schwalbe (2009: 289) encourage researchers to document 
and analyze “manhood acts” or the identity work that males do to claim identities and privileges 
as men.  Manhood acts are, of course, socially learned, historically and cross-culturally variable, 
and are contoured by social class, race, ethnicity, religion, age, ability, and other social forces.  
Nevertheless, they are bound by a common theme: “the desire to claim an identity as a member 
of a privileged gender group,” which entails “signifying a capacity to exert control over one’s 
self, the environment, and others” (p. 286).  This theme suggests that manhood acts share certain 
aims: “claiming privilege, eliciting deference, and resisting exploitation” (p. 281).  Identifying 
these aims in terms of specific actions can help overcome the aforementioned categorical 
essentialism and reification of masculinities, and also show how males achieve dominance.  
                                                          
2 In other words, “The implicit claim is that all members of a category (e.g., Black masculinity, gay masculinity, 
working class masculinity) practice an identifiable unique form of masculinity,” which “can cause us to lose sight of 
what these allegedly diverse gender-signifying practices have in common that makes them masculinity” (Schrock 
and Schwalbe 2009: 281).   
3 For example, Carrigan, Connell, and Lee (1985); West and Zimmerman (1987). 
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Men’s violence, for example, has long served as an exercise of gender power and been motivated 
by a desire to establish or resist domination (Kaufman 2001).  In this way, violent acts constitute 
manhood acts.  Examining the aims of martyrdom may offer insights into the role of gender in 
prompting these acts, including the extent of embodiment (i.e., how male bodies serve as assets 
for committing martyrdom and signifying manhood) and degree of institutionalization (e.g. why 
martyrs are deemed heroes in Islamic movements and thus come to epitomize Muslim manhood).  
The framework put forth by Schrock and Schwalbe suggests that martyrdom in global jihad is 
rooted in the gender subjectivities of jihadists, and that delineating the expressed aims of these 
acts can clarify the apparent role of masculinity, and offer another way to conceptualize them.   
Martyrdom as Violent Self-Help 
Although scholars disagree about what motivates martyrdom, the above explanations all 
share the premise that these acts constitute a response to a grievance.  It is here that the work of 
sociologist Donald Black provides a conceptual bridge for further distinguishing such violence.  
Black (2004; 2000; 1998: 74; 1983) proposes that most violent acts4 are forms of self-help, 
which he defines as “the handling of a grievance by unilateral aggression.”  With respect to 
martyrdom, whether grievances are political, religious, or gender-based, they are handled with 
violence all the same.  According to Black (1998: 31), aggrieved individuals and groups use 
different types of self-help in “an effort to achieve compensation, or restitution, for a harm that 
has been done.”  The concept of self-help represents one way that conflicts are managed; other 
responses include avoidance (temporary or permanent curtailment of interaction), negotiation 
                                                          
4 According to Black (1998: 74-75), violent forms of self-help include “massive assaults resulting in numerous 
deaths…fighting, beating, and killing between family members, friends, acquaintances, ethnic groups, and nations.”  
Non-violent forms of self-help include “quick and simple gestures of disapproval, such as glares and frowns,” as 
well as gossip, taunting, and ridicule.  
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(working toward a mutual agreement), settlement by a third party (deferred decision), and 
toleration (inaction) (Chapter 5).  Violence is an extreme form of self-help and is more likely to 
arise in conflicts where the parties are unequal in terms of social status and/or are “uninclined or 
unable” to resolve their issues using laws (p. 3) [see Black (1998) for complete discussion of the 
social structure of self-help].  By contrast, avoidance and negotiation are more common among 
parties of equal status and similar access to legal recourse.5  This interesting take on self-help is 
applicable to martyrdom, delimiting these acts strictly in terms of grievances.   
This conceptual approach to self-help has been used to explain both collective and self-
inflicted violence (e.g., see Manning 2012; Cooney and Phillips 2002; Senechal de la Roche 
1996).  However, current applications of the concept do not focus on or appropriately address 
acts of martyrdom in Islam and cannot be readily extended.  For example, Black (2004: 15) 
defines the ideal type of terrorism, pure terrorism, as “self-help by organized civilians who 
covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians.” Although the definition of pure terrorism 
seems applicable to martyrdom in global jihad, conflating the two is problematic on both 
definitional and political grounds.  Martyrdom acts may involve the use of mass violence, but 
unlike pure terrorism they are often overt (e.g., pronounced publicly) and target both civilians 
and militaries (Aslan 2009; Hafez 2007; Riedel 2007; Hoffman and McCormick 2004).  Insofar 
as terrorism lies in “the eye of the beholder” (Turk 2004), defining martyrdom as a form of pure 
terrorism also reflects and serves the interests of targeted groups.  Similarly, Blackian scholars 
have classified suicide, the “self-application of lethal violence,” as an expression of grievances 
(Manning 2012: 208).  Using historical cases of suicide, Manning shows how some suicidal acts 
                                                          
5 This is thought to explain why violent self-help occurs more often in conflicts where avoidance and other types of 
conflict management are “difficult or impossible” (Black 1998: 82). 
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serve as a mode of social protest or moral punishment directed at another party.6  Acts of 
martyrdom in global jihad are also punitive and like suicide in other cases and contexts (e.g., 
Canetto and Cleary 2012; Fincham et al. 2011; Counts 1987), these acts are highly gendered.  
Such specifications of suicidal behavior suggest that martyrdom acts may be defined as a distinct 
form of self-help.   
While Black’s definition of self-help has the potential to inform our understanding of 
martyrdom, questions have also been raised about the theoretical framework, pure sociology,7 
within which this and other concepts have been formulated.  The crux of pure sociology since its 
inception nearly four decades ago has been the scientific distinction of sociology, particularly 
through efforts to “purify” the field of psychology (Black 2004; 1998; 1983; 1976).  According 
to Black and fellow scholars (e.g., Manning 2012; Campbell 2009, 2010; Cooney and Phillips 
2002), a purely sociological approach to the study of social behavior must focus on the behavior 
of social structures and not individuals or collectivities.  That is, sociologists should consciously 
ignore psychological factors, including people’s attitudes, intentions, and goals, because these 
data make sociological theories prone to subjectivity and undermine the discipline’s ability to 
explain and predict social phenomenon.  For instance, Black (2004: 15) contends that violence is 
“unpredictable and unexplainable only if we seek its origins in the characteristics of individuals 
(such as their beliefs or frustrations) or in the characteristics of societies, communities, or other 
collectivities (such as cultural values and level of inequality).”  Rather than the expressed aims of 
perpetrators, sociologists should concentrate on defining the behavior of violence itself (i.e., the 
location and direction of violence in social space).  By dismissing human thoughts, feelings, and 
                                                          
6 For example, in highly patriarchal societies, women have used suicide or the threat of suicide as a way of handling 
grievances against their husbands and for coercing them to change their behavior (Counts 1987).   
7 As a theoretical strategy, pure sociology attempts to explain and predict human behavior by examining its “social 
geometry,” or the location and direction of human relations in social space (Black (2004: 15; 1998; 1983). 
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intentions—the stuff of subjectivity—as extraneous to explanations of violence, Black’s pure 
sociology perspective suggests that neither the meanings jihadists’ attribute to martyrdom nor 
their subjective aims can be used to properly theorize these acts.   
Marshall (2008) and Turner (2008) have put forth critiques of pure sociology, including 
its lack of purported objectivity, empirical support, explanatory power, testability, and 
falsifiability as a scientific method.  While addressing these extensive criticisms is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, it is possible to parse and clarify two issues that pertain to the central focus 
of this study: (1) the role of subjectivity and (2) suitable empirical support.  First, the explicit 
disregard and implicit use of subjectivities in Black’s work renders his core concepts confusing 
and empirically problematic.  The term “self-help,” for instance, implies that the interpretations 
and intentions of actors influence how, when, where, and why they engage in violence in order to 
handle grievances.  In scrutinizing the aforementioned concept of pure terrorism, Marshall 
(2008: 220) asks: “Does the inclusion of self-help in the definition require one to ascertain the 
(subjective) motivations of terrorists in order to decide whether to include them?”  For Blackian 
scholars, the answer is no.  And yet research on jihadist groups has shown that subjectivities do 
matter for making sense of their choice and use of violence (Aslam 2012; Aslan 2009; 
Khosrokhavar 2009; Hafez 2007; Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005).  For example, through 
interviews with inmates accused of plotting terrorist acts, scholars found that feelings of shame, 
humiliation, and marginalization, along with perceptions of Western arrogance, were articulated 
motives for their activities (Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005).  The video testimonies of suicide 
bombers, including that of Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the four men who coordinated and 
carried out the 7/7 attacks in London, reveals how anger and indignation over the persecution of 
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Muslims also motivated them to carry out their missions (Aslan 2009: 51-52).  These cases 
indicate that the subjectivities of actors are indeed important for understanding martyrdom.   
Second, Black’s framework continues to lack adequate and appropriate empirical support.  
The problem lies with verifying concepts, like self-help, based on the data and methodological 
approach of pure sociology.  According to Marshall (2008: 219), the sampling frames for these 
studies are too large, consisting of the “totality of human history,” which leads to opportunistic 
and arbitrary selection of evidence.  The specific evidence used to support Black’s concepts and 
claims are therefore questionable.  For example, Black (2004: 16) never specifies the historical 
range or contexts involving pure terrorism and considers certain attacks (e.g., 9/11) to be a case 
of pure terrorism but not others (e.g., the Oklahoma City bombings) by simply distinguishing 
some as an attack on the state and not civilians.  In many cases, however, both civilians and state 
institutions are deliberately targeted (Hoffman and McCormick 2004).  Because of such dubious 
definitional criteria and problematic sampling frames, Blackian concepts remain “unvalidated 
and awkward” (Marshall 2008: 222), which cast doubts over their empirical status.  Based on 
their stance on subjectivity, Black and other pure sociologists also dismiss evidence that seems 
relevant to explaining the type and occurrence of violent acts, such as self-report data, while at 
the same time inferring from them to construct pure sociology concepts.  Self-help, for instance, 
suggests that actors consciously direct actions in order to bring about “some more satisfactory 
state” (p. 226).  Support for this concept presupposes evidence of the interpretive processes 
through which actors identify and attempt to achieve desired goals—precisely the evidence that 
pure sociologists reject.  So, while the concept of self-help may develop our understanding of 
martyrdom, it lacks the right kind of evidence.  Analyzing the social meanings that jihadists 
attribute to martyrdom acts, along with the taken-for-granted role of gender, may address these 
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shortcomings and criticisms.  In order to capture and assess these meanings, I turn to the framing 
perspective in social movements. 
Framing Acts of Martyrdom 
How jihadists make sense of, or frame, martyrdom is one indication of their subjective 
aims.  Frames refer to “schemata of interpretation” that people use to define social situations and 
occurrences (Goffman (1974: 21).  This concept has been elaborated by social movements 
scholars to mean discourses that define issues, events, activities and other phenomena in the 
social world by locating them in a larger system of meaning (Snow and Byrd 2010; Snow 2004; 
Benford and Snow 2000; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 
1986; Snow 1986).  In practical terms, frames enable people to “interpret their experiences, 
identify the source of their problems, and develop a response to those problems” (Fitzgerald 
2009: 185).  For instance, following 9/11 attacks, U.S. leaders used an “injustice” frame in order 
to mobilize the American public in support of preemptive military actions abroad and acceptance 
of new surveillance and security measures at home (Entman 2003).  In practice, framing is used 
by people to “construct, negotiate, and redefine meanings about a problem” (Coe 2011: 296; 
Snow and Benford 1988: 198).  The framing of 9/11 involved media and policy discourses that 
defined the event as a watershed moment that ushered in a new era with new enemies, hence the 
U.S. “War on Terror.”  So, framing is “meaning work”8 that groups draw on to “legitimize and 
motivate collective action” (Benford and Snow 2000: 613).  The concepts of frame and framing 
can help us to better understand acts of martyrdom in the context of global jihad by directing 
                                                          
8Benford and Snow (2000: 613) define “meaning work” as “the struggle over the production of mobilizing and 
countermobilizing ideas and meanings.” 
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analytic attention toward the discursive processes through which such violence is interpreted, 
endorsed, and perpetuated.   
Examining the ways in which martyrdom is framed by jihadists sheds light on what these 
acts signify, and yet relatively few studies have specifically examined the framing activities of 
jihadists themselves (Snow and Byrd 2010; Aslan 2009; Hafez 2007; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 
2003).  Among these, Snow and Byrd (2010: 131) analyzed the framing activities of al-Qa’ida 
and other Islamic extremist groups and found differences in the ideological basis for martyrdom.  
Their analysis indicated that these acts are “nurtured and developed” through social movement 
activities in which framing processes are central.9  Because suicide is considered haraam 
(forbidden in Islam), these movements conjure images of the shahid (martyr), characterized by 
his commitment and self-sacrifice, in order to frame suicide attacks as martyrdom acts.  
Similarly, in examining the framing of martyrdom operations during the Iraqi insurgency, Hafez 
(2007: 95) found that jihadists used emotional narratives to “mythologize martyrdom” by casting 
suicide bombers as “heroic martyrs.”  Still, many of these studies have failed to theorize this 
violence and determine, at least directly, how masculinity is involved in the framing process.10  I 
build on these gaps in the literature by examining how martyrdom acts are framed by jihadists 
and what role gender plays in this process.  
This research thus stands to make a few modest empirical and conceptual contributions to 
the sociological literature on gender and violence.  First, by making masculinity visible as a key 
aspect of martyrdom in global jihad, this study further illustrates the link between gender identity 
                                                          
9 Snow and Byrd (2010) analyzed and differentiated the core framing tasks (e.g., diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing) as well as the processes of frame articulation and elaboration to make the claim that “Islamic 
terrorist movements” are not ideologically “monolithic.” 
10 While Hafez (2007) notes that “appeals to manhood” inform a range of issues and motivations jihadists use to 
frame martyrdom, he does not explain how or in what ways.   
24 
 
and violent behavior, especially how men’s subjectivities are conditioned by the framing of this 
behavior.  Second, using a gender lens to delineate the frames used to define martyrdom can help 
illustrate the degree to which these acts constitute “manhood acts” and signify possession of a 
masculine self (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009).  Examining martyrdom via the expressed motives 
and aims of jihadists may also address criticisms of Blackian concepts, like self-help, particularly 
the exclusion of human subjectivities and lack of empirical support.  With these contributions in 
mind, I now present the data and methodological approach taken to do so.  
DATA & METHODS 
Jihadists (mujahedin11) are the self-proclaimed true believers and self-identifying holy 
warriors of Islam.  They are members of a multifaceted militant Islamic movements that espouse 
visions of global transformation and encourages violence as a means of advancing their interests 
(Gerges 2009; Aslan 2009; McCants 2015).  In particular, jihadists exhibit a “zealous devotion to 
the glories of martyrdom” (Aslan 2009: 7) as evidenced by the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the 7/7 
suicide bombings in London, the near daily suicide attacks during the Iraq War and in its wake, 
and, most recently, the November 10th attacks on Paris by ISIS members.  Given their grandiose 
goals and signature use of martyrdom operations, jihadists have been described as “heavy metal 
Muslims” (Roy and Boubekeur 2012) waging a “cosmic war” against infidels and other non-
believers (Aslan 2009).  Despite the apparent successes of the U.S.-led War on Terror, their 
movement activities continue, as does their membership, numbering in the millions (McCants 
2015; Gerges 2006).  In contrast to Islamist groups whose suicide missions have been confined 
to local and regional conflicts, jihadists have expanded the scope of violence to over twenty-two 
                                                          
11 “Mujahedin” literally refers to “those who wage jihad” (Aslan 2006: 271). 
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countries around the world (Roy and Boubekeur 2012; Aslan 2009; Gerges 2009; Sageman 
2008).  Because of jihadists, martyrdom acts have gone global.   
In order to delineate the subjective meanings and aims of martyrdom in militant jihad, I 
coded and analyzed data from the compendium, In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad (Aaron 
2008).  According to the editor, this compendium is intended to provide students and researchers 
with “unfiltered access to a broad range of the stories, rationales, ideas, and arguments” of global 
jihad—as expressed by jihadists themselves (Aaron 2008: iii).  This text contains more than 300 
direct quotations and statements from contemporary leaders (e.g., Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Musab al-Zarqawi), prominent historical figures (e.g., Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Faraj) 
and rank-and-file members of the movement, some of whom successfully carried out suicide 
attacks (e.g., Mohammad Sidique Khan, Ali Hussein al-Samari).  The quotes were derived from 
a number of different sources, including books, articles, interviews, and web postings, and were 
translated from Arabic to English.  The decision to analyze martyrdom frames using these data 
was straightforward given the central and increasing role of such violence in jihadist movements 
(Aslam 2012; Aslan 2009; Hafez 2007; Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005: Chapter 3).  Compared 
with other texts that have documented the biographies and goals of jihadists (e.g., Hafez 2007; 
Sageman 2008), the RAND compendium offered a significantly broader set of accounts about 
the ideological basis for and use of violence, and, in doing so, minimized cherry-picking and 
other potential biases (a more detailed discussion of bias is included in the Conclusion chapter).  
Considering the challenges and dangers12 associated with obtaining information on jihadist 
                                                          
12 Aaron (2008: xi) notes that locating and accessing jihadist internet web sites is difficult in large part because these 
sites” come and go, closed down by various authorities or abandoned by their creators, who may switch to password 
protected sites” (pp. xi-xii).  The authors also “regularly move sites to avoid attracting the attention of hackers and 
internet service providers” (p. xii). 
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networks, for researchers and lay inquirers alike, this text also served as a unique and secure 
source of data on movement activities.   
Analytic Technique 
My analysis of the data was guided by three interrelated questions.  How do jihadists 
frame martyrdom acts?  What do these frames reveal about the meaning of martyrdom and mass 
violence in global jihad?  What do these meanings indicate about the impetus for these acts in 
social movements more generally?  Given the focus on framing and meaning construction in this 
research, I used Grounded Theory (GT) methods to analyze the data.13  This methodological 
approach is particularly useful in examining subjectivities using extant texts (Charmaz 2006: 35-
36).  So, the meanings of martyrdom were “grounded” in the data.  I situated the data, source, 
and my research approach within the sociopolitical and cultural context of the study.  I also took 
a constructivist stance governed by the notion that social reality is “pluralistic, interpretive, open-
ended, and contextualized” (Creswell and Miller 2000: 125).  For instance, even as these data 
were packaged and presented as jihadi views on “virtually every subject relevant to their cause,” 
and in their “actual words” (Aaron 2008: iii), I maintained a critical approach toward the content 
and structure of the text, including which actors and what types of statements were included (or 
excluded), and the extent to which the text reflected or perpetuated prevailing discourses on 
terrorism and Islamic extremism in Western societies.  In adopting this method, I regarded both 
the data and my analysis as products of subjective reality—i.e., recognizing that the data and my 
reading of it were shaped by both the editor’s assumptions and interests, as well as my standpoint 
                                                          
13 By GT methods, I refer to research that “focuses on creating conceptual frameworks or theories through building 
inductive analysis from the data” (Charmaz 2006: 187).  Scholars have long used GT methods to develop theories of 
social processes, beginning with empirical observations (Charmaz 2009; DeVault and McCoy 2003; Strauss 1995; 
Guba and Lincoln 1994; Glaser 1978; Glaser and Strauss 1967).   
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as a researcher.  Therefore, my goal was not to conjure an objective “Truth” about martyrdom in 
global jihad but rather to identify and offer a way of conceptualizing these acts. 
I analyzed the data by coding, organizing, and comparing statements on martyrdom acts, 
developing categories to represent these statements, and sorting the main categories into frames.  
I coded the raw data in stages: initial, focused, and theoretical coding.  During initial coding, I 
studied and named each quotation in the text by coding the data line-by-line (Charmaz 2006: 50-
53) and created open codes in order to capture and condense the substance of each quote.  While 
only a few sections of the compendium were dedicated exclusively to martyrdom operations and 
suicide attacks, I found that references to martyrs and martyrdom acts permeated the data—there 
were over one hundred fifty direct mentions and many that indirectly eluded to them.  Using the 
qualitative analysis software N-vivo (9.0), I defined, sorted, cataloged, grouped the open codes 
together into categories (called “nodes” in N-vivo) in order to identify and clarify patterns in the 
data (Dahlgren, Emmelin, and Winkvist 2004).  I then used comparative methods to evaluate the 
initial codes, spot similarities and differences among them, and to delineate categories and 
subcategories.  Among the most salient categories I defined during this stage were: moralistic, 
obligatory, defensive, honorable, restorative, agentic, altruistic, and heroic.   
In focused coding, I refined and specified the above categories to develop an analytic 
frame for the data.  Drawing on Benford and Snow’s (2000) typology of core framing tasks,14 I 
distinguished the framing processes through which jihadists’ viewed martyrdom.  In comparing 
these framing tasks, I discovered that acts of martyrdom and mass violence were most often 
                                                          
14 Benford and Snow’s (2000: 616) typology of core framing tasks consist of: diagnostic framing, which creates a 
shared understanding of a problematic condition and identifies the source of the condition, often by attributing 
blame or responsibility to a specific actor or set of actors; prognostic framing, which outlines a “plan of attack” for 
resolving the issue; and the likely consequences; and motivational framing or “a call to arms” (p. 617), which is used 
to inspire movement members to act and to legitimate the proposed action.  
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framed in motivational terms, “to inspire movement members to act and to legitimate the 
proposed action” (p. 617).  I also determined that jihadists engaged in both “internal framing” 
(Coe 2011: 501), or framing martyrdom through communications with one another, and framing 
geared toward outsiders—e.g., potential followers and perceived enemies of their movement.  
During this stage, I revisited and reassessed the initial codes, removing those that were irrelevant 
or tangentially related to this motivational framing process, and searched back through the data 
for disconfirming evidence, such as inconsistencies among the prospective frames (Charmaz 
2006; Dahlgren et al. 2004; Cresswell and Miller 2000: 127).  Through this focused coding, I 
delineated the main motivational frames for martyrdom as self-defense, restorative rituals, and 
honor displays—frames which I detail in the findings below.   
In the final stage, I examined the interconnections among the main frames so as to move 
the analysis toward a theoretical explanation (Glaser 1978: 72).  In relating these frames to one 
another on an abstract level, I discovered that, on the one hand, martyrdom acts were defined as a 
legitimate response to jihadist grievances, consistent with Black’s (1998: 74) definition of self-
help, and, on the other hand, the expressed aims of these acts reflected Schrock and Schwalbe’s 
(2009: 281) conceptualization of manhood acts.  By elaborating the focused codes in theoretical 
terms, I determined that the concepts of self-help and manhood acts were apparent in the frames.  
Thus, I was able distinguish, build, and posit an emergent theory of martyrdom and masculinity.  
In the next section, I present the main martyrdom frames as findings and illustrate the ways in 
which these frames are indicative of masculine self-help. 
CONSTRUCTING MARTYRDOM FRAMES 
In analyzing the statements of jihadists, I found that martyrdom acts were framed as self-
defense, restorative rituals, and honor displays.  These frames were “motivational” insofar as 
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they served as a “call to arms” and a “rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action” 
(Benford and Snow 2000: 617).  First, jihadists framed martyrdom as a form of self-defense—
defending Islam and the ummah from outsiders, including foreign militaries, autocratic regimes, 
and rival sects.  Second, they framed martyrdom as restorative rituals—necessary for purging 
perceived enemies, restoring Islamic hegemony, and paving the way for the caliphate.  Lastly, 
these acts were articulated as honor displays—as ways of preserving one’s dignity, redressing 
humiliations experienced by Muslim people, and delivering justice on behalf of Allah.  In their 
view, various outsiders have instigated a global war on Islam that has destroyed and devastated 
Muslim communities, and subverted Islamic ways of life.  This conflict cannot be resolved using 
non-violence (e.g., through physical separation or diplomatic agreements that entrust foreign and 
local governments).  In this context, jihadists framed so-called “martyrdom operations” as divine 
retribution.  Such violence enabled them to resist domination and exploitation, “re”establish 
certain privileges, and elicit deference from others by claiming exclusive identities as martyrs of 
Islam.  In the words of Omar Bakr Mohammad, a jihadi cleric who endorsed the July 7th 2005 
suicide bombings in London: “the self-sacrifice operation is the only way of life for those who 
resist” (Aaron 2008: 82).  Although their statements often reflected some combination of these 
frames, I discuss them separately in order to show how each constructs martyrdom as a gender-
signifying form of self-help. 
Self-Defense 
One way jihadists framed martyrdom acts were as self-defense against threats to Islam 
and the ummah posed by outsiders, including infidels and Zionists (kuffar), apostates (murtad), 
heretics (fasiqun).   These “sources(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents” (Benford and 
Snow 2000: 616) were deemed responsible for the deaths and suffering of countless Muslims 
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around the world, the theft of oil and other wealth generating resources from Muslim territories, 
and the purposeful violation of Islamic social life.  For jihadists, the power and pervasiveness of 
outside forces, and the defenselessness of many Muslim communities precluded non-violent 
remedies.  The only way to resolve this ongoing conflict is through collective action that resists 
and repels those forces from the Muslim world.  And so, they defined martyrdom acts in part as a 
valid response to an immediate threat or “self-defense.”  These acts enabled Muslims to defend 
their communities, their religion, and themselves from annihilation.  This self-defense frame is 
evident in the following quote by Abu Hajer, an al-Qa’ida operative and former editor of the 
jihadist training publication Sword of Prophets:  
We have not conducted a single offensive operation; all operations that 
have taken place have been defensive operations. On the contrary, you 
will find that the brothers try as much as possible to avoid confronting 
the army and security forces. However, the government is escalating 
its war, and is trying to remove me and you and all Islamists…I have  
taken upon myself an oath to purify the Arabian Peninsula from polytheists.  
We were born in and saw the light in this country, so we will fight the  
Crusaders and the Jews in it until we have repelled them or we are martyred 
(Aaron 2008: 182). 
 
Martyrdom operations are framed here as “defensive,” a mode of resistance against the 
ongoing victimization of Muslims by foreign nations-states and their militaries.  In other words, 
these operations are necessary for survival.  According to Hajer, al-Qa’ida has actually tried to 
avoid violent confrontations with outside forces (identified here as “Crusaders” and “Jews”) that 
are “trying to remove” (i.e., kill) him and other true believers.  The apparent inability to defend 
the ummah and Muslim lands using non-violent methods has compelled them to fight back and 
be “martyred.”  Even though the vast majority of Islamic scholars forbid violence (Aslam 2012: 
108), it remains permissible for Muslim men “if he is attacked, [and] he has no alternative but to 
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fully defend himself.”15  Moreover, the prohibition of all but defensive wars is considered one of 
the “most important innovations of the doctrine of jihad” (Aslan 2005: 84) and a major rationale 
for violent action.  In this way, the cover of self-defense in Islam was used to justify martyrdom 
operations and to exonerate those that carried them out.  The framing of this violence as self-
defense was also consistent with one of the main and distinct aims of manhood acts: “resistance 
to domination and exploitation” (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009: 281).  Through martyrdom, these 
aggrieved men could assert their will and abilities to resist threats posed by outsiders, and, in so 
doing, defend and signify their manhood. 
In an interview aired on Al-Jazeera following the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden drew a 
similar connection between martyrdom acts and self-defense:  
They did this [the 9/11 hijackers]…as a matter of self-defense, in 
defense of our brothers and sons in Palestine, and to liberate our sacred 
religious sites/things. If inciting people to do that is terrorism, and if 
killing those who kill our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness 
that we are terrorists…the truth [is] that we are not terrorists as they  
understand it but (acting in self-defense) because we are being attacked  
in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, the Philippines  
and everywhere else (Aaron 2008: 86). 
 
Bin Laden points to a number of Muslim-majority countries beset by conflict and foreign 
occupation to make the case that Muslim people “everywhere” are “being attacked” by outsiders.  
The attacks on New York and Washington were thus framed as moralistic violence “in defense” 
of Muslims in conflict zones and “to liberate” sacred Muslim spaces.  Such statements vindicated 
the 9/11 hijackers, defining these nineteen men as martyrs who sacrificed themselves to defend 
the ummah.  This framing strategy served as a way of countering the “terrorism” frame invoked 
by Western governments to define the events of 9/11 (Entman 2003).  Such quotes also revealed 
                                                          
15 Qur’an 5:2. 
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the jihadi belief that avoiding, tolerating, or negotiating with offending groups was futile.  Only 
through militant jihad could they effectively resist.  Irrespective of being “central to the notion of 
male honor” in Muslim cultures (Aslam 2012: 211), violence as revenge is sanctioned in Islam 
for “victims of violence” and “on the principle of justice” (p. 104).  For jihadists, these acts were 
a form of divine retribution doled out by holy warriors.  Their justifications further revealed that 
martyrdom acts were seen as a way to resist domination by demonstrating the abilities of Muslim 
men to reciprocate violence—i.e., to fight fire with fire.      
The framing of martyrdom acts as self-defense also involved expanding the category of 
combatants to include civilians.  Jihadists often argued that those who are presumably innocent 
in the conflict (e.g., civilians) were in fact complicit in the war on Islam and therefore subject to 
violent sanctions.  In order to remove the Islamic injunction on killing innocent people, they 
problematized the definitions of “innocent” and “civilian” in jihad.  For instance, Ahmed Ismail 
Yassin claimed that, “Islamic history has no term for ‘civilian’ in the Western sense.  In our 
Islamic rules of war…a person can be a combatant even if he does not carry a weapon” (Aaron 
2008: 105-06).  Considering that this distinction goes against the early doctrine of jihad put forth 
by the Prophet Muhammad (Aslan 2006: 84), these men focused on ayas (verses in the Qur’an) 
that dismissed it in their cases.  By rejecting the notion of innocents (i.e., you are either a 
defender or an enemy of Islam) such views were used to frame sensational acts of mass violence 
as martyrdom.  For example, on November 9th 2005, suicide bombers hit three hotels in Amman, 
Jordan, one of which was host to a wedding reception that killed over sixty women and children, 
and wounded hundreds of others.  The orchestrator of the suicide attacks, al-Qa’ida operative 




After the blessed attack conducted by the heroes of the nation, the 
lions of the al-Barra’ bin-Malik Brigade, against some of the dens of 
evil in Amman, we committed to explain to Muslims some of the reasons 
the jihad fighters targeted these dens, so that all may know that 
we did not target [the dens] until after we had determined that they 
were centers for waging war against Islam and for supporting the  
Crusader’s presence in Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula, and  
supporting the presence of the Jews in Palestine (Aaron 2008: 228-29). 
 
The claim here was that the hotels were targeted by the al-Barra’ bin-Malik Brigade16 
after they were “determined” to be “centers for waging war against Islam.”17 In other words, 
these suicide attacks were deemed a defensive measure.  In particular, al-Zarqawi accused the 
hotels or “dens of evil” of “supporting the presence” of “Crusader’s” (i.e., Western forces) in 
Muslim territories.  Since they cannot unilaterally withdraw from, mutually settle, or further 
tolerate conflicts with these foreign occupiers, and considering the complicit role of local actors, 
jihadists were forced to defend Islam and the ummah by any means necessary.  In framing acts of 
such violence in terms of self-defense, jihadists attempted to dispel any and all reservations over 
the killing of civilians,18 especially among followers and potential recruits.  What is more, the 
suicide bombers were deemed “heroes of the nation,” worthy of praise and adulation.  In keeping 
with the legacy and fraternity of Muslim martyrs before them, those who successfully carried out 
the mission were cast as symbols of resistance, defiance, heroism, and deserving of “high social 
prestige” (Rohde 2008).  While depictions of martyrs as saint-like figures in Islam has been well 
documented by scholars (Khosrokhavar and Macey 2007; Hafez 2007; Bloom 2006; Gerami 
2005; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003), accounts like that of al-Zarqawi further indicated that 
                                                          
16 Hafez (2007: 98) describes the al-Barra bin Malik Brigade as “al-Qaeda’s suicide bombing squad.”  
17 According to Aaron (2008: 228), the hotels were host to groups that militant jihadists have accused of conspiring 
in the invasion of Iraq, including “foreign military contractors, oil executives, government diplomats, and Western 
journalists.”   
18 While not all jihadists agreed with the killing of civilians, especially other Muslims, their framing of martyrdom 




their actions “elicit deference from others,” another objective of manhood acts (Schrock and 
Schwalbe 2009: 281).  That is, by sacrificing their lives in this way, militant jihadists could claim 
exclusive identities as “heroic martyrs” (Hafez 2007: 95) and, in the process, convince others of 
their manhood—points which I discuss below.   
Restorative Rituals 
 
Martyrdom acts were also framed as necessary rituals for restoring Islamic hegemony. 
According to jihadists, the plight of Muslims stems in large part from the decline of Islam as a 
dominant, or hegemonic, system of social relations.  Though this decline was attributed to a long 
and, at times, random list of outside forces, their statements consistently identified infidels, 
apostates, and heretics as the main obstacles to a unified Islamic nation.  In their view, the only 
way to restore Islam and “regain its lost glory” is by purging these enemies from Muslim lands, 
and reinstalling the “fallen caliphate” (Aaron 2008: 112).  According to jihadi leaders, Muslims 
could not avoid or negotiate with infidels given the latter’s economic interests (read: oil) and 
military actions in the Muslim world (read: Iraq and Afghanistan), nor could they continue to 
tolerate the deviant conduct of apostates and heretics given the degree to which true Islam has 
been undermined.  Here again, martyrdom operations were framed in terms of the perceived 
inefficacy of non-violent methods for handling grievances.  More specifically, such violence was 
framed as rituals that purified the ummah and paved the way for the caliphate.19  For instance, in 
a letter to followers, Musab al-Zarqawi claimed that:  
…the tree of triumph and empowerment cannot grow tall and  
lofty without blood and defiance of death, that the [Islamic] nation  
cannot live without the aroma of martyrdom and the perfume of fragrant  
blood spilled on behalf of God, and that people cannot awaken from their  
stupor unless talk of martyrdom and martyrs fills their days and nights 
                                                          
19 The Islamic Caliphate refers to “the political office of the head of Islam, established with the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 c.e. and abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924” (Aslan 2009: 7).  
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(Aaron 2008: 235).   
 
Such evocative language was often used to frame martyrdom as “ritual or ceremonial 
acts” (Aslan 2009: 102) for resurrecting the caliphate.  Similarly, in a 2002 web post, Abu Sa’d 
al-Amili links suicide attacks to the larger goal of Islamic nationhood:  
The raid [9/11] was purely religious in nature.  The mujahadin’s  
[jihadist’s] stated aims were to strike the enemy in order to expel  
him from the Arab Peninsula in keeping with the prophet’s order:  
Expel the polytheists from the Arab Peninsula.’  This slogan had 
been forgotten, but it calls for the unification of all the scattered  
Muslims and mujhadin to restore the caliphate and reunite the  
community (Aaron 2008: 219).  
 
The 9/11 attacks were motivated not only by the need to “expel” Western forces from 
Muslim territories but also for the purpose of restoring the caliphate and reuniting the ummah.  
These acts thus served as restorative rituals that fulfilled “the Prophet’s order” to rid Muslim 
territories of perceived enemies and establish an Islamic state.  Although the basis for the “raid” 
is defined above as “purely religious,” the statement as a whole indicates that such violence was 
a response to grievances over foreign occupation and, as argued by Pape and Feldman (2010: 
175-76), “unjust interferences in and control over the affairs of Muslim countries.”  In linking 
the impetus for the 9/11 attacks to the glory and revival of the caliphate, jihadists also reminded 
Muslim men of their lost power, place, and positions in society.  Much like the motive for men’s 
violence in other cultural contexts (Kaufman 2001: 40), these acts also displayed the desire to 
reclaim a “rich set of privileges” and were an assertion of patriarchal power.  As well as resisting 
domination, then, these acts were also cast in terms of claiming privileges, yet another aim of 
manhood acts (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009: 281).   
In framing martyrdom acts as restorative rituals, jihadists often distinguished between 
“near” and “far” enemies, and invoked the Islamic practice of takfir to interpret their violence.  
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First, consistent with previous research on militant jihadism (Gerges 2009; Aslan 2009), their 
statements defined the far enemies as forces outside the Muslim world that represent a threat to 
Islamic ways of life (e.g., Zionism, global capitalism, military imperialism, modernization, and 
secularization linked to “the West”).  In contrast, the near enemies were identified as hypocritical 
Muslims and apostates—i.e., the enemies within (Riedel 2007).  These near enemies included 
autocratic and allegedly corrupt Muslim governments, as well as heretical sects (e.g., Shi’ism).  
They blamed these enemies for undermining Islamic hegemony in part by facilitating the foreign 
invasion and resource divestment of Muslim lands.  In their words, apostate regimes “obey the 
United States” (Aaron 2008: 174) by expediting the expropriation of oil from Muslim territories, 
which they described as “the greatest theft in the history of humanity” (p. 204).  Control of oil 
and other forms of wealth was a recurring theme, and key motive for violent jihad.  The only 
way to “rule ourselves,” and regain “control [over] our own wealth” (p. 110), they argued, was 
through eliminating the near and far enemies of Islam, and reestablishing the caliphate.  Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qa’ida, maintained:  
Without achieving this goal, our actions will mean nothing more  
than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired  
goal, which is the restoration of the caliphate and the dismissal of the  
invaders from the land of Islam.  This goal must remain the basic  
objective of [global jihad], regardless of the sacrifices (Aaron 2008: 111).   
 
Such statements indicated that militant jihad was also a response to grievances over 
economic exploitation and lost lands.  In order to right this wrong, the men of jihad must be 
willing to sacrifice themselves as martyrs.   
Second, their statements linked martyrdom to takfir, an Islamic edict that “places the 
authority [for violent sanctions] in the hands of individual believers, allowing them simply to 
declare Muslim enemies as ‘unbeliever,’ thereby avoiding any religious prohibitions against 
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shedding Muslim blood” (Aslan 2009: 104).  Takfir is to martyrdom what conviction is to state 
execution: it authorizes the aggrieved parties (jihadists) to use law (their interpretation of the 
Sharia) to justify the punishment (death).  While there was some debate among jihadi leaders and 
rank-and-file members as to which enemies should be targeted, most agreed that both stood in 
their way and were subject to takfir.  For example, in a 2004 communique, al-Qa’ida member 
Faris al-Zahrani argued:  
The rulers of the countries of Islam in this age are all apostate,  
unbelieving tyrants who have departed in every way from Islam.   
Muslims who proclaim God’s unity have no other choice than iron  
and fire, jihad in the way of God, to restore the caliphate according  
to the Prophet’s teachings (Aaron 2008: 173).   
 
Here, martyrdom and jihad are defined as necessary measures for overcoming the deviant 
rule of local leaders and resurrecting the caliphate.  In other words, these acts were viewed as a 
form of de facto excommunication whereby the punishment of alleged apostates is placed in the 
hands of individual believers.  The claim that they had “no other choice than iron and fire” (i.e., 
holy war) to resolve grievances was, in effect, a rejection of others forms of conflict resolution 
and indicative of self-help (Black 1998).  In order to restore the caliphate and their former status 
and privileges, they argued, Muslim men must accept roles as heroic martyrs and wage violent 
jihad against these near enemies.   
In addition to infidels and apostates, martyrdom acts were framed as ways of handling 
grievances against heretics.20  Again, jihadists are Sunni Muslims that espouse a radical militant 
interpretation of Islam that guides their choice and use of violence.  Specifically, their statements 
denounced Shi’a Islam for being a heretical sect and pointed to historical conflicts with Shi’a 
Muslims as a major hindrance to restoring the caliphate and reunifying the ummah.  As evidence 
                                                          
20 Unlike apostates who have rejected Islam, heretics were considered to be imposters whose actions violate Islamic 
codes and values (Aaron 2008: 6). 
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of Shi’a “treachery” and “betrayal,” jihadists accused Shi’a Muslims of colluding with outsiders 
in oppressing Sunnis (Aaron 2008: 239-244) and encouraged the targeting of Shi’a communities 
with suicide attacks.21  For example, Musab al-Zarqawi argued that “The danger from the Shi’a, 
however, is greater and their damage is worse and more destructive to the [Islamic] nation than 
the Americans…” and therefore jihadists must “strike the religious, military, and other cadres 
among the Shi’a with blow after blow until they bend to the Sunnis” (Aaron 2008: 239-242).  
The labeling of these near enemies as traitors and cowards also illustrated the problematizing of 
neighboring masculinities, an impetus for violence in such “movements of restoration” (Kimmel 
2005).  Although some expressed reservation over the targeting of other Muslims,22  most were 
in agreement that Shi’ism, along with Sufism and other traditions in Islam, represented a threat 
to their rule and that violent confrontation with followers of these traditions was inevitable.  
Honor Displays 
Yet another way that jihadists framed martyrdom acts were as symbolic and embodied 
displays of honor.  In their view, outside actors have not only subverted Islam and endangered 
the ummah, but in the course of perpetrating these “crimes” (Aaron 2008: 127) they have also 
humiliated Muslim people.  The need to secure Muslim honor (ard) was articulated by jihadists 
as another motive for martyrdom.  They drew on passages from the Qur’an, Hadith,23 as well as 
the writings of Salafi scholars to frame these acts as a revered way of redressing humiliations, 
                                                          
21 Such views were especially visible during the Iraq insurgency, wherein “the most gruesome suicide attacks” were 
directed at Shi’a civilians (Hafez 2007: 97).   
22 Jihadist Isam al-Barqawi, argues that “the number of Iraqis killed in suicide operations has become a tragedy for 
Iraq’s people…the mujahideen (holy fighters) must revise their tactics and I must stress that I have reservations 
about these actions” (Aaron 2008: 243).   
23 The Hadith are stories, statements, and anecdotes of the Prophet Muhammad that are often used for understanding 
Islamic laws (Aslan 2006). 
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salvaging reputations, delivering divine justice, and reaping eternal rewards.24  Not surprisingly, 
this framing process involved more explicit appeals to Muslim men and manhood.  For example, 
in an official statement after 9/11, al-Qa’ida called on the “sons of Islam” and the “men of 
belief” to “recall those who followed the path of jihad and martyrdom: the path of glory, and not 
humiliation; of pride, and not subjection; or paradise, and not of hell” and conduct similar 
operations (Aaron 2008: 237).  In call-response fashion, these grievances were also voiced by 
jihadists who went on to successfully carry out suicide attacks.  This is evident in the following 
communique by 7/7 suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan: 
…the path of jihad and the desire for martyrdom is imbedded in  
the holy prophet and his beloved companions.  By preparing  
ourselves for this kind of work, we are guaranteeing ourselves  
for paradise and gaining the pleasure of Allah.  And by turning  
our back on this work, we are guaranteeing ourselves humiliation  
and the anger of Allah.  Jihad is an obligation on every single  
one of us (Aaron 2008: 83).  
 
The message is unequivocal: Muslims who embrace their role as martyrs are rewarded 
with the “pleasure of Allah” and guaranteed entry into “paradise,” while those who turn away 
from this duty are guaranteed “humiliation” and Allah’s wrath.  That is, martyrs were devout 
Muslims that received divine rewards by preventing certain indignities at the hands of outsiders.  
Redressing humiliation has been recognized as a basis for joining jihadist groups (Khosrokhvar 
and Macey 2005: Chapter 3) and a theme “at the heart of mobilizing narratives” for suicide 
attacks (Hafez 2007: 99).  In this sense, martyrdom was framed as both a means and an end for 
preserving ard.  Claims that “the desire for martyrdom is imbedded in the holy prophet and his 
beloved companions” also illustrated how these acts were defined as manhood acts in Islam.  As 
                                                          
24 The rewards were articulated as posthumous fame, glory, and esteem in the eyes of the Ummah, sexual prospects 
in the afterlife (e.g., the proverbial seventy-two black-eyed virgins), and other kinds of androcentric catharsis.   
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martyrs, men like Sidique Khan joined the ranks of exemplary Muslims, above all the Prophet 
Mohammad.  In this sense, martyrdom was a form of identity work through which jihadists 
signified masculinity and claimed membership as “true men of Islam” (Aslam 2012: 119).  
Jihadists also framed martyrdom acts as honor displays by directly questioning the faith 
and fortitude of Muslim men.  For instance, in a 2005 video directed at potential recruits, an al-
Qa’ida spokesperson asked, “Where are those desiring martyrdom, seeking to become near the 
Prophet and to please the Merciful? Where are the lovers of martyrdom?” (Aaron 2008: 237).  
As well, in a response to Muslims that expressed opposition to suicide attacks in Iraq, Musab al-
Zarqawi asks:  
Has the dignity of your women become so slight?...Many of your  
pure and spotless sisters in the Sunni Community of Tel’Afur were  
violated, their chastity slaughtered and their wombs filled with the  
sperm of the Crusaders and their brothers the hateful Rafidites?!25 
Where is your religion? And where [is] your chivalry, your ardor,  
your manliness? (Aaron 2008: 246).   
 
Each line of questioning provides a window into the subjective meanings and aims of 
martyrdom in militant jihad and how they reflect the centrality of men’s honor.  Not only were 
these acts framed as a way for these men to defend their honor (especially that of their women), 
but also to affirm their virility and display their “chivalry” and “manliness.”  The suggestion of 
rape as a “weapon of war” (Aslam 2012: 132) and the undeniable shame it brings on them and 
the ummah also illustrated how honor was used to motivate martyrdom acts, after all, “rape is a 
collective dishonor” (p. 134).  The line of questioning also coincides with claims that movements 
like al-Qa’ida use masculinity as symbolic capital by eliciting men’s honor and threats of 
emasculation as “rhetorical devices” to motivate “similarly situated” men to join the movement 
                                                          
25 According to Aaron (2008: 246), “Rafidites” refer to “Shi’ites.” 
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and conduct martyrdom operations (Kimmel’s (2005: 416).  In other words, martyrdom signifies 
masculinity in Islam and failure to take such action when necessary “raises questions about one’s 
nobility and sense of manhood” (Hafez (2007: 101).  Such questions presented the threat of 
dishonor as Casus belli, a basis for violence, and cast martyrdom as “quintessentially masculine” 
(Aslam 2012: 96), the moral duty of Muslim men.26  The significance of Muslim honor as a 
motivational frame is further evidenced by a 2003 web post by Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, entitled 
“Iraq Must Establish a Suicide Army.”  
In order to defend the homeland from the terrorist Crusader attack, 
there is a need for people who yearn for Paradise, and the shortest way 
to Paradise is death for [the sake of] Allah. Some of us should see the 
joyful and satisfied faces of the mothers in Iraq when they part from 
the fruit of their loins, who go off to the realms of honor, the realms 
of martyrdom. This is so that the enemy of the nation knows that 
safeguarding honor and the homeland is dearer than life, and that our 
mothers in Iraq, like our mothers in Palestine, [are willing] to sacrifice 
the fruit of their loins–but not their honor (Aaron 2008: 89). 
 
Given the extent to which Muslim societies have been besieged by “the terrorist Crusader 
attack,” defending Islamic spaces and honor rests on the shoulders of martyrs—i.e., those “who 
yearn for Paradise.”  Here, martyrdom was framed as a way of exhibiting and protecting honor, 
especially of those in conflict zones, like Iraq and Palestine, as well as a direct path to and place 
in the afterlife.  Such statements illustrated how, in the eyes of militant jihadists, Muslim men 
have something to prove and something to gain by committing acts of martyrdom.  Along with 
self-defense and revenge, “affairs of honor” are considered a basis for self-help (Black 1998: 74).  
The expressed eagerness for such violence further indicated that, among jihadists, “men become 
men if they ‘face’ death with a smile” (Aslam 2012: 119), and the apparent willingness of their 
mothers to “sacrifice the fruit of their loins—but not their honor” suggested that men’s bodies 
                                                          
26 Aslam (2012: 93) connects this duty to protect Muslim women to qawwam, or the custodial responsibilities of 
Muslim men to protect their wives and women as directed by Islamic scriptures. 
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served as symbolic resources for honor displays, on behalf of the ummah.  Indeed, “denying 
one’s own needs while providing for others is a signifier of being a man” in Muslim cultures and, 
in this case, as a key mobilizing narrative for suicide attacks (Aslam 2012: 119; Hafez 2007: 99).  
For jihadist, then, martyrdom acts convinced adversaries, onlookers, the ummah, and Allah, of 
their honor.  According to this frame, such violence elicited deference from valued others and 
secured certain privileges—i.e., prestige in this life and paradise in the next. 
The quotes above help to illustrate how jihadists defined acts of martyrdom as moralistic 
violence for defending Islam and the ummah from perceived threats, restoring certain privileges 
and entitlements—vis-à-vis the caliphate—and redeeming Muslim honor.  In other words, these 
acts were framed in motivational terms, as ways to resist domination (self-defense), claim “lost” 
privileges (restorative rituals), and elicit deference from others (honor displays).  Considering the 
cosmic stakes and intractable conditions of the conflict, jihadists rejected non-violent resolutions 
and advocated martyrdom as a necessary means of handling grievances and achieving movement 
goals.  In line with previous observations, these frames also elevated martyrs “to the status of 
extraordinary moral beings who make the ultimate sacrifice for God” (Hafez 2007: 96), “fully in 
control of their choices and destinies” (p. 107).  In this sense, martyrdom acts were defined in 
terms of heroism, nationalism, and other markers of masculinity (Nagel 2005; Kimmel 2005; 
Schrock and Schwalbe 2009).  Together, these frames indicated that martyrdom in the context of 
militant jihadism both constituted self-help and signified manhood.  I now turn to a discussion of 
these findings. 
Martyrdom, Subjectivities, and Self-Help 
In the context of militant jihad, martyrdom acts constitute a form of masculine self-help 
or a gender-signifying form of conflict resolution.  In line with Black’s (1998: 75) definition of 
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self-help, the statements of jihadists defined martyrdom as moralistic violence—directed at both 
others and the self—for handling grievances.  Their framing activities indicated that these acts 
signified manhood, enabling Muslim men to defend Islam and the ummah from outsiders, restore 
a system of religious patriarchy (a caliphate), and claim exclusive identities as heroes and holy 
warriors of Islam.  In these respects, martyrdom acts constitute “manhood acts” (Schrock and 
Schwalbe 2009: 281).  This understanding of martyrdom reinforces the importance of gender 
subjectivities in facilitating violent practices and the knowledge that can be gained by integrating 
Blackian theories of conflict management with critical constructionist approaches to masculinity.  
In this section, I further discuss what these findings reveal about the meaning of martyrdom in 
social movements, and how, in spite of recent criticisms of Black’s pure sociology perspective, 
they provide qualified support for conceptualizing these acts in part as violent self-help.  I then 
elaborate and specify this concept in terms of gender, proposing that martyrdom acts may be 
understood as a form of masculine self-help.  I conclude by discussing why future studies of 
martyrdom should consider the role of gender subjectivities and how the concept of masculine 
self-help can be used to examine and explain the identity work that men do, consciously and 
collaboratively, to achieve dominance. 
One of the main goals of this study was to understand the subjective meanings and aims 
of martyrdom in militant jihad.  I identified these meanings in how jihadists framed these acts—
as self-defense, restorative rituals, and honor displays.  Consistent with the previous claims of 
gender scholars, these framing activities involved direct and indirect appeals to masculinity.  In 
particular, jihadists viewed such violence as a legitimate means for resisting domination and 
restoring privileges.  The delineation of these martyrdom frames contributes to the literature on 
framing and ideology in social movements, as well as ongoing debates regarding the basis and 
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impetus for martyrdom by showing how gender ideologies are integral to interpretations and the 
impetus for violence.  In this case, the framing of martyrdom involved advancing the interests of 
aggrieved men and claiming exclusive gender identities and gender-based rewards.  In line with 
research on gender and war, martyrdom and manhood in militant jihad appear to be “mutually 
constitutive and mutually reinforcing, with masculinity acting as an enabling condition” for these 
acts (Hutchings 2008: 391).  In other words, doing martyrdom is a way of doing masculinity.   
Following the agenda charted by Schrock and Schwalbe (2009), this research focused on 
a specific practice through which males claim identities as men and illustrated how this practice 
signifies possession of a masculine self.  Again, a masculine self is constructed in interaction, 
including those mediated through discourse and framing, and possessing this virtual self means 
signifying the capacity “to ‘make things happen’ and to resist being dominated by others” (p. 
280).  Violence remains an all-too prevalent way for men to handle grievances, and this is further 
illustrated by the frames above that cast martyrdom as “legitimate and justified when it occurs in 
a struggle between good and evil” (Jordan and Cowan 1995: 728).  These martyrdom frames not 
only reflected the “bifurcated worldview” of jihadists (Aslan 2009: 5) but also revealed the role 
of gender-as-motive.  Martyrs are portrayed as exemplary Muslim men whose actions display 
qualities of heroism, altruism, courage, fearlessness, and honor—traits befitting of ideal Islamic 
masculinity and indicative of Muslim manhood.  Consistent with Schrock and Schwalbe (2009), 
then, the framing of martyrdom acts reflected the aims of manhood acts, enabling jihadists to 
resist domination and exploitation at the hands of outsiders (e.g., near and far enemies), elicit 
deference from others (most notably from the ummah and fellow jihadists), and claiming certain 
privileges (ranging from material to symbolic rewards).  These scholars (p. 280) are careful in 
qualifying the subjective aims of manhood acts as “elements of masculinity in Western cultures,” 
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but the findings above suggest they are relevant to movements and male peer cultures outside of 
Western contexts as well. 
This research also shows how jihadists collaborated in defining martyrdom in terms of 
manhood.  Their framing activities focused on collective aims: the defense of Islam and the 
ummah, especially Muslim women, the resurrection of the caliphate, and so on.  Aggrieved men 
could draw on these frames as “vocabularies of motive” (Mills 1940) and “craft a manhood act” 
(p. 287) that resisted domination and elicited deference from others.  For instance, by framing 
martyrdom as a rite of passage and incumbent upon the “men of belief” (Aaron 2008: 90), 
jihadists tied these acts to essential “maleness/manhood” in Islam (Gerami 2005: 452).  Even as 
they offered praise to any Muslim, man or woman, who conducted a martyrdom operation, the 
grievances and aims that were apparent in framing these operations appealed almost exclusively 
to Muslim men and manhood.  For instance, they defined suicide attacks in terms of their honor, 
duty, and reputation as men, and discouraged their Muslim sisters from carrying them out.27  
Similar to the discursive role of masculinity in framing acts of war, the “crucial characteristic” of 
martyrdom in global jihad is that they are “not feminine” and not for women (Hutchings 2008: 
401). Such gender-based distinctions are not surprising given that war and soldiering remain 
exclusive avenues for constructing, reproducing, and deploying masculinity, and correspond with 
evidence that women continue to have limited and ancillary roles in jihadist movements, 
especially as suicide bombers (Pape 2005; Davis 2013; Morgan 1994: 165; Hutchings 2008).  To 
borrow from Morgan (1994: 166), the gendered expectations associated with martyrdom acts 
“define not only who does what but who is what,” and reach “deep into a man’s sense of identity 
                                                          
27 In a message to “sisters wanting to participate” in martyrdom operations, one jihadist stated “the situation in the 
Ummah is not that desperate yet, that sisters are called to fight” and instead encouraged female adherents to work as 
“nurses” providing health care to jihadi fighters and “to mold the thought process of their young sons—the future 
mujahideen of the Umma” (Aaron 2008: 96-97).   
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and self.”  These acts reveal the extent to which militant jihad also emphasizes “masculine group 
solidarities organized around violence (p. 167).  This suggests that martyrdom acts are not only 
integral to signifying manhood in militant jihad and but also in other social movements that 
similarly seek to restore “lost” power and privileges.  
Many of the jihadist statements discussed above support and illustrate Black’s (1998) 
conceptualization of violent behavior by showing how martyrdom and mass violence serve as a 
means of handling grievances.  In other words, these acts may be understood as a form of self-
help.  This was not surprising given Black’s unique and broad definition of self-help, and the 
reasons it is used to handle grievances, including “self-defense,” “revenge,” “affronts to honor,” 
the “defense of ‘manliness,’” “the pursuit of justice,” “vengeance,” and “matters relating to sex, 
love, and loyalty” (1998: 31-76).  Although the statements of jihadists revealed multiple 
motivational frames for martyrdom, all proposed to handle grievances with violence and invoked 
the reasons just listed.  Following Marshall’s (2008: 228) claim that researchers must make the 
“missing motivational engines” of human behavior explicit in order to determine whether or not, 
for instance, a violent act actually constitutes self-help,28 this study explicates these engines in 
and through the motivational framing of martyrdom acts.  And yet, the findings provide some 
support for Black’s definition of self-help: martyrdom is in part the handling of a grievance by 
unilateral aggression.  This analysis suggests that efforts to “eliminate the individual” (Black 
1995: 849) in theorizing violence and other social phenomenon may be counterproductive in 
supporting Black’s work and suggests a modest middle-path solution for substantiating pure 
sociology concepts: acknowledge and analyze the role of subjectivities. 
                                                          
28 Again, Marshall (2008) has detailed how Black’s own work infers from the psychological underpinnings of other 
research, as well as the partial assumptions of readers and those he himself holds in making theoretical claims.  For 
example, he argues that Blackian constructs, such as “grievance,” are “patently psychological” (p. 228).    
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In addition to meeting the definitional criteria for self-help, these findings reflect some of 
the distinctions in Black’s self-help framework.  Again, self-help is among a number of ways in 
which grievances are resolved in conflicts; others include avoidance, negotiation, settlement by a 
third-party, and toleration.  The statements of jihadists indicate that martyrdom acts arise because 
the conditions of the conflict are perceived as precluding non-violent resolutions.  In their view, 
Muslim societies cannot avoid foreign aggression, given the “cosmic war” (Aslan 2009) in which 
they are embroiled; they cannot negotiate a resolution given outside interests in exploiting the 
resources of Muslim territories; they cannot rely on nor do they trust a third-party to settle the 
conflict, save Allah; and they can no longer tolerate the harmful conduct of outsiders (infidels, 
apostates, and heretics), given the degree to which these actors have undermined “true” Islam 
and devastated Muslim communities.  In lieu of alternative modes of recourse, suicide attacks 
and other martyrdom operations are framed as moralistic violence for handling grievances.  So, 
although Blackian scholars believe that the study of subjective factors is antithetical to the 
scientific (read: positivist) approach of a “pure” sociology, these same subjectivities may 
nevertheless help distinguish the characteristics and use of martyrdom in social movements.   
These findings also offer more appropriate evidence for supporting and employing the 
concept of self-help in future studies of collective violence.  As noted above, Black (2004; 1998) 
and fellow scholars (Senechal de lar Roche 1996) have dismissed data pertaining to subjectivities 
(e.g., people’s perceptions, attitudes, intentions) as beyond the scope of sociological theories of 
violence.  In their view, historical cases of conflict and big data are sufficient for verifying pure 
sociology concepts and generating “highly general and testable propositions about the likelihood 
and severity of collective violence” (p. 102).  As detailed earlier, despite such claims, Black’s 
work has been accused of weak empiricism, stemming in part, from underspecified and unclear 
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concepts (Marshall 2008; Turner 2008).  For example, Marshall (2008: 222) insists that “Black’s 
theories require a clear articulation between constructs and their empirical indicators, such that 
their terms are identified with some fixed and fully specified measures.”  Without more precise 
and consistent operationalization, Blackian concepts are difficult to substantiate.  Unlike the 
“objective” focus and methodological approach of pure sociology, this research explored the 
social meanings and aims of violence.  It provided a clear unit of analysis (the subjective views 
of jihadists) and evidence (interpretive frames) for analyzing whether or not an act (martyrdom) 
may be defined as self-help.  What is novel about these findings, then, is how they support the 
self-help concept and what they suggest about the empirical value of subjectivities.  While this 
research is far from a treatise on the empirical claims and criticisms of pure sociology, it does 
indicate that subjective factors can serve as empirical indicators for concepts, like self-help. 
CONCLUSION: Martyrdom as Masculine Self-Help 
Explicating the subjective and empirical dimensions of self-help is integral to the main 
findings of this research: that martyrdom may be understood as a form of masculine self-help—a 
gender-signifying act that expresses a grievance through unilateral, self-sacrificial, and embodied 
aggression.  Again, this conceptualization combines the analytic approach to gender proffered by 
Schrock and Schwalbe (2009) with the Black’s (1998) definition of self-help, offering a more 
precise and evidence-based understanding of martyrdom in movements like militant jihad.  In 
line with other motives for men’s violence, jihadists framed their actions as a way to “achieve 
manhood status through actual and symbolic acts of intimidation” (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009: 
283).  Insofar as martyrdom is seen as a way to “put on a convincing manhood act” (p. 281), it 
signifies a gender-based response to grievances.  This process, evident in the martyrdom frames 
above, further suggests that such acts arise from the desire to “signify possession of a masculine 
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self” (p. 281).  That is, martyrdom represents a mode and a consequence of clinging devotion to 
a masculine self. 
The concept of masculine self-help offers a way of distinguishing violent acts based on 
their symbolic and structural features and makes masculinity visible in the framing and use of 
certain types of violence in social movements.  The concept also sensitizes us to the collaborative 
process through which men define and support each other’s behavior—e.g., how individual men 
come to believe that they have something to prove and something to gain by engaging in violent 
behavior.  Based on these empirical and definitional criteria, a few applications of the masculine 
self-help concept may be conjectured for future research.  For instance, how and to what extent 
might the violence perpetrated by hooligans, prison gangs, school shooters and so forth, also be 
understood as masculine self-help?  How and to what degree do the actions and activities of 
these groups of men reflect the aims of manhood acts?  And what about women—in what ways 
do the crime and violence they perpetrate also reflect gendered repertoires of contention?  Or, as 
Schrock and Schwalbe (2008: 289) suggest, are these cases of “compensatory manhood acts,” or 
attempts to appropriate or out-do male exercises of power?  Addressing such questions would 
provide evidence for further assessing the scope and explanatory power of the masculine self-







Haraam-less Masculinity: Normative Gender Displays as Strategies for Managing the 
Stigmatized Identities of Young Muslim Men 
Abstract 
In Western contexts, the social identities of Muslim men pose a persistent predicament.  Still, 
few sociological studies have theorized the ways in which these identities are constructed and 
negotiated in mixed-contacts or everyday encounters with non-Muslim publics.  In this chapter, I 
examine the experience and effects of anti-Islamic stigma by analyzing in-depth interviews with 
twenty-six young Muslim men and women living in the Midwestern United States.  I find that 
participants use specific gender-signifying strategies in order to manage their impressions and 
interactions with non-Muslim audiences.  I define these strategies as allaying embodiment, 
benign accommodation, and claiming normality.  Drawing on Goffman’s dramaturgical 
framework and concept of gender displays, I argue that young Muslims cope with stigmatization 
by both challenging and adhering to normative ways of doing gender in Western cultures.  This 
research further develops two ideas about the stigma process: (1) gender displays are integral to 





 Stigma and the Social Identities of Muslims 
 Stigma inevitably affects our lives and shapes our identities.  For Muslims living in the 
U.S., this process has been profoundly shaped by the events of 9/11.  Much like the Japanese 
following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, their social identities have been defined as foreign and 
threatening, casting over them a shadow of collective stigmatization. Understanding the lived- 
experiences of Muslims in this context presupposes an understanding of how their identities are 
depicted, defined, and managed in daily life.  In particular, it is important to ascertain the impact 
of the stigma process.  In the now classic essay Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled 
Identity, Goffman (1963: 2) defined social stigma as a relationship between an attribute and a 
stereotype that is “deeply discrediting” to individuals and groups that bear them.  These stigmas 
may be embodied, concealed,29 and/or affixed to social categories (e.g., races, ethnicities, and 
religions) that are deemed alien, extreme, insolent, or otherwise menacing by dominant social 
groups.  The lattermost stigmas are “tribal” in that the identities of all members of the group are 
devalued and relegated in status.  The negative effects of tribal stigma are evident materially, in 
terms of limited life chances, and symbolically, in terms of mortified selves (Link and Phelan 
2001; Goffman 1963).  Since 9/11, Muslims living in Western countries have been subjected to 
tribal stigmatization, as evidenced by negative media portrayals of Islam, ongoing legislative 
efforts to restrict or ban Islamic practices, and extraordinary surveillance and social control of 
“bad” Muslims (Mamdani 2014; U.S. Cong., House Committee on Homeland Security 2011; 
Ibrahim 2010; Naber 2008; Banks 2005; ICE 2003; Lyon 2002).  A number of studies have now 
documented the extent of this “Islamophobia”30 and the ways in which Muslim identities have 
                                                          
29 Examples of embodied stigmas are scars, disabilities, and perceived “deformities’” examples of concealed stigmas 
are mental illnesses, addictions, or radical political and religious beliefs (Goffman 1963: 4). 
30 In line with Kunst et al. (2013), I define Islamophobia as general fears of Islamization often leading to perceived 
and actual experiences of prejudice and discrimination on the part of Muslims. 
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been targeted and tarnished (Khosravi 2012; Kunst et al. 2012; Ryan 2011; Peek 2011: Chapter 
4).  The persistence of anti-Islamic sentiment in the West affects new generations and newly 
formed communities of Muslims—subjecting them to unease, fear, and abuse (e.g., Ewing and 
Grady 2013).  What it means to be Muslim in America continues to be shaped by the events of 
9/11.  What remains unclear, however, are the specific spaces and ways in which these Muslims 
have since confronted collective stigmatization.   
How stigma manifests and is managed in daily life is most apparent in mixed-contacts, or 
“moments when a stigmatized and normal are in the same social situation” (Goffman 1963: 12).  
As such, the effects of stigma on Muslims may be gleaned from encounters with non-Muslim 
majorities.  As Goffman theorized, whenever there exists a discrepancy between other’s 
expectations of an individual, their “virtual social identity,” and attributes that an individual 
possesses or could be revealed about them, their “actual social identity,” then he or she is 
vulnerable to being stigmatized.  This broad basis for scrutiny suggests that most people 
experience stigma at some point in life.  The impact of such experiences on the self, however, 
depends on the extensiveness of the stigma labels and the particular situations wherein these 
labels become harmful.  Mixed-contacts thus serve as both a key space and social context for 
understanding how Muslims deal with or “manage” stigma.  For example, O’Brien (2011) has 
shown how Muslim youth anticipate mixed-contacts by practicing different types of rehearsals 
among themselves.  These rehearsals included preparing remarks for educating non-Muslims 
about Islamic beliefs and practices, and tailoring their rehearsals to local challenges.  Following 
Goffman, then, how successful Muslims are in mitigating the effects of stigma labels hinges in 
part on their ability to present information and control expectations about themselves in these 
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situations.  In other words, they must influence the definition of the situation in order to 
effectively manage their impressions.   
 The successful management of stigma is also dependent upon the particular form and 
perceptibility of the stigmatized attribute and the extent to which it deviates from a social norm.   
The form of stigma may be distinguished as discredited (i.e., readily evident to others as signs of 
abnormality or deviance) or discreditable (i.e., not obvious but potentially damaging information 
related to an abnormal or deviant trait) (Goffman 1963: 19).  Both forms may discredit or “spoil” 
one’s identity, but this spoiling process often depends on the type of “mark” one bears.  For 
example, studies have detailed the stigmas associated with Muslim names and veils31 (e.g., 
Khosravi 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010), as well as Islamic beliefs and rituals (e.g., Mahon 2013; 
Mobasher 2006).  For many Muslims in the West, the negotiation of self and identity necessarily 
involves controlling information that draws attention to their “debasing identity discrepancy” (p. 
43).  This information is symbolic and includes physical signs and appearances, gestures, and 
manners of interactions associated with Islam—all of which come to the fore in mixed-contacts.   
The experience of stigma in encounters with non-Muslims—i.e., how the stigma process 
unfolds in mixed contacts—is shaped by cultural ideologies, standards, and boundaries.  That is, 
the impact of stigma on the self is related to the extent and ways in which one’s appearance and 
behavior depart from prevailing social norms.  For instance, Western mainstream media have 
characterized Muslim women as “victims” and Muslim men as “dangerous,” and as “agents of 
terrorism” (Mishra 2007; Naber 2008: 282).  Such portrayals have spoiled Muslim identities, in 
general, and raised concerns about the activities and intentions of ordinary Muslim men, in 
                                                          
31 Simply being perceived as a Muslim has also been shown to have stigmatizing effects and, in some cases, lethal 
consequences (see Santora 2012).   
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particular (Aslam 2012; Bayoumi 2009).  This was evidenced by the 2011 hearings on “Islamic 
radicalization” conducted by the U.S. Congress.32  Concerns with deviance are, of course, a 
cornerstone of Goffman’s work on stigma: it is the inability to sustain identity norms that 
inevitably leads to stigma management (1963: 130-35).  Several studies have referred to this 
concern to explain the plight of Muslim minorities in Western contexts.  For example, Ryan 
(2011) detailed how Muslim women in Britain interpreted and resisted anti-Islamic stigma, 
especially associated with their clothing and veiling.  Like other minorities, their sensitivity to 
being seen as subversive outsiders led them on a “quest for normalcy” (p. 3) and a mission to 
show themselves as “good members of society” (p. 8).  Such studies suggest that normative 
expectations, particularly relating to gender, are a significant feature of anti-Islamic stigma and 
that the social identities of Muslims present certain risks—risks that requires management.   
Stigmatized persons respond to their situations in a myriad of ways and adopt a multitude 
of strategies (Goffman 1963; Herman 1993; Siegel, Lune, and Meyer 1998; O’Brien 2011).33 
Among Muslim minorities, these stigma management strategies have included avoidance of 
social spaces deemed unfriendly or potentially hostile and, when avoiding such spaces is neither 
feasible nor desirable, attempting to cover up, play down, or abandon their religious identities 
altogether (Khosravi 2012; Kunst et al. 2012; Mir 2006; Mobasher 2006).  For example, in 
Sweden, some Muslim immigrants have engaged in name-changing as a “strategy to cope with 
and manage stigmatization and discrimination” (Khosravi 2012: 66).34  They expressed hope that 
                                                          
32 U.S. Congress, Committee on Homeland Security (2011). 
33 Among these strategies are attempts to fix the “objective basis” of the stigma, (e.g., through surgery, therapy, or 
religious conversion); develop skills that offset the stigma label (e.g., through cultural assimilation); separate 
themselves from others that bear and share the stigma; or by embracing the stigma as something that has actually 
enhanced their sense of self; a “blessing in disguise” (Goffman 1963: 9-11).   
34 Name changing in this case specifically refers to changing Muslim surnames to “Swedish-sounding” or “neutral” 
European names (Khosravi 2012: 66) 
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extricating themselves from these markers of Muslim identity would facilitate social and 
employment opportunities, and shield them from prejudicial treatment (p. 72).  Name-changes 
are one way for Muslims to blend in or “pass” as normal in Swedish society.  Muslim minorities 
have also resisted stigma and stereotypes through active engagements with non-Muslim publics 
and by strengthening their associations with Islam and involvements with fellow Muslims (Ryan 
2011; Peek 2005, 2011: Chapter 6; Amiraux 2011; Schanzer, Kurzman, and Moosa 2010).  For 
example, many of the Muslim women interviewed by Ryan (2011) challenged images that cast 
Muslims as backward by asserting their own moral standing.  These strategies not only coincide 
with Goffman’s conceptualization of stigma management,35 but also indicate that Muslims 
embedded in different cultural contexts draw on various repertoires (e.g., passing, covering, and 
confrontation) in order to manage spoiled identities.   
 The growing volume of research on Islamophobia and the experiences of Muslims in 
Western societies is compelling, and yet much of it remains under-theorized, Eurocentric, and 
primarily focused on the experiences of women.  For instance, most studies of these studies have 
focused on describing the civic consequences of Islamophobia rather than explaining the coping 
process (e.g., Kunst et al. 2012; Kunst et al. 2013; Ghaffari 2009; Elaasar 2004; Perry 2003).  
Many also employ and extend theories of race, assimilation, and multiculturalism (e.g., Mamdani 
2014; Hopkins and Gale 2009; Maruoka 2008; Halim 2006).  In addition to descriptive and race-
based accounts, it is necessary to examine the subjective experience of anti-Islamic stigma, 
especially how Muslims negotiate self and identity in everyday encounters with non-Muslim 
publics.  This latter focus is important not only for documenting the material and emotional 
                                                          
35 In particular, this corresponds with Goffman’s (1963: 51) conceptualization of stigma management as “an 
offshoot” of “stereotyping or profiling of “normative expectations regarding conduct character” in mixed-contacts. 
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impact of stigma on minorities, but also for clarifying and understanding what strategies are 
deemed effective in coping with the adverse effects.  Given the history and pervasiveness of anti-
Islamic sentiment in Western Europe, more research on Muslim identities and stigmatization has 
also taken place in European societal contexts (e.g., Ryan 2011; Kunst et al. 2012; Amiraux 
2005; Hopkins 2004).  Less attention has been paid to how Islamophobia is experienced and 
handled by Muslims living in the U.S. Research suggests that American society has historically 
been less hostile to Muslims than in Europe, even though anti-Islamic sentiments has remained 
prevalent since 9/11 (Gallup, Inc. 2010; Obeidallah 2016).   
Many qualitative studies of Islamophobia have focused on the accounts and experience of 
Muslim women, particularly regarding controversies over the hijab (e.g., Ryan 2011; Mishra and 
Shirazi 2010; Meer, Dwyer, and Modood 2010; Williams and Vashi 2007; Haddad 2007; Zine 
2006; MacDonald 2006; Cole and Ahmadi 2003).  Less is known about how Muslim men deal 
with stigma labels in daily life.  This is not surprising considering the mistreatment and marginal 
status of Muslim women in some hardline Islamic regimes, as well as prevailing discourses on 
women’s rights in the West (Lorber 2002).  After all, “under Western eyes” (Mohanty 1988), it 
is such women that are seen as imperiled and in need of rescue (Razak 2004; MacDonald 2006; 
Mishra 2007; Ho 2007).  It is also important consider, however, how Muslim men have dealt 
with stigmatization.  On the one hand, the beliefs and displays of some men—nineteen jihadists 
in particular—have arguably contributed most to the rapid rise and development of Islamophobia 
in American society, and set into motion a series of discursive and institutional processes that 
have effectively spoiled the identities of all Muslims.  On the other hand, ordinary Muslim men 
are obliged to confront and/or correct stereotypes through their own actions, for instance, by 
exercising restraint, tolerance, liberalism, and other values amenable to social life in the West.  
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Doing Gender in Islam 
Gender is a key aspect of social identity as well as a potential source of stigma, especially 
for men of color.  This is evident in media and policy discourses that continue to define minority 
men as deviant and in need of social control (hooks 2004: Chapter 5; Hopkins 2004; Anderson 
1998).  For instance, depictions of Islam in Western media have often cast Muslim men as 
hostile and oppressive, and Muslim women as passive and programmed—at best, “oppressed 
creatures” with few rights and second-class status; at worst, complicit in their own oppression 
and the subversive activities of the men (Mishra 2007).  These depictions suggest that doing 
gender in Islam is intrinsically deviant and that Muslim men are, by nature, nefarious.  Recently, 
Aslam (2012) presented a keen analysis of gender and jihad that attempted to address, 
theoretically and empirically, controversial questions surrounding the identities of Muslim men, 
such as “why are Muslim men so violent?” (p. 140).  Aslam (2009: 224-26) argues that the dire 
economic and political conditions that beset many Muslim communities are channeled through 
masculine notions of honor and bravery in Islam, leading some Muslim men and boys to engage 
in ritualistic acts or performances that are harmful to others and themselves.  For instance, she 
found that Muslim men who idealized stereotypical masculine traits were more likely to “offer 
themselves for jihad.”  Masculinity was thus linked to the radicalization of these men and boys 
through its relationship to gender socialization in Islam, the economic power and prospects of 
Muslim men (or lack thereof), and shifting gender regimes inside and outside Muslim societies.  
Ultimately, Aslam considers movements like militant jihad to be another form of “gender 
trouble” (Butler 2006) or a disruption of “ideal” Islamic masculinity via the violent performances 
of Muslim men.   
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 While the argument put forth by Aslam is intriguing and presupposes further analyses of 
gender-signifying acts and gender-based grievances in Islam, the framework on which it rests is 
problematic for theorizing the role of masculinity in managing stigma during mixed-contacts.  It 
reflects an ontological position that relegates human agency and patently denies the existence of 
the self.  Aslam focuses on gender performativity, a concept taken from Butler (2006) and rooted 
in post-structuralist perspectives that question the ability of individuals or “subjects” to decipher 
and direct their gender performances.  Instead, gender is conceptualized as a product of repetitive 
acts, wherein embodied males, females, and intersexed subjects (are compelled to) exhibit (what 
appear to be) natural expressions of masculinity and femininity.  These expressions are therefore 
viewed as contrived images or “illusions” that reflect hegemonic discourses, such as compulsory 
heterosexuality (Rich 1980).  That is, who and how we are as men and women is more a matter 
of coercion than volition, dictated by social discourses, sanctions, and taboos.  This take on 
gender suggests that Muslim men and women must recognize the power of gender ideologies to 
mount an emancipatory response to them.  Studies of anti-Islamic stigma indicate that Muslim 
men and women are aware of gender-based stigmas and adjust their appearances and behavior 
accordingly (Khosravi 2012; Mir 2006).  In other words, they exhibit “stigma consciousness” 
(Pinel 1999) and present the self in ways that will facilitate acceptance from others. 
Dramaturgical theories define gender as a psychic process that arises and is achieved in 
interaction.  As something people “do,” gender is “carried out in the virtual or real presence of 
others who are presumed to be oriented to its production” (West and Zimmerman 1987: 126).  
Insofar as gender is an emergent feature of social situations, individuals can orient their behavior 
in order to claim a masculine or feminine self.  In this sense, Muslim manhood and womanhood 
reflects selfhood.  Although gender ideologies and norms are understood as social constraints on 
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the self, individuals have agency in doing gender (Goffman 1979).  Compared to Aslam and 
many Butlerian scholars,36 Goffman and fellow dramaturgical theorists do not see individual 
behavior—gender or otherwise—as “tightly programmed by culture” but as consciously directed 
and driven by the self, with “a considerable amount of expressive manipulation along several 
fronts” (Turner and Stets 2006: 26).  In this sense, Muslim men and women are creative actors 
with appreciable agency, not just passive subjects with docile bodies.  This approach is apparent 
in Goffman’s (1979: 1) conceptualization of gender displays or the “readable expressions” and 
“conventionalized portrayals” of normative sex roles.  Such displays convey an actor’s alignment 
with others in social situations and, consequently, are “important insofar as alignments are” (p. 
1).  In the case of Muslim minorities, establishing allegiance with non-Muslim publics is an 
important, if not crucial, aspect of daily life.  Individuals can manipulate such displays in order 
to gain acceptance—e.g., present a masculine or feminine self that will be confirmed by others 
(p. 3).  These displays are not simply seen as part of a gender game, but as a means of self-
construction and social survival.  To borrow from Howarth (2006: 443), the theoretical scheme 
of dramaturgy points to “the possibilities and conditions for stigmatized communities as agents 
and not (only) as objects or victims of stigma” by emphasizing the self-efficacy of Muslim men 
and women.  So, in spite of the revelatory use of gender performativity in previous studies of 
violent jihad, I argue that the concept of gender displays is just as useful, if not more so, for 
explaining how such violence is dealt with.   
Aside from acknowledging self and agency as critical aspects of gender, dramaturgical 
approaches offer insights into the specific structure of gender performances.  In particular, the 
conceptualization of gender displays involves distinguishing patterns that are relevant to stigma 
                                                          
36 For example, Barad (2014), Tyler and Cohen (2008), Hancock and Tyler (2007), and Jackson (2004). 
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management.  Goffman (1979: 2) identifies two basic patterns of displays that are apparent in 
mixed contacts: (1) “bracket rituals,” which are “concentrated at the beginnings and endings of 
interaction” and (2) “overlays,” those “designed to be continued through interaction.”  Examples 
of these include names, dress, and demeanor (p. 2).  Together, these constitute a “schedule of 
displays” through which individuals define and present themselves in social situations (p. 2).  
Encoded in these displays is vital information about one’s self and identities, of which gender is 
central37 (p. 7).  For example, the Sunna beard (lihyah) is an overlay of Muslim identity that 
signifies both gender and situational alignment.  According to many Islamic scholars, this beard 
is a display of essential differences between men and women and is mandatory (wajib) for all 
males capable of growing them (Khalilullah 2011).  Shaving the Sunna beard is thus forbidden 
(haraam) on religious grounds as well as on charges that it violates gender mores of the ummah 
or Muslim community.  And yet, in the post-9/11 context of American culture, this gender 
display has taken on a very different meaning: as a sign of religious extremism.  In this sense, the 
Sunna beard is a marker of Muslim identity that “renders men and boys at once foreign and alien 
to the nation, but at the same time connected to ‘the terrorist’” (Khosravi 2012: 69).  How such 
overlays are handled by devout Muslim men in Western contexts is therefore a matter of great 
significance—a decision that means confirming or countering stigma labels and dealing with the 
social consequences from both within and outside one’s group. 
Insofar as gender roles, identities, and relations in Islam are scrutinized in the West, they 
serve as important dimensions of the stigma process.  How Muslims manage such stigmatization 
is likely to involve displays of masculinity and femininity in mixed-contacts.  As indicated by the 
                                                          
37 Goffman (1979: 7) acknowledges the central role of gender in this process by stating that “the most deeply seated 
traits of man, it is felt, is gender: masculinity and femininity are in a sense the prototypes of essential expression—
something that can be conveyed fleetingly in any social situation and yet something that strikes at the most basic 
characterization of an individual.” 
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Sunna beard, these gender displays bring to the fore the simultaneous demands of non-Muslim 
audiences and internal pressures to adhere to the beliefs and rules that govern gender interaction 
in Islam.  The resulting tension and how it is resolved has important implications for the self-
conceptions and social involvements of Muslims living in Western societies, especially younger 
generations and recent immigrants.  Hence, in this research, I ask: how do Muslims in the U.S. 
manage stigmatized identities?  In particular, what stigma management strategies do they employ 
in mixed-contacts?  In particular, I explore how young Muslim men and women define-and-do 
gender in daily life.  By addressing such issues empirically, I hope to uncover, assess, and clarify 
the process of anti-Islamic in America. 
DATA & METHODS 
This research is part of a larger project on the effects of anti-Islamic stigma on the self, 
for which I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with twenty-six young Muslims living in 
the Midwestern United States.  My goals were to understand the experience of stigma among 
young Muslims in a particular milieu and to identify the specific strategies they used to cope 
with stigma in mixed-contacts, or everyday encounters with non-Muslim publics.  The focus of 
this aspect of the research was on the manifestation and management of stigma in the daily lives 
of the young Muslim men (I explore similar processes with respect to the young Muslim women 
in the next chapter).  Interview participants ranged in age from nineteen to twenty-eight years 
and varied in terms of ethnic38 and nationality39 backgrounds.  Close to an even number of 
participants followed either Sunni (15) or Shi’a (11) traditions in Islam and identified as either 
men (14) or women (12).  Most (21) were second-generation U.S. citizens or 1.5 generation 
                                                          
38 Participant ethnicities included Arab, Azeri, Bengali, Pashtun, Persian, and Punjabi. 
39 Participant nationalities encompassed countries in the Middle East and South Asia, including Pakistani, Indian, 
Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Palestinian. 
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naturalized citizens.  Three participants were in the process of applying for U.S. citizenship and 
two were students with F1-visas,40 all of whom expressed interest in finding work in the U.S. 
following the completion of their studies.  
The interview research took place in the greater metropolitan area of a large Midwestern 
city between September 2011 and September 2012.  The selection of this site was predicated on 
recent calls to examine the construction of ethno-religious identities in new Diasporic contexts 
(Moghissi and Ghorashi 2010; Braziel and Mannur 2003). Although the Midwestern U.S. has a 
few sizeable Muslim communities, like that in Dearborn, Michigan,41 the region is considered a 
new gateway for Muslims and other immigrants from developing countries (Waters and Jimenez 
2005).  Knowledge of the daily lived-experiences of Muslims in these settings remains limited.  
In contrast to more established ethnic enclaves, which have been shown to mitigate the adverse 
effects of prejudice and discrimination for Muslim minorities (Hassoun 2005; Ewing and Grady 
2013), the urban sprawl and influx of immigrants to parts of the Midwest also provides a distinct 
social context for exploring the negotiation of Muslim identities.  These areas may function less 
as a “buffer” against Islamophobia and therefore produce distinct experiences and responses to 
collective stigmatization.  As one my participants put, “the ones who grow up in a Muslim 
majority area, like they are from Michigan and places like that, they don’t have as much of an 
issue with all this” (Khalid, 23).  Indeed, this context has served as an impetus for studies of 
ethnic and religious identities, as well as gender attitudes and relations among young Arab 
Muslims (Haddad 2004).  It is also worth noting that with the exception of Arizona, Alaska, and 
Maine, all twenty-three states that had proposed anti-Sharia legislation at the outset of this study 
                                                          
40 F1 visas are a specific type of non-immigrant F visas that allow foreign students to pursue their education in the 
U.S., so long as they maintain full time status.  For more details, see “The ABC’s of Immigration – F3 and M3 Non-
immigrant Visas – August 18, 2003. Visalaw.com. Retrieved January 14, 2014. 
41 See Hassoun (2005). 
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were located either in the Midwestern or Southern U.S. (Wajahat et al. 2011: 38).  Such 
proposals not only suggest greater fears of and hostility toward Muslims in these regions, but, 
again, that Muslims residing in them may view and respond to anti-Islamic stigma and sentiment 
in particular ways. 
Study participants were sampled from the Muslim Student Associations (MSA) of two 
large Midwestern universities and an Islamic center and mosque.  These Muslim spaces have 
been scrutinized by American media personalities, counter-terrorism experts, policymakers, and 
pundits, for facilitating the radicalization of young men and even abetting “jihadi terror” (e.g., 
Geller 2015; Spencer 2014; Seibold 2011; U.S. Congress, Committee on Homeland Security 
2011; Coalition to Honor Ground Zero 2010; Grantham 2010; Center on Security Policy 2009; 
Silber and Bhatt 2007; Post and Sheffer 2006; Emerson 2006, 2002; Pipes 2010, 2003).  Such 
fears became apparent in the controversy over police spying on MSAs at several universities in 
the U.S. (e.g., Powell 2012; Devereaux 2012), leading some Muslims leaders to believe there are 
informants in virtually all mosques in America (e.g., Ewing and Grady 2013).  In one case, the 
New York State Police Department acknowledged that it had sent an undercover informant on an 
MSA-sponsored whitewater rafting trip where he recorded student names, conversations, and 
activities for police intelligence.  Incidentally, this well-publicized story occurred in the midst of 
my data collection and was raised during a few interviews as a cause for concern and caution in 
dealing with outsiders.  The extent to which these spaces have been characterized as “incubators” 
of terrorism suggests that they are important entry points for this research.  In addition, most of 
the young men were students studying applied technical fields, like engineering and medicine, 
and thus “fit the profile” of the 9/11 hijackers and other jihadists in terms of age, education, and 
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social class background42 (Aslan 2009; Kimmel 2002).  Together, these Muslim identities and 
arenas remain the prime targets of surveillance and scrutiny—i.e., they serve as the social 
context of anti-Islamic stigma. 
It is important to note that stigmatized individuals are also more likely to participate in 
research that examines their personal views and lives if they are approached by an in-group 
member or a person with a similar background and standpoint (Johnson 2002)—what Goffman 
(1963) refers to as members of the “own” and the “wise.”43  As a second generation Iranian-
American, I was accepted by participants as someone wise to their situations and given access to 
settings and events generally closed to outsiders (e.g., Friday Prayers and MSA meetings).  I was 
granted approval from the Human Subjects Committee of Lawrence (HSCL) to proceed with this 
research on June 6, 2011 (#19463).  I collected the interview data using snowball sampling, an 
established methodological approach for the study of sensitive topics and accessing populations 
that fear exposure, and are difficult to reach (Sadler et al. 2010; Oliver 2006; Platzer and James 
1997; Bailey 1994: 438; Lee and Renzetti 1993: 5; Biernacki and Waldorf 1981: 141).  I began 
by recruiting and interviewing a small number of key informants44 from the MSAs.  Following 
the interviews, I asked informants to recommend others who would be appropriate and willing 
participants for this research.  Meet-ups were scheduled over email or phone and the majority 
were conducted in a reserved private room at the university campuses or the mosque.  The 
remaining interviews took place at private residences.  All of the participants were either fluent 
                                                          
42 For biographical accounts of specific members of al-Qa’ida and other jihadist groups see Aslan (2009) and 
Kimmel (2005). 
43 Goffman (1963: 27) defines the “own” as persons who share the stigma and by virtue of this are defined and 
define themselves as his own kind.  The “wise” are defined as “persons who are normal but who special situation 
has made them intimately privy to the secret life of the stigmatized individual and sympathetic with it, and who find 
themselves accorded a measure of acceptance, a measure of courtesy membership in the clan”(Goffman 1963: 28). 
44 The definition of informant here is based on grounded theory research methods (Charmaz 2006) and is not to be 
confused with the law enforcement criteria discussed earlier. 
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or proficient in English.  At the time of the interview, each person was handed an information 
sheet stating the purpose of the study and an informed consent form to be signed and returned to 
me.  They were also asked to complete a brief demographic questionnaire, the responses of 
which are detailed in Appendix B.  With the exception of one convert to Islam, all participants in 
the sample were from Muslim families.  In addition, I attended a few small gatherings at 
participants’ homes and at some coffee shops and restuarants they frequented.  Meeting in these 
casual environments was helpful for clarifying questions in the interview schedule and, later on, 
served as a safe space for “member-checking” or taking my initial codes back to participants to 
determine if, how, and to what extent they “fit” participants’ actual views and experiences 
(Charmaz 2006: 111).   
In interviewing these young men and women, I was concerned with (1) detailed accounts 
of how Western discourses surrounding Islam, jihad, and terrorism were viewed, felt, and dealt 
with in daily life, and (2) thick descriptions of how the self and identities of young Muslims in 
America have been defined and negotiated in the decade since 9/11.  To acquire such knowledge, 
I asked participants to share their thoughts and feelings about 9/11, their experiences of anti-
Muslim prejudice and discrimination, if any, and the ways in which they coped with anti-Islamic 
stigma.  In order to remove terms that may be unfamiliar or have “normative connotations” 
(Ryan 2011: 5) that could be misinterpreted, such as “stigma,” “discourse,” and “radicalization,” 
I also pre-tested a number of interview questions with key informants.  Based on this pre-testing 
process, I refined and finalized the interview schedule (see Appendix A), and then proceeded to 
make contacts and conduct a formal round of interviews.  The interviews varied in length from 
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50 to 110 minutes and most45 were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded using the qualitative 
analysis program N-Vivo version (9.0).   
The interview guide was comprised of three sections focusing on participants’ views and 
experiences as Muslims in America, their presentations of self in everyday life, and definitions of 
masculinity and femininity in Islam.  The latter category emerged during the initial round of pilot 
interviews, wherein participants often emphasized how portrayals of gender roles and relations in 
Islam and perceived violations of Western gender norms were integral to their stigma experience, 
and, in turn, their coping strategies.  The final interview guide consisted of fifteen questions, 
carefully worded and delivered so as to facilitate and maintain trust between myself and 
participants.  I also used probes and a few vignettes to delve further into their reactions to stigma.  
For example, I followed responses about the negative portrayal of Muslims in Western media by 
asking participants to share their thoughts on the impact of such portrayals, especially how they 
coped with them in daily life.  I concluded all interviews by asking participants how, if at all, 
their views on being Muslim have changed since 9/11 and what strengths they had discovered 
about themselves in the process.  These questions were placed intentionally at the end of the 
interview guide not only to end on a more “positive note” (Charmaz 2002: 679), but also to allow 
participants to revisit, clarify, or elaborate on any earlier responses.  For many participants, these 
closing questions had a cathartic effect, providing them with an opportunity to vent frustrations, 
acknowledge personal triumphs, and discuss new-found perspectives. 
                                                          
45 Twenty-one of the twenty-six interviews were audio recorded and transcribed; the remaining five interviews were 
conducted face-to-face but were not audio recorded due to the participant’s concerns over anonymity and personal 
safety.  In these cases, a pen and notepad were used to take notes and followed up by member-checking in order to 
confirm statements and views. 
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Considering the sensitivity of the issues discussed, I took extra precautions in managing 
the data.  All audio files were kept in a password protected Zip file folder which no one else had 
access to but me.  The demographic information of participants was acquired via a questionnaire 
(Appendix B) and hard copies of these, along with back up audio files, were stored at a bank safe 
deposit box.  The names of all participants are pseudonyms or fake names.46  Considering the 
snowball sampling technique used in this study, another important aspect of data collection was 
maintaining confidentiality among participants who knew others through the referral process.  In 
these cases, I made sure to avoid references to specific comments and redirected the focus of the 
interview back to the immediate participant, when such matters arose.     
Data Management & Analysis 
I used grounded methods to collect, organize, and analyze the interview data, and to 
theorize the emergent findings.  This methodological process involved a series of steps that 
began with empirical observations and developed into a conceptual framework for the study, 
without making a priori assumptions about what should or ought to be discovered (Charmaz 
2006; DeVault and McCoy 2003; Johnson 2002; Warren 2002; Strauss 1995; 1987; Glaser and 
Strauss 1967).  Grounded methods are particularly appropriate for qualitative interviewing and 
analysis in that they direct researchers in data collection and in identifying emergent processes 
within the data (Charmaz 2002: 676).  Given my focus on learning about the experience of social 
stigma in a particular milieu, I also adopted a constructivist approach to the data.  In other words, 
I viewed the “implicit meanings” and “experiential views” of participants as constructed within 
the cultural, historical, and political context of the individual’s life (2002: 677-78).  Unlike 
                                                          
46 In order to facilitate member-checking, I allowed each participant to choose their name.  Less than a third choose 
to do so, leaving the remaining pseudonym selections up to me. 
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positivist research designs that approach data as inherently meaningful and treat findings as 
representations of a fixed, objective reality, I took the position that multiple realities exist and 
that the interview data and analysis of it are co-creations, defined by me and these young 
Muslims.  As such, this study offers a “portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it” 
(p. 678) and reflects the mutual influence of the researcher and participant on each other’s self-
presentations and social worlds. 
In coding these data, I followed the two-stage analytic technique detailed by Charmaz 
(2002).  In the first stage of coding—open coding—I crafted codes that captured participants’ 
views and experiences of stigma by analyzing the interview data line-by-line.  I compared the 
tonality, use of language, points of emphasis, and so forth in order to ascertain what these young 
Muslim men and women found important and/or problematic about their social identities.  I then 
converted these into “action codes,” or codes that captured their methods of coping (p. 684).  
Based on comparison of these action codes, I developed categories and subcategories that 
specified the different dimensions of the stigma process.  For example, in this stage, I discovered 
that gender was a key feature of interaction between participants and non-Muslim publics and, 
using a dramaturgical framework, I defined the specific relationships between gender constructs 
(i.e., masculinity and femininity) and stigma management (e.g., passing and covering).  In the 
second stage—selective coding—I sorted and synthesized the initial codes and elaborated the 
most salient categories into concepts.  In doing so, I drew on a small set of sensitizing concepts,47 
including “mixed-contacts,” “impression management,” and “gender displays,” as defined by 
Goffman (1959; 1963; 1967; 1979), and “negotiation” and “accommodation” as described by 
                                                          
47 According to Blumer (1954: 7), “sensitizing concepts give the user a general sense of reference and guidance in 
approaching empirical instances.”  
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grounded theorists so as to apply “an analytic frame to the data” (Charmaz 2006: 62).  For 
example, I asked what, if anything, the concept of gender display reveal about participants’ 
experiences and management of stigma?  This step not only served as a starting point for 
conceptual analysis, but also clarified the fit and relevance48 of a dramaturgical framework for 
theorizing the presumptive findings. 
Throughout the analysis, I used comparative methods for determining and refining the 
conceptual categories, deciding when to stop data collection, and detailing the initial findings.  
Doing so entailed: (a) continuously moving back and forth between the statements and stories of 
participants and analysis of them; (b) maintaining an open-mind about what could be discovered 
about anti-Islamic stigma while coding; (c) questioning the degree to which the open codes and 
categories supported theoretical claims about stigma and the self; and (d) challenging my own 
preconceptions about the meaning and management of Muslim identities in Western societies, 
like the U.S.  That is, I insured the reliability and trustworthiness of these data by remaining 
reflexive and flexible from the outset of data collection through to the analysis and presumptive 
findings (Denzin and Lincoln 2013).  My decision to stop at twenty-six interviews was based on 
saturation of the conceptual categories—i.e., when no new information or insights were being 
gained about the stigma process beyond those which emerged during selective coding (Charmaz 
2006; Glaser 1978).  While no universal standard for saturation exists is accepted by qualitative 
researchers,49 I based my decision on the opinion of Glaser (1978), as well as the modest scale 
and claims of the case studies.  For example, rather than focusing on the repetitive patterns of 
                                                          
48 Along these lines, Charmaz (2006: 54) notes that a study “fits the empirical world when you have constructed 
codes and developed them into categories that crystallize participant’s experiences.  It has relevance when you offer 
an analytic framework that interprets what is happening and makes relationships between implicit processes and 
structures visible”  
49 For detailed descriptions and disagreements over the issue of saturation, see Morse (1995), Dey (1999), Glaser 
(2001), and Charmaz (2006).  
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responses as an indication of saturation, I paid close analytic attention to the strategies or 
“properties” of this pattern in order to form an abstract accounting (read: conceptualization) of 
them.  Next, I present empirically the role of gender in stigmatizing Muslim identities, according 
to participants, and the strategies used to manage these identities in mixed-contact situations. 
“THE PROBLEM”: Discursive Representations of Global Jihadism and the Spoiling of 
Muslim Identities  
While the events of 9/11 were acutely experienced by Muslim minorities in the West, 
including the young women and men in this study, knowledge of how they understand and have 
coped with the stigmatizing effects remains limited.  Some recent studies suggest that gender 
plays a part in this process (Naber 2008; Meer et al. 2010; Hopkins and Gale 2009; Ryan 2011).  
For one, the framing of 9/11 and other acts of “Islamic terrorism” in Western media has also 
involved and invoked negative representations of Muslim gender roles and relations (Mishra 
2007; Ryan 2011).  My interviews supported these prior observations, that “discourse about 
Muslims” in the wake of 9/11 “has been heavily gendered” (Ryan 2011: 2), especially in terms 
of media portrayals of Muslim men and masculinity in Islam.  For example, when asked about 
how Muslim men are portrayed in Western media, my participants used the words “violent,” 
“crazy,” “scary,” “oppressive,” “intolerant,” “hostile,” “abusive,” “extremist,” “un-American,” 
or as one of the young woman succinctly put it, “their identities all ended up being labeled as 
terrorist” (Maryam, 21).  While they often discussed these characterizations in terms post-9/11 
perceptions of Islam, their statements emphasized the particular ways in which militant jihadists 
and media and policy discourses have, together, discredited the identities of young Muslim men.  
For instance, Karim, a first generation Muslim-American from Bangladesh, claimed that “Before 
9/11, I really didn’t see any kind of exposure of me as being very hostile to American culture, 
American ideologies, or American national interests. But after 9/11, the whole coverage of my 
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identity has been colored in terms of being backward, hostile, [and] intolerant.”  Because of 9/11, 
Karim’s intersecting identities have become simultaneously visible and problematic.   
In more detail, Naseem, 20, a second generation Muslim-American of Iranian descent, 
described the portrayal of his identity and negative associations made about him: 
I feel we are portrayed as superior to women just because usually it’s the men who are 
blowing themselves up and whatever. And then aside from that, I think with the whole 
hijab situation with the women and then hearing from governments like Saudi Arabia 
doesn’t let women drive or they are not allowed to vote. I think that might have changed. 
I’m not sure, but all these little ticky-tacky laws and rules about how women can’t do 
this, but all men can do everything…I think that portrays Muslim men as aggressive and 
overpowering over women and there is no women’s rights, and we just treat women 
badly and all that. 
 
Similarly, Yasmine, 26, a 1.5 generation Muslim immigrant from Pakistan stated: 
 
I think Muslim men have become the most irrational actor, when it comes to how the 
media portrays them.  They’re always put in some kind of threatening role, whether it’s a 
dictator we need to get rid of, or as the young revolutionary who is going to go to any 
violent means to overthrow that dictator, or down to the person who is sitting next to you 
on the airplane with intentions of harming you.  And I think that no matter which way 
you look at him, he is irrational, he is threatening, he is scary, and he is always opposed 
to anything that the West represents.  There’s no way he believes in freedom or that he 
believes in those ideals that the West holds dear and sincere to them. 
 
Such quotes indicated that discourses surrounding Islam have stigmatized the identities of 
Muslim men by defining them in terms of deviant manhood acts.  These men have been cast as 
potential terrorists and gender deviants whose male gendered practices are geared toward the 
resistance and disruption of Western social institutions, including the gender arrangements in 
these institutions.  To illustrate by comparison: whereas the ideal or “hegemonic” form of 
masculinity in Western cultures is characterized by stoicism, rationality, rugged individualism, 
libertarian sexual proclivities, and whiteness (Connell and Wood 2005; Connell 2005; Goffman 
1963: 128), Islamic masculinity is, as described above, regarded as “irrational,” “threatening,” 
and otherwise unpredictable and unruly.  This corresponds closely with Leary and 
72 
 
Schreindorfer’s (1998: 20) argument that stigmatized persons “are assumed to pose a threat to 
others, contribute inadequately to the common good, violate social standards,” and “induce 
aversive emotions in other people.”  Insofar as Muslim men continue to be portrayed in these 
terms, they arouse feelings of “suspicion, disbelief, and mistrust” among non-Muslims, and are 
subject to extraordinary surveillance and social control (Khosravi 2012: 68; Lyon 2002).  In this 
case, deviance and masculinity are fused to form a discursive frame that, in Goffmanian (1963: 
3) terms, “reduce” the identities of Muslim men in the minds of Western audiences, from the 
“whole and usual” to the “tainted and discounted.”  In line with the research reviewed earlier, 
then, these participants linked anti-Islamic stigma to negative representations of gender in Islam.  
My participants were not only aware of but also sensitive to stigma labels, especially the 
negative ways in which militant jihad and media portrayals reflected on Islam, the ummah, and 
themselves as individual Muslims.  For instance, they viewed media coverage of 9/11 and other 
mass-casualty attacks carried out by Muslim extremists as discrediting their social identities, and 
rendering them unacceptable to non-Muslim majorities.  It is precisely this lack of acceptance 
that Goffman (1963: 8) emphasizes as “the central feature of the stigmatized individual’s social 
situation in life.”  The daily barrage of discrediting information seemed focused on the deviant 
displays of Muslim men.  Although one participant did mention that media coverage of the Arab 
Spring had portrayed them in a positive light—as people “fighting for [values of] freedom and 
democracy” (Omar, 20)—nearly all expressed the view that Muslim men are more-often-than-
not depicted as inherently volatile, resolutely anti-American, and easily moved to extremism.  As 
Naseem put it, “You never see news media come in and say, ‘Oh, Muslim man saves ten people.  
It’s always, like, Muslim man kills ten people’.”  The notion that Muslim men are more inclined 
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to take lives than save them is a powerful narrative against which Naseem and the other young 
men defined themselves and their situations in daily life.   
Not surprisingly, then, stigma continued to affect these young Muslims in profound ways, 
summoning them to develop strategies for managing the effects.  Gender was highlighted as an 
integral part of this process—i.e., certain displays of masculinity were necessary for managing 
interactions with non-Muslims.  The nexus of gender and stigma in this case raises questions 
about the construction and negotiation of Muslim identities in Western contexts.  For instance, 
what specific role does gender play in coping with anti-Islamic stigma?  How is gender manifest 
in stigma management strategies used by young Muslim men in everyday life?  What other 
factors inform and influence this process?  I address these questions by presenting a thick 
description of how some young Muslims in the Midwestern U.S. define-and-do gender, and how 
young Muslim men, in particular, manage their spoiled identities in mixed-contact situations. 
DISPLAYING MUSLIM MANHOOD IN THE WEST 
In analyzing the statements and stories of participants, I found that perceptions of anti-
Islamic stigma and stereotypes compelled them, however reluctantly, to adopt certain strategies 
for managing mixed-contacts.  These stigma management strategies were markedly gendered or, 
more precisely, involved gender displays.  For instance, the young men spoke of situational 
pressures to show awareness and deference toward Western ways of doing gender.  Among the 
most salient strategies discussed were allaying embodiment—altering the physical manifestations 
of stigma so as to dispel the fears and suspicions of normals, in this case non-Muslim audiences; 
benign accommodation—modifying or foregoing religious practices that violated prevailing 
gender norms; and claiming normality—resisting stereotypes by embracing normative displays, 
both averse to the deviant manhood acts of Islamic extremists and amenable to traditional gender 
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roles and relations in American society.  With respect to the latter, many of the young women 
also attempted to extricate Muslim men and manhood from charges of inherent sexism and 
inclinations toward violence.  For instance, they described “real” Muslim men as peaceful, 
tolerant, family-oriented, and respectful toward women.  Although participants often discussed 
some combination of strategies, for the sake of scholarship, I present them as distinct forms of 
stigma management.  Also, in order to show the richness of the interview data, I focus here on 
participant accounts that most clearly and cogently exemplify these strategies.  
Allaying Embodiment and Benign Accommodation: From Shaving to Shaking Hands  
One strategy that some young men used to cope with stigma involved altering their self-
presentations, particularly with respect to two Islamic practices: maintaining the Sunna beard, a 
show of piety and closeness to the Prophet Mohammed, and shaking hands with women, an act 
that is considered haraam by a number of Islamic scholars representing the different schools of 
jurisprudence.50  Much like Muslim names and veils (Khosravi 2012: 66), these practices were 
seen as conveying negative information about their social identities, potentially disrupting social 
interactions, and even leading to social rejection and abuse.  The associated fears contributed to a 
deep sense of pressure to control such discrediting information in everyday encounters with non-
Muslim publics.  In Goffmanian (1959: 23) terms, this process involved changing aspects of their 
“personal front” (e.g., appearance and manner) that signified spoiled identities.  The goal was to 
present the self in an inconspicuous manner and, thereby, influence the beliefs and reactions of 
others.  In altering their personal fronts, these young men were clearly anticipating and expecting 
that: if I don’t appear or act like a “Muslim terrorist,” I won’t be treated like one.  For example, 
                                                          
50 For example, Imam Hanifah, Imam Malik, Imam Ash-Shafi’i, Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (Khalilullah 2011). 
75 
 
when asked about how they have responded to portrayals of Muslims in Western media, Salem, a 
1.5 generation Muslim-American from Qatar, discussed an infamous point of interaction for him 
and fellow Muslims since 9/11: 
So, when I’m going to the airport, I just try to make sure that my beard is shaved. I’m 
groomed.  I’m looking nice and stuff.  You know, try to be cool…so that people have this 
perception that I’m cool…I am not going to blame the people for thinking that way, they 
have been trained to think that way, that you know, a guy with a beard who is a Muslim, 
he is a terrorist and stuff.   
He continued: 
I mean, it [9/11] had a really big impact on lots of people, and see, if I grow this beard, I 
don’t want my friends or my coworkers or my colleagues or whatever to think that I am 
one of them.  And so I end up debating whether to go with—to please everybody else or 
just to go with how I am supposed to live, which is the way of my life…That’s the 
challenging thing, [pause] that’s a big issue, actually, to be dealing with in my daily life 
(Salem, 21). 
To shave or not to shave.  “To display or not to display” (Goffman 1963: 42).  This issue 
vexed a number of the young men.  For Salem, the events of 9/11 have transformed the meaning 
of the Sunna beard from a symbol of piety to one of extremism.  The dawning of this beard drew 
negative attention that could prompt special scrutiny from Travel Security Administration (TSA) 
agents and/or other passengers.  Since it is “evident on the spot” the Sunna beard is discredited 
stigma (Goffman 1963: 4) that could induce negative sanctions and thus needed to be managed.  
This process is acknowledged in the quote above via the seamless link between “…a guy with a 
beard who is a Muslim” and the idea that “…he is a terrorist.”  Fearing that his facial hair would 
bring to mind such stereotypes, especially in securitized settings like the airport, Salem decided 
to shave in order to (appear) “to be cool.”  Here, the word “cool” meant usual, acceptable, and, 
essentially, non-threatening.  It also projected poise, a type of “facework” used to avert incidents 
by concealing attributes that threatened to leave a person “shamefaced during encounters with 
others” (Goffman 1967: 9-13).  In this sense, the Sunna beard served as embodied information 
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that could be construed by certain audiences as signaling an imminent threat.  In order to manage 
this embodied stigma, then, one strategy was to remove the source—i.e., literally excise stigma 
from the body. 
Managing Muslim identities at the airport is arguably different than in mundane settings, 
particularly post-911, but for most participants encountering non-Muslim publics were viewed 
with apprehension no matter where they were.  Each mixed-contact situation presented risks and 
presupposed a schedule of displays for conveying their true feelings and alignment vis-à-vis non-
Muslim audiences.  As Salem later put it, “Wherever I go, you know, I have to take these kinds 
of extra steps and extra precautions so they don’t perceive me as one of them…so they don’t 
perceive me as this angry terrorizer with red eyes.”  Whether they were traveling, interviewing 
for jobs, running routine errands, or socializing in public, the young men expressed anxiety over 
how others might react to the sight of the Sunna beard.  It seemed to matter less where they were 
when encountering non-Muslim publics (read: normals), but rather how flexible they could be in 
managing their impressions.  In a multitude of settings, shaving was seen as a way to influence 
the definition of the situation and proceed undisturbed.  Insofar as shaving enabled these young 
men to avoid detection and “definitional disruptions” in mixed-contact situations (Goffman 
1959: 13), it constituted an attempt at passing or, more specifically, “adapting certain aspects of 
identity so as to be ‘unmarked’ as Muslim” (Khosravi (2012: 78).  These disruptions were 
described as ranging from subtle forms of shaming (e.g., mean and suspicious glances) to more 
blatant acts of exclusion (e.g., bullying and violence).  Removing the beard was thus considered 
a method for more predictably (read: safely) passing through different social arenas in the West.   
77 
 
Although shaving was considered by many of the young men as an effective way to cope 
with stigma, it was not unanimously accepted.  Ahmed, a Palestinian-American Muslim and 
active MSA member, stated: 
To me, I see that in airports and, in my opinion, I just don’t respect that because, first of 
all, the people [responsible for] 9/11, none of them had a beard.  Second of all, it’s a red 
dot on your name, regardless, even if you come naked…The fact that you are changing 
yourself, to the other side, let’s say to the U.S. government.  It shows two things, you are 
either hiding something, that’s why you are trying to fool us or you are not strong.  You 
don’t have strength.  That you are not proud of what you believe in.  And either way, it’s 
a negative thing.  It’s a bad thing (Ahmed, 21). 
 
For Ahmed, shaving the Sunna beard so as to avoid negative interactions with non-
Muslims was both cowardly and counterproductive.  In his view, the men who shaved either 
lacked intelligence (e.g., not knowing the actual basis for additional airport security that Muslim 
passengers face) or lacked strength (i.e., misrepresenting themselves and their beliefs).  In 
describing these men as “hiding” and “trying to fool” others, Ahmed associated this particular 
coping strategy with weakness, cowardice, and appeasement—characteristics that run counter to 
ideal Islamic masculinity (Gerami 2005, 2003; Aslam 2012).  Such views correspond with 
previous claims that dis-identifying acts present a virtual catch twenty-two for Muslim men: “To 
conservative Muslims,” like Ahmed, “they lack authenticity and have sold out their true faith for 
the price of admission to the West.  To the dominant group of their Western homes, they are 
suspects deserving to be watched” (p. 455).  The rejection of shaving, in this instance, further 
shows how issues of social misrepresentation can cause conflicts among the “own,” in this case, 
fellow Muslim men living in Western societies.  As noted by Goffman (1963), trying to manage 
discrediting information about the self comes with risks.  For young men, like Ahmed, the risk of 
feeling “disloyalty and self-contempt” (p. 84) by removing the Sunna beard outweighed the 
benefits of ameliorating personal fears and anxieties.  He would rather manage the social tension 
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than the social information conveyed by this gender display.  Disagreements over shaving, 
though limited, nevertheless revealed the importance of embodiment to the stigma experiences of 
these young men, and, in turn, how gender displays informed their stigma management 
strategies. 
Interestingly, while the young men pointed to the hijab (the Muslim practice of veiling) 
as a more detrimental marker of Muslim identity than the Sunna beard, a number of the young 
women expressed the opposite.  Even as they acknowledged the obvious stigma of veiling in 
Western settings, these women highlighted the problematic situations of the men.  For example, 
Sana, a second generation Muslim-American, claimed:  
A lot of times, girls will say, “Well, it’s harder for me.  I’m the one who walks around 
with a hijab on my head.”  That’s not completely fair.  The guys have their hijab too [the 
Sunna beard] and we have to understand what struggles go with it.  At least when a guy is 
going to look at me, he’s going to know I’m a Muslim woman and I’m off limits. With 
the guys, the moment people see they’re Muslim, they know they could get into trouble. 
She continued: 
I mean, it’s hard to wake up every morning and walk out with a hijab on your head but 
after a while it becomes part of you and it makes things a lot easier for you, although you 
might face the challenge of being taken aback by some person’s who’s never seen a girl 
in a hijab.  But I still have that sense of comfort that, you know what, everyone’s going to 
know I’m Muslim, but I’m probably not dangerous.  I don’t have to constantly explain 
myself, whereas the poor brothers with ‘lihyah,’ they’ve got to. 
Sana’s sensitivity toward the plight of her “poor brothers” was nuanced and poignant—it 
revealed how embodied stigma presented unique challenges for Muslim men.  By virtue of being 
privy to the challenges Muslim men face in the West, “wise” young women like Sana attempted 
to share the burden—what Goffman (1963: 31) refers to as bearing a “courtesy stigma.”  As Sana 
put it: “the guys have their [own version of] hijab too” in the Sunna beard.  This stigma symbol 
was understood as a similarly consequential to the veil, with different trade-offs.  The veil does 
indeed presented challenges for these young women but, as indicated above, it was not clearly 
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associated with danger and hence did not draw the same sort of scrutiny.  Such testimonies 
served as empathetic support and compensation for the negative encounters and occurrences 
experienced by Muslim men, once again, based on a gender display.51   In this way, young 
women like Sana exhibited “dramaturgical loyalty,” sharing in the “division of definitional 
labor” (Goffman 1959: 212, 9) with the young men.   
Although a few of participants that did not appear stereotypically Muslim (read: Arab 
Muslim) took advantage of their racially ambiguous appearance in mixed-contacts (for instance, 
by not volunteering their Muslim backgrounds or beliefs unless asked about them directly), more 
often they considered unmarking their bodies.  In other words, these men attempted to “directly 
correct” the discredited stigma (Goffman 1963: 9).  I call this strategy allaying embodiment or 
presenting the body in a manner that mitigates the effects of stigma by lessening the perceived 
anxieties and suspicions of normals, in this case, non-Muslim audiences.  These participants 
were aware that certain gender displays were stigmatized and so feared being judged and/or 
mistreated based on them—a process scholars refer to as “stereotype threat” (Steele and Aronson 
1995; Link and Phelan 2001: 374).  Much like the stigma of race, this stereotype threat was 
“embodied in ways of being seen, being treated, and being feared as different” (Howarth 2006: 
445).  In describing their motives and misgivings with regard to shaving, these young men were 
clearly grappling with the reality that their bodies were viewed as “quite thoroughly bad or 
dangerous” (Goffman 1963: 3) and therefore subject to being “policed, controlled, and excluded 
in particular ways in order to minimize the threat” (Howarth 2006: 445).  As a strategy, allaying 
embodiment constituted a form of passing intended to avoid the social inequalities that stigmas 
                                                          
51 In line with Goffman (1959: 13), whereas the stigma management strategies of the young men were primarily 
“defensive,” an effort to safeguard the own impressions, those of the young women were more “protective,” an 
attempt “to save the definition of the situation” projected by the men.   
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induce (p. 447).  While passing can be both intentional and unintentional, the statements of these 
young men suggested that shaving was a conscious overlay, intended and expected to project a 
favorable impression during mixed-contacts.  Such overlays reflected participants’ awareness of 
the embodied nature of anti-Islamic stigma and the role of gender displays in managing them—
points which I discuss further below.   
In addition to shaving, the young men discussed specific religious practices they felt the 
need to modify or abandon altogether in mixed-contacts.  A common concern was with Islamic 
rules on gender interaction, especially those forbidding Muslim men from shaking hands and 
making direct eye contact with women (ghad al-basar).  The former is considered forbidden 
(haraam) by a number of Islamic scholars, along with touching of any kind between Muslim 
men and women not related by blood or marriage; the latter mandates that Muslim men “lower 
their gaze” in the presence of women (Mir 2006; El Guindi 2005).  While these gender mores are 
viewed as signs of respect among devout Muslims, they have been portrayed as quite the 
opposite in the West (Razak 2004; Mishra 2007).  My participants expressed awareness of this 
contradiction and felt pressure to jettison such rules in mixed-contacts.  In Goffman’s (1963: 14) 
words, they felt “on” in these situations and therefore “self-conscious and calculating about the 
impression” they made.  For Hani, a first-generation Muslim-American, coed handshakes were a 
dilemma on par with shaving the Sunna beard:   
I mean shaking hands is not allowed in Islam—a Muslim man cannot shake hands with a 
woman, okay, that’s there…But when somebody, like an American lady or another 
Muslim lady comes in and wants to greet you and say hello, just to introduce herself, if I 
tell her that, ‘hey, I cannot shake hands with you, that’s insulting [to] her. So you must go 
ahead and do it.  For me, personally, this is what I do, actually, when I meet somebody 
[sits back slightly]. I do not approach. I do my best not to get physically involved with 
them, be it a handshake or whatever.  If they approach me with a handshake, yes I go 
ahead and do that, but I do not do it myself…I mean, I have to, kind of, make sure they 
know I am a nice guy.  That I’m not being sexist and stuff (Hani, 20). 
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The choice in mixed-contacts was clear: commit haraam by shaking hands with women, 
be they Muslim or not, or risk being thought of “as one of them” (i.e., Islamic extremists).  For 
young men, like Hani, this risk was not worth taking and so they devised strategies for handling 
such situations: “I do not approach” [to shake hands with a woman], Hani states, [but] “if they 
approach me with a handshake, yes, I go ahead and do it.”  Without attempting to conceal his 
identity or beliefs, Hani tried to present himself as a willing participant when it comes to identity 
norms, a process Goffman (1963: 30-31) distinguishes as “normification.”52  Agreeing to engage 
in such rituals demonstrated to others that they were not hostile and sexist but rather open-
minded and respectful toward gender codes of conduct outside Islam, thereby leaving positive 
impressions.  In this sense, coed handshakes were a form of “code-switching” (St. Claire and 
Guadalupe 1980) that signaled their alignment with non-Muslim audiences.   
When asked how, if at all, media portrayals of Muslims have affected his behavior, 
Karim, a second-generation Muslim-American, and Khaled, a first-generation immigrant from 
Pakistan also mentioned this bracket ritual:  
So, for example, in terms of shaking hands with a female.  It’s something very small. So 
in situations like this I try to avoid the [Islamic] idea that I should not shake hands with a 
female colleague or someone of the opposite gender.  I try to avoid that idea. I try to not 
abide by that idea for the fear that, okay, she is going to think of me like as someone that 
is being portrayed in the media (Karim, 28). 
I do feel like I have to go out of my way to dispel the negative stereotypes.  I mean, my 
stance on shaking hands has changed over time.  Before, I would never do it…I try to 
make it known to my non-Muslim female friends that I don’t hug and stuff like that, and I 
tell them, I’m not doing this out of disrespect or anything…But when somebody, like an 
American lady or another Muslim lady is being so nice to you and wants to greet you, 
and, you know, just get introduced.  If I tell her that I cannot shake hands with you, that’s 
insulting to her, which certain scholars have said is worse than not shaking the hand itself 
(Khaled, 23).   
                                                          
52 Goffman (1963: 30-31) defines “normification” as “the effort on the part of the stigmatized individual to present 
himself as an ordinary person, although not necessarily making a secret of his failing.” 
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 The risk and fear of coming across as disrespectful toward women compelled these 
young men to reconsider their stances on coed handshakes.  While Karim “avoided the idea” (the 
proscription on coed handshakes) altogether, Khaled made earnest attempts to explain to non-
Muslim women his decision to refrain from such gestures.  Ultimately, however, the situational 
pressure to do gender appropriately forced their hands, quite literally. As Khalid later admitted, 
“I do feel compelled to do these things now that I normally wouldn’t do just to not perpetuate 
stereotypes.”  Fortunately, as mentioned above, some Islamic scholars have qualified the practice 
of ghad al-basar, allowing participants to excuse certain gestures on moral grounds.  Such 
statements revealed how discrepancies between the virtual and actual identities of Muslim men 
led to strategic performances in mixed-contacts.  These situations were seen as consequential in 
that they (a) served as arenas where negative representations of Muslim men and manhood 
would be conjured and tested, and (b) where these young men could—through exercising stigma 
consciousness and management—project impressions that belied these representations.  Once 
again, a proper (read: normative) gender display was identified as a way to mitigate the effects of 
anti-Islamic stigma. 
The potential for handshakes to cause definitional disruptions was not only a dilemma in 
mixed-contacts, but also in terms of the identity norms of Muslim men.  In particular, for many 
participants, the controversy surrounding such gestures created confusion over masculine gender 
socialization in Islam.  For instance, Karim emphasized that abstaining from coed handshakes 
was “a show of respect to both genders.”  This practice was understood and conveyed as the 
opposite of sexism.  For Omar, refusal to shake hands with women was problematic not only 
because of perceived sexism but also because of personal misgivings about gender codes of 
conduct in Islam.  “I, personally, if a female extends her hand, I’ll shake it,” he stated.  I try to 
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look them in the eye, which is just so hard.  It’s a habit you have to get used to and that’s still 
something I have to work out.”  Omar explained that ghad al bassar and related practices were 
taught to him as ways to show honor and respect for women, and conduct himself as a Muslim 
man.  The discomfort he experienced in mixed-contacts reflected the tension such rules and 
expectations produced for these men—a tension that was only heightened by their commitment 
to Islam.  Omar elaborated with a story of an anxiety-producing interaction he had with a guest 
speaker at a MSA event.  The speaker, a non-Muslim woman, was initiating handshakes with 
some of the attendees before the talk and eventually approached him. “I was just sitting there 
thinking, what should I do?  What do you do?  I went ahead and shook her hand.”  Again, in this 
instance, concerns over the meaning and implications of a gender display meant certain 
capitulations.  For these young men, the path of least resistance was to abandon such displays in 
the presence of non-Muslims or, in Goffmanian terms, to accommodate the normals.   
Along with allaying embodiment, then, some of the young men managed stigmatized 
identities by reconsidering and refraining from gender displays that could convey or confirm 
negative stereotypes about them.  Besides embodied stigma, participants were concerned with 
religious rules and rituals that deviated from Western gender norms.  In their view, agreeing to 
shake hands and making eye-contact with women during mixed-contacts prevented incidents by 
facilitating their alignment with non-Muslim majorities.  To paraphrase Goffman (1976: 1), such 
alignment helped to “tentatively establish the terms of the contact” between these young men and 
their non-Muslim audiences by offering a corrective to accounts of their apparent and inherent 
misogyny, in “real-time.”  As a technique of impression management, shaking hands was more 
often mentioned than shaving or other physical changes to appearance, reinforcing Goffman’s 
(1963: 102) assertion that, among the stigmatized, “many of those who rarely try to pass, 
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routinely try to cover.”  As was the case with shaving the Sunna beard, this impression was 
contingent upon a normative gender display.   
These participants rationalized their decisions to forego ghad al-basar in mixed-contacts 
on the basis of situational pressures and supportive opinions espoused by Islamic scholars—i.e., 
those which deemed such decisions as permissible in certain cases and contexts.  In this way, 
shaking hands with women was re/defined as a forgivable indiscretion, and not an irredeemable 
transgression. Insofar as these indiscretions were perceived as minor, lacking the religious 
significance and repercussions of other forbidden acts, they were deemed benign.  Benign 
accommodation therefore constituted a second stigma management strategy, whereby 
participants attempted to influence the definition of social situations through gestures and bracket 
rituals that appeased non-Muslim majorities.  This strategy revealed their capacities to anticipate 
and avoid slips, scenes, and faux pas that perpetuated stereotypes about Muslim men, as well as 
apprehend and emulate normative gender displays in American culture.  In action, they were 
code-switching; in effect, they were “covering” (Goffman 1963: 102).  By engaging in such 
benign accommodation, participants also avoided the “social and personal misrepresentation” 
that was associated with shaving the Sunna beard—a coping strategy that nevertheless produced 
feelings of ambivalence, guilt, shame, deception, and disapproval among some participants.  This 
strategy was defined in terms of participants’ abilities to exert control over their situations and to 
read their actions as, for instance, shows of respect rather than capitulation to the host society.  In 
this sense, their gender displays were haraamless.   
Claiming Normality: “We’re Just Normal, Average Guys”  
 The third stigma management strategy could be summed up by a single quote and claim 
from Omar: “We’re just normal, average guys.”  That is to say, young Muslim men are usual, 
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typical, and acceptable, as are their ways of doing masculinity.  Unlike the previous strategies, 
such an approach was about resisting stigma through a process of “laying claim to the normal” 
(Ryan 2011: 3).  This process was twofold: on the one hand, participants denounced the gender 
displays of Islamic extremists and, on the other hand, proffered definitions and descriptions of 
masculine practices in Islam that coincided with traditional gender roles in Western cultures.  
They claimed normality by establishing social distance53 and emphasizing gender normativity.54  
For instance, both the young men and women rejected notions of honor, courage, and altruism 
used by jihadists to define themselves and their actions—instead they described these men as 
“brainwashed.”  In turn, they drew on passages in the Qur’an, Hadith, and on experiential reality 
to define Muslim manhood in terms of providing and caretaking.  While their statements often 
interwove subtexts of social distancing and gender normativity, I distinguish them here in order 
to specify the different bases for claiming normality as yet another stigma management strategy. 
Establishing Social Distance 
Not surprisingly, all participants expressed negative emotions (e.g., anger, distress, grief, 
sadness, shock, and shame) over the events of 9/11 and other acts of mass violence carried out by 
jihadists.  The interpretation and exhibition of jihad in these movements was seen as tragically 
misguided, departing from core Islamic principles of non-violence.  The correct view of jihad, 
participants explained, was as a personal struggle to overcome non-virtuous desires and to lead 
an honorable life, what scholars have distinguished as the “greater jihad” (Aslan 2006: 81).  
Interestingly, their disapprovals of militant jihad were often articulated in terms of the deviant 
                                                          
53 I define “social distancing” here as the process of disassociating one’s self and identities from individuals and 
groups with whom one share’s certain social characteristics, including age, sex/gender, race, and religion. 
54 By “gender normativity,” I refer to expressions and performances of gender identity that correspond with 
prevailing cultural definitions and expectations of masculinity and femininity. 
86 
 
gender displays of jihadists themselves.  For example, when asked what, if anything, the 
perpetrators of 9/11 were trying to achieve, participants responded in the following ways: 
I still have a hard time with that, that they would consider themselves Muslims.  And like 
the whole I am promised all these virgins.  Like I am pretty sure that’s a metaphor, but 
you are taking it literally for seventy-two virgins, which kind of makes you a pervert 
(Fatimah, 21). 
  
Their seventy-two virgins (Maryam, 21). 
 
That’s not how I have been taught, how I learned to be a Muslim, you know, to be a man. 
I didn’t learn to kill people and get these women…They definitely thought that what they 
were doing was full of honor and they wanted to get that kind of respect from other 
people and other nations and religions.  They were definitely trying to show their power, 
but ultimately I don’t feel—I feel they just humiliated our religion.  They used the name 
of Islam and humiliated the religion. (Omar, 20). 
 
Far from restoring the honor of the ummah, jihadists were seen as undermining Islam in 
pursuit of their own delusional masculine desires.  For instance, the prospect of seventy-two 
virgins55 promised to Muslim martyrs (shahid) in the afterlife was understood as an illegitimate 
motivation for violent acts—more so an indication of perversion than piety.  In their view, the 
jihadi interpretation of martyrdom perpetuated the false view that violence gets you sex in Islam 
and that such violence was an acceptable display of Islamic masculinity.  However, as Omar 
affirms above, such displays departed from proper male gender socialization in Islam.  His 
expressed sense of humiliation was echoed by several participants in recalling the events of 9/11 
and other acts of “Islamic terrorism,” a noteworthy finding considering that jihadists have often 
framed their violence as a means of redressing humiliations that they and fellow Muslims have 
been subjected to (Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005: Chapter 3; Hafez 2007; Sageman 2008: 
Introduction; also see Chapter 2 of this dissertation).  In the eyes of participants, these men were 
not praiseworthy but rather a manipulated minority whose self-serving actions have effectively 
                                                          
55 References to seventy-two virgins in paradise are found in both the Qu’ran and Hadith, including Sunan al-
Tirmidhi volume IV, chapter 21, hadith 2687. 
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stigmatized all Muslims.  The management of spoiled identities thus entailed a resounding 
rejection of these men and their shirk56 manhood acts.  
Participants also challenged depictions of Muslim men and manhood in Western media.  
For example, Salem stated:  
I don’t see Muslims like me on TV or Muslim like my friends on TV at all, like I don’t, 
in fact, I don’t see any Muslims that I know of on TV at all.  The Muslims on TV, these 
guys with turbans on their head, with a beard, doing this, maybe a gun or sword on their 
hand and they are doing this kind of talk or giving speeches, usually when they have 
kidnapped somebody, that’s the Muslims that they show.  I mean, I don’t see Muslim 
guys like me—and those guys, they are not even Muslims! (Salem, 21) 
  
 Such quotes were telling in the fluid manner with which they linked the attributes of 
Muslim men (e.g., the Sunna beard, turban, and/or taqiyah) to deviant behavior (e.g., acts of 
aggression and oppression).  In their defense, young men like Salem argued that the images of 
Muslim men broadcast on Western television bear no resemblance to them and that they do not 
share jihadists’ inclinations toward violence or fundamental disregard for human life.  Such 
statements were consistent with the social distancing strategies of Muslim women observed by 
Ryan (2011) and in line with Goffman’s (1963) assertion that identity norms are often defined in 
contrast to attributes deemed “abnormal.”  In this case, participants laid claim to the normal by 
distinguishing between genuine and deviant gender displays.  
The role of gender in social distancing was even more apparent in responses to follow up 
questions and probes.  For example, when asked how important, if at all, notions of honor, glory, 
and bravery were to the men who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, Yasmine, a first-generation 
Muslim-American, claimed: 
No one is glorifying them. No one is honoring them, besides those who are of that 
terrorist group. That’s it.  So, it’s just the group which, when you look at it, it’s not a lot 
of people.  But the depictions they made in our country seems like there is a million of 
                                                          
56 In Islam, the concept of “shirk” refers to actions that directly undermine the unity of God (Aslan 2006). 
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them out there, but no one else is glorifying them, no one else is honoring them.  This is 
not called bravery!  Even their own people, their own countries, are calling them 
cowards.  I mean everyone is calling them cowards, except that group—the terrorists 
(Yasmine, 26).  
 
The tone and terminology used by Yasmine above to describe the 9/11 hijackers says it 
all: these men are defined as “terrorists” and “cowards,” and the label “them” appears six times 
in the span of four complete sentences.  Cowardice, in particular, is a hallmark of unmanliness 
(Nagel 2005; Ouzgane 2008).  Participants claimed normality by expressly de-Islamifying the 
masculinity of militant jihadists.  Such statements thus indicated their disassociation—or lack of 
alignment—with the gender displays of jihadists.  To borrow from Goffman (1976: 3), even as 
these displays were “conveyed” as “natural” expressions of masculinity by militant jihadists, 
they were not “received” as such by young Muslims, like Yasmine.  Although a few participants 
likened the motives and displays of jihadists to those of American soldiers,57 the vast majority 
agreed, in way or another, with Yasmine’s complete and utter rejection of these men and the 
movement.  
Emphasizing Gender Normativity 
In addition to establishing social distance between the identities of actual Muslim men 
and the virtual men of jihad, these participants also emphasized the normative dimensions of 
gender in Islam.  In particular, they emphasized the ways in which masculine practices in Islam 
were compatible with traditional gender roles in Western cultures.  This was expressed through 
personal stories, anecdotes, and advice-lending about who Muslim men are and ought to be, as 
well as invocations of the virtues and values of the (all-male) Muslim prophets.58  They often 
                                                          
57 For example, “These are all men who do awful acts to defend their countries” (Noor, 20). 
58 There are twenty-five prophets mentioned in the Quran, all of whom are male and are believed to serve as 
exemplars of Muslim values and conduct.  These prophets may be considered “reliable indicators of ideal Islamic 
masculinity” (Aslam 2012: 95). 
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described “real” Muslim men as “family men.”  For example, when asked to elaborate about how 
to talk to others about being Muslim, Mohamed, a second-generation Muslim-American of Saudi 
descent, claimed: 
I will say [to others] the endpoints of our desires are the same.  We want a family, we 
want kids, we want a stable job, and I don’t think that’s seen.  I think, obviously, due to 
the media portrayals, it’s kind of hard to see a family man portrayal of a Muslim man.  
But the reality is, that’s what we want.  We want just to work, take care of the kids, take 
care of our family, and live a content life.  I don’t think a lot of Americans see that 
(Mohamed, 22). 
 
Similarly, Omar, 20, stated: 
 
You have to lead by example.  If you experience it [anti-Muslim prejudice], you are 
going to have to deal with it.  Now, you can respond with violence or you can respond 
with integrity.  The media portrays us as violent, arrogant, and whatnot, but we’re just, 
normal average guys.  I mean, I’m not al-Qa’ida.  I’m not here establishing Sharia 
Law…I want to get my degree and go to a prestigious law school and after that I want to 
work, work, work, and reap the benefits of my labor.  I am pretty sure that’s what you 
want to.  We have very similar goals at that point. 
 
These quotes illustrated how some participants resisted stigma by appealing directly to 
normative conceptions of traditional masculinity in American society.  That is, despite media 
portrayals that suggest otherwise, these young men expressed desires to pursue accepted and 
respected roles in Western societies.  Their emphasis on family roles and responsibilities served 
as a form of dis-identification, or establishing an identity claim by “throwing severe doubt on the 
validity of a virtual one” (Goffman 1963: 44).  Such claims also constituted an attempt to correct 
the “objective basis” of their “failing” (p. 9) by highlighting similarities between the identity 
norms of Muslim and non-Muslim men.  In particular, they detailed the Islamic principle of 
qawwam that defines men’s roles in terms of breadwinning (Brekke 2012: 257).  In line with the 
claims of Islamic scholars interviewed by Aslam (2012: 109), their statements stressed “the role 
of caregiver rather than warrior as an ideal for young Muslim men.”  In this sense, participants 
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claimed normality by distinguishing between authentic and deviant masculinity in Islam, and 
emphasizing the normative dimensions of their ways of doing gender.  
According to participants, like Omar, Muslim men must “lead by example,” exercising 
restraint when provoked and continuing to emphasize commonalities and shared goals with non-
Muslim majorities.  He and other Muslim men faced a choice when confronted with prejudice, 
misrepresentation, and discrimination: “either” respond with “violence” or with “integrity.”  The 
course and impact anti-Islamic stigma was seen as contingent on strategic actions during mixed-
contacts.  In Goffmanian terms, their “defensiveness” in these situations may be construed by 
others as “a direct expression” of their “defect” (1963: 6).  Rather, they should adhere to the 
religious virtues and role modeling of exemplary Muslim men, like the Prophet Muhammed.  For 
many of the young men, such adherence involved joining professional associations and groups 
that substantiated their roles as upstanding men.  As articulated by Omar above, they often talked 
about their career goals and paths—be it practicing law, medicine, or running a business—as 
showing their commitments to caretaking and to the community.  To be sure, they were not out 
proselytizing the Sharia or partaking in militant jihadism because they were too busy doing real 
men’s work.   
Interestingly, and relevant to the central question in this chapter, many of the young 
women also challenged anti-Muslim stigma and stereotypes by emphasizing the normative 
dimensions of masculinity in Islam.  In contrasting the depictions and actions of jihadists with 
those of ordinary Muslim men, Maryam, 21 argued: “they have their own families, they take 
their kids to school and bring them back, they love their wives and do their job, they do their 
business, and at the same time they go pray.  They don’t terrorize anybody.  They don’t kill 
anybody.”  She pointed to surahs (chapters) in the Qur’an that specifically encourage family role 
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performances. She even clarified controversies over qawwam, the guardianship or “custodial 
reign” of Muslim men over women (p. 92) as a misunderstood and misleading basis for anti-
Islamic stigma.  Rather than representing a set of male privileges, she explained that qawwam 
placed great pressure on men to provide for and protect their families.  Such religious practices 
were seen as making Muslim men more accountable to Muslim women and not as a pretext for 
abusing them.  The practice of purdah59 and the oppression of women in Islamic fundamentalist 
cultures, like the Taliban, was, in her view, a perversion of qawwam and not a reflection of the 
“natural” inclinations or “true” inner desires of Muslim men.  In mounting their own challenges 
to ideas about the limited power and agency of women in Islam (issues I explore in Chapter 4), 
these participants also supported the stigma management efforts of the men—in this case, by 
claiming normality on their behalf.   
Similarly, Noor described how she personally confronted stereotypes about Muslim men 
in encounters with non-Muslim women: 
You get these women who are, like, oh you poor thing, I must liberate you.  I feel so bad 
for you.  I bet your husband beats you. I bet he rapes you, or I bet you are putting on that 
scarf—you dress that way because these men need you to do that.  I didn’t used to, but 
now I’ll correct them.  I’ll tell them, I don’t need to be liberated and that, you know, 
we’re treated very well by the guys, thank you!  I mean, what makes them so different?  
They want a wife and kids, and good job, and they work hard for it.  They don’t just force 
it on us (Noor, 20). 
 
Mixed-contact encounters like this meant not only facing pity and derision directed at her 
situation, but also suspicion and aversion directed at Muslim men.  In this case, Noor confronted 
stigma by challenging the labeling of the men as terrorists, rebels, and rapists.  Mixed-contacts 
were thus an opportunity to confirm the significant responsibilities and obligations of Muslim 
                                                          
59 “Purdah” refers to a system of gender separation or apartheid (Aslam 2012). 
92 
 
men related to qawwam and the various consequences of failing to do so.  In other words, ideal 
masculinity in Islam was “that of a family man rather than an unbridled one” (p. 109).  The 
problem, as Mohamed pointed out, was that “a lot of Americans don’t see that.”  Such expressed 
frustration was a grim reminder that, in the eyes of these participants, non-Muslims publics had 
considerable power to define (read: spoil) their social identities and yet a limited understanding 
of Islam and Muslim ways of doing gender.  For these reasons, Noor and a number of other 
young women claimed the Muslim men actually “have it worse.”  While such solidarity was not 
all that surprising, the focus on exonerating Muslim men by way of their privileges was. 
These testimonies indicate that, in addition to rejecting the acts and aims of jihadists, and 
challenging related portrayals of Muslim men and manhood in the West, participants coped with 
stigma by asserting normative gender displays.  In particular, they pointed to the ways in which 
masculine gender roles in Islam were compatible with traditional arrangements in American 
culture.  In other words, far from being a “deviation from the norm,” the identities of Muslim 
men were imbued with the same values and predilections of traditional American men.  Again, 
this strategy involved laying claim to the normal through establishing social distance, on the one 
hand, and emphasizing gender normativity, on the other.  Similar to allaying embodiment and 
benign accommodation, the claiming of normality constituted a form of stigma management, 
whereby these young Muslim men and women managed anti-Islamic stigma in mixed-contacts.  
The quotes and accounts above illustrate the extent to which participants were sensitive to how 
they were viewed by non-Muslim majorities, how the displays and depictions of Muslim men 
contributed to negative stereotypes, and, in turn, why they felt the need to communicate to others 
(including me as a researcher) what gender in Islam really entails.  Their responses revealed not 
only an acute awareness of discrepancies between their virtual and actual identities, but also of 
93 
 
the specific signs that perpetuate them.  At issue were differences between how Muslim men and 
manhood are depicted, what they ought to be, and who and how they actually are.  The effects 
and management of stigma was also understood as most consequential in mixed-contacts—social 
situations where Muslims encounter non-Muslim publics.  Together, these strategies revealed 
how participants not only coped with collective stigmatization, but did so in gender-specific 
ways.  With these cases and connections in mind, I now turn to a discussion of the findings. 
CONCLUSION: Gender Displays and Managing Stigma  
As Gerami (2005: 450) had anticipated following 9/11, “Western popular cultures have 
seen their demons and they are Muslim men.”  The ease and anguish with which my participants 
described this demonization process revealed both the impact and extent of their awareness of 
stigma labels.  Such stigma consciousness resulted in feelings of intergroup anxiety that led, in 
part, to passing and covering strategies, out of “fear and expected rejection” (Link and Phelan 
2001: 374), as well as individual efforts to disabuse others of anti-Muslim stereotypes during 
mixed-contacts.  Their frustration and strategic responses to portrayals of Muslim men not only 
“underlines the dehumanizing nature of discourses and practices” that stigmatize (Howarth 2006: 
443), but also highlights how gender is part and parcel of this process.  More specifically, the 
basis for being stigmatized were particular gender displays, including the discredited bodies and 
deviant inclinations of Muslim men.  According to Goffman (1979: 8), because these displays 
reveal an actor’s alignment in social situations, they wield more power to define and affirm “our 
ultimate nature” than practically any other social division.  That certain gender displays serve to 
discredit Muslim identities and must be managed further supports the role they play in the 
formation and perpetuation of stigma.  
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Although gender displays constrain and distinguish the lives of stigmatized persons, they 
can also be employed in ways that mitigate the effects of stigma labels in mixed-contacts.  In this 
sense, gender displays indicate agency.  Whether they engaged in allaying embodiment or benign 
accommodation, these young men demonstrated their awareness and abilities to do gender “by 
design” (p. 3).  These strategies suggest that gender performances are not purely a product of 
coercion, but a tool that can influence the definition of situations and enable minority men to 
exert some control over the stigma process.  As Goffman (p. 9) points out, “Any scene…can be 
defined as any an occasion for the depiction of gender difference, and in any scene a resource 
can be found for affecting this display.”  These resources range from embodied to gestural signs 
of gender identity, or “genderisms,” that facilitate the alignment with normals (or at least present 
the prospect of doing so).  As well as shaping stigma labels, these gender displays also mitigate 
the effects.  Minority men may draw on normative genderisms to confront and counter stigma in 
everyday life. 
Gender displays are an integral part of how young Muslim men experience and manage 
stigma.  These displays constitute both a discursive frame for defining Muslim identities and a 
social tool for coping with anti-Islamic stigma.  In line with Goffman’s dramaturgical claims, the 
stigma surrounding these identities led to the development of specific strategies for mitigating 
the associated and adverse effects, especially in mixed-contacts.  As shown by the findings, these 
strategies ranged from directly correcting to challenging the basis for stigmatization and may be 
conceptualized as allaying embodiment, benign accommodation, and claiming normality.  These 
strategies were also gendered in that each involved projecting certain definitions of masculinity 
in Islam, and so indicate that gender displays are (1) integral to stigma management and (2) may 
be strategically deployed in order to protect the self in mixed-contacts.  This process involves a 
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complex interplay between the normative expectations and demands of the stigmatized person’s 
own group (in this case, other devout Muslims) and those of “normal” audiences (in this case, 
non-Muslim publics).  This research offers an explanation for why certain coping strategies are 
used in various social situations—explanations that remain rare in the literature on stigma (Lebel 
2006: 420).  In this section, I further discuss how gender displays are involved in the creation, 
perpetuation of stigma labels, and are thus an important aspect of stigma management.  I then 
describe what the above strategies reveal about the agency of stigmatized persons—specifically, 
the degree to which strategic displays of masculinity can protect and stabilize the self.  I close by 
considering how these displays may serve as a distinct survival strategy for minority men.   
First, the findings indicate that men’s gendered bodies are a critical dimension of stigma. 
Participants described the physical attributes and appearance of Muslim men as discredited and 
in need of management.  In terms of allaying embodiment, the young men discussed shaving in 
anticipation of mixed-contact situations.  They were aware that the Sunna beard, in particular, 
signified “dangerousness,” a key aspect of stigma and social rejection (Feldman and Crandall 
2007), and considered removing it in order to avoid or minimize negative reactions.  They hoped 
that unmarking their bodies in this way would assuage or “allay” the fears and suspicions of 
others.  This way of coping further suggests that visibility or “perceptibility” is a consequential 
aspect of stigma (Goffman 1963: 48; Jones et al. 1984; Lebel 2008: 411).  Decisions about 
shaving not only reveal the degree to which stigma symbols vary in meaning from person to 
person and group to group (e.g., the Sunna beard does not have the same connotation or status as 
the so-called “hipster beard” dawned by white American men), but also how these symbols can 
constrain or facilitate people’s agency—as something to be covered or confronted.  So, while 
shaving-to-pass constituted a “momentary” strategy (Goffman 1963: 80) and was not 
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unanimously accepted by participants in this study, it was nevertheless considered an effective 
overlay in everyday interactions.  The proof was in the pudding, so to speak: participants that 
shaved ahead of mixed-contacts admitted less discomfort and greater ease in traversing these 
situations.  Insofar as such gender displays are conducive to the interactional goals of stigmatized 
persons, they constitute a way of passing.  For minority men, whose intersecting identities have 
often been deemed deviant and dangerous, this suggests that allaying embodiment via gender is 
one way to cope with stigma.   
In addition to embodied changes, the young men managed their impressions in mixed-
contacts by refraining from certain religious codes of conduct, particularly those perceived as 
violating Western gender norms.  This strategy of benign accommodation involved and invoked 
Islamic rules on gender interaction, namely ghad al-basar.  Considering the stigma surrounding 
the identities of Muslim men, participants were sensitive about any and all actions that indicated 
sexism.  To avoid confirming and perpetuating such negative stereotypes, many chose to heed 
prevailing gender norms by shaking hands and making eye contact with women during mixed-
contacts.  Again, by accommodating non-Muslim majorities in this way, participants engaged in 
covering, preventing the stigma from “looming large” (Goffman 1963: 102).  They recognized 
the importance and impact of what is “given” and “given off” in interaction, especially in terms 
of shaping the attitudes and actions of others toward them, and believed that doing gender in 
normative ways would enable them to present favorable impressions and, as a result, influence 
the definition of these situations (Goffman’s 1959: 2-4).  As Mead (1934: 141) long-ago put it, 
“the conversation of gestures is the beginning of communication” and this communication 
structures social interactions and experiences.  The findings suggest that, for some stigmatized 
persons, gender displays greatly influence these conversations.   
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These participants also challenged stereotypical portrayals of Muslim men by laying 
claim to normative identities and ways of doing gender.  They did so by establishing social 
distance and emphasizing gender normativity.  For instance, they defined Muslim men as family 
men.  In Goffmanian terms, they challenged stigma by attempting to bridge the gap between the 
actual and virtual identities of Muslim men.  Like Ryan (2012: 4-7) observed among Muslim 
women in Britain, these participants challenged collective stigmatization by “distancing 
themselves from the ‘abnormal’” (in this case, the activities and accounts of Islamic extremists) 
and by asserting their normality and “moral standing” as a good members of society (in this case, 
as good Muslim men).  These findings indicate that Ryan’s conceptualization of “laying claim to 
the normal” (p. 7) may be extended to the stigma management strategies of other Muslims—men 
as well as women.  While this particular strategy is not new, this research delineates the specific 
manner in which it manifests in mixed-contacts: as contested gender displays.   
Together, these strategies reveal the anticipated and acted-upon changes through which 
young Muslim men cope with collective stigmatization, and how this process involved gender.  
Allaying embodiment and benign accommodation consisted of gender displays that deflected 
attention from the stigmatized identities of Muslim men.  In addition, participants expressly 
challenged the suggested links between these identities and those represented in both Western 
media and Islamic extremist movements by defining and displaying Muslim manhood as in 
keeping with traditional gender roles in American culture.  They were attempting to clear the 
record about masculinity (and femininity) in Islam by laying claim to normative ways of doing 
gender, rather than resigning themselves to passing or covering.  While the first pair of strategies 
were described in terms of self-defense or damage-control, the claiming of normality was more 
confrontational.  These different strategies correspond with previous arguments that stigma 
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management exists along a “reactive-proactive” continuum (Siegel et al. 1998).  Along this 
continuum, allaying embodiment and benign accommodation both involve the concealment, 
selective disclosure, and present no challenge to stigma labels, all characteristic of reactive 
strategies, whereas claiming normality entailed active resistance of discrediting information, in 
line with intermediate strategies.  There was implicit assumption that mixed-contacts were arenas 
where stereotypes about Islam and Muslim identities would be tested, and that perceptions and 
actions of these Muslims were linked to their gender performances in these situations.  For young 
Muslim men, such performances constitute some truth about their nature that can either confirm 
or counter stereotypes, and reduce or intensify the associated social consequences. 
Each of these strategies also reveals the significance of teamwork and the power of 
audiences to define the situations of stigmatized persons.  Both the young men and women 
defined masculine practices in Islam as normative, further indicating that stigma management is 
a “collaborative” process (Howarth 2006: 447-48).  While the young men managed their spoiled 
identities through self-presentations and performances that coincided with acceptable scripts of 
masculinity in Western cultures, the young women did so by drawing on their own experiences 
and observations to validate those presentations and performances.  For example, they clarified 
the Islamic practice of qawwam, for example, by emphasizing the great responsibility it places 
on Muslim men to perform as providers and to honor women.  Such clarifications were made in 
mixed-contacts (e.g., when questions about the conduct of Muslim men were raised by others) 
and constituted a challenge to depictions of “Muslim man as ‘the oppressor’/Muslim woman as 
‘the victim’” (Khosravi 2012: 69).  Contrary to this deviant dichotomy, masculinity in Islam was 
defined as fundamentally non-violent, family-oriented, and otherwise amenable to social life in 
the West.  Interestingly, then, in discussing their own views and experiences of being cast as 
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objects of oppressive gender regimes, these young women also discussed the pressures and 
privations faced by the men—the apparent source of their misery.  So, although these young 
women were not able to control the portrayals of Muslim men, they could still engage in 
“protective measures” in mixed-contacts by confirming their identity claims and corroborating 
the normativity of their gender displays (p. 212).  Considering the powerful role that Muslim 
women’s voices have in either lending legitimacy or offering a corrective to stereotypes about 
gender relations in Islam, such testimonies are an indispensable part of Muslim men’s efforts to 
manage stigma.   
 The findings further indicate the considerable influence that audiences exert over the 
experience of stigma, in large part by setting the contingencies of acceptance and approval in 
interaction.  As evidenced above, these contingencies were connected to certain gender displays.  
Again, for example, many of these young men feared the immediate consequences of refusing to 
shake hands with women in mixed-contacts.  In their view, the source of stigma and the image 
that needed to be disconfirmed in these situations were one and the same: deviant ways of doing 
gender.  There were two main audiences in this regard: discrete audiences, channeled through 
mass media and policy discourses, and immediate audiences, those encountered face-to-face.  
Even though participants blamed discrete audiences for manufacturing, perpetuating, and 
exacerbating anti-Muslim stereotypes, especially those about Muslim men, their focus and 
concerns remained with immediate audiences.  What truly mattered, then, was the vicinity of 
stigma—i.e., how and in what ways stigmatizing discourses intruded upon their daily lives and 
what they could do about it.  That being said, when detailing these strategies, none of the men 
mentioned insecurities over jobs.  Most seemed concerned with being improperly detained and 
questioned for involvement with terrorism, not so much about finding work, providing for their 
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families, or otherwise “making it” American society.  These concerns stand in contrast to those 
expressed by Muslims in Europeans countries (e.g., Kunst et al. 2013; Aslan 2009), suggesting 
that Islamophobia in the U.S. is different and perhaps less institutionalized than in Europe.  In 
both contexts, however, gender is identified as an important part of the stigma process—one that 






Capturing the Veil: The Nexus of Commitment, Salience, and Stigma in the Moral Careers 




Young women that embrace Muslim identities remain targets of criticism and controversy in 
Western societies.  In this chapter, I examine the consequences of this process by analyzing 
interviews with twenty-six young Muslims living in the Midwestern United States.  I find that 
young Muslim women cope with collective stigmatization through strategic action, including 
allaying embodiment and embracing stigma.  Such strategies indicate that the extent to which 
stigmatized identities are invoked in daily life is dependent on the patterns of socialization and 
strength of social ties associated with these identities. Drawing on Identity theory and Goffman’s 
concept of moral careers, I argue that the stigma management strategies of participants are linked 
to increased commitment, salience, role-related behavior, and self-esteem.  The findings support 
this argument and suggest that the stigma process may have self-protective properties, increasing 





9/11 and the Moral Careers of Young Muslim Women in America 
 To be sure, the stigmatized have distinct standpoints and develop particular conceptions 
of self through everyday encounters with non-stigmatized persons.  These processes constitute 
their “moral careers” whereby they become aware of and learn to deal with discredited attributes.  
For Goffman (1963: 32-35) there are four general patterns of socialization that moral careers take 
depending on the onset, form, and type of stigma, the protective efforts of the social circle of the 
stigmatized, and the social contexts within which they are embedded.  In terms of these patterns, 
Muslim identities in the U.S. have followed the course of “sudden stigmatization,” which occurs 
when an identity is abruptly transformed on the basis of an unanticipated event or condition that 
discredits it (e.g., the September 11th attacks).  This career often begins after stigmatized persons 
have developed a sense of normative boundaries—i.e., what it means to be a “normal” person.  
The moral careers of Muslim women have not only been shaped by the events and aftermath of 
9/11, but also by their ages and awareness of American cultural norms.  Following Goffman 
(1963: 38-39), “a life event,” such as 9/11, “can thus have a double meaning on moral careers, 
first as immediate objective grounds for an actual turning point and later...as a means of 
accounting for a position currently taken.”  These careers help shed light on how stigma is 
acquired, understood, and managed in daily life, including the coping strategies young Muslim 
women in America use to deal with sudden and collective stigmatization.    
 The moral careers of the stigmatized often involve changing or new-found relationships 
to others that bear and share their deviant treat.  For instance, in an effort to gain acceptance, 
these individuals may strengthen ties to in-group members.  Conversely and with the same 
intention, they may distance themselves from those individuals and groups perceived as of their 
“own” kind.  These degrees or “cycles” of affiliation (p. 38) are a key indicator of the strength of 
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stigmatized identities, as well as one’s connection to them over time.  For Muslim minorities, 
these affiliations consist of ties to Islamic centers and mosques, and involvements in online 
Muslim groups—the “virtual Ummah” (Zaman 2008: 467).  Not only are these spaces designated 
for religious practice but, in the wake of 9/11, a sanctuary for devout Muslims: places where they 
will be accepted, protected, and free to explore and construct identities (Ewing and Grady 2013).  
At the same time, these spaces have been scrutinized by politicians, pundits, media personalities, 
and average citizens as hostile to American culture and interests, where young, impressionable 
people are manipulated, radicalized, and even recruited into extremist groups (U.S. Cong. 
Committee on Homeland Security 2011; Post and Sheffer 2006; Pipes 2003; Emerson 2002).  
Such discourses have made the affiliative cycles of Muslim minorities an important dimension of 
their moral careers, in need of further study. 
 Although researchers have documented the impact that 9/11 and subsequent acts of 
“Islamic terrorism” have had on Muslim minorities in the U.S. (Peek 2011; Bayoumi 2009; 
Jamal and Naber 2008), there are particular aspects of the stigma process that remain unknown.  
In particular, how have Muslims that “came of age” in the wake of 9/11 dealt with anti-Islamic 
stigma?  What coping strategies have they used and what do they suggest about the salience of 
Muslim identities among younger generations of Americans?  Insofar as age and social context 
are critical facets of one’s moral career, the answers to such questions would be instructive and 
novel.  Not surprisingly, major contributions along these lines have featured Muslims that clearly 
recollect 9/11 (e.g., Naber 2008; Peek 2011).  Many of these studies have also focused on issues 
of prejudice and discrimination, racial assimilation, and various facets of civic engagement (e.g., 
Kunst et al. 2012; Bayoumi 2009; Jamal and Naber 2008).  We have yet to learn how collective 
stigmatization is managed by younger generations of Muslim women in America, such as how 
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they define themselves and deal with Islamophobia in everyday life.  Exploring these issues is 
necessary for further developing our understanding this stigma process, including the negotiation 
of deviant identities and the dramaturgical effects of mixed-contacts.  With this focus in mind, I 
now turn to a discussion of Identity theory and what it claims about role-behavior that can shed 
light on the management of anti-Islamic stigma. 
Muslim Identities in Western Contexts: The Salience of Spoiled Identities 
 In an early treatise on Identity Theory, sociologists Sheldon Stryker and Richard Serpe 
(1982) argued that future analyses of the self and identity must develop more precise concepts 
that can be measured empirically.  In their view, Symbolic Interactionists (SI) have cogently laid 
the groundwork for explaining the quintessential and consequential relationship between society 
and the self, but many SI studies continue to face methodological challenges.  These challenges 
were seen as stemming from a combination of underspecified concepts, theoretical propositions, 
and empirical evidence, as well as a lack of hypothesis-driven research.  Hence, they proposed a 
theory of identity that would enable both qualitative and quantitative researchers to develop and 
improve explanations of social behavior by focusing on a particular kind: role-related behavior.  
Such a focus would also help refine and extend the SI perspective by better situating concepts 
within the microsociological framework of self and identity.  Among the key concepts they 
defined for making sense of role-related behavior were commitment, the extent to which a 
person’s relationships to others rests on attachment to a social role, and salience, a way that a 
person’s identities are organized and ordered in relation to the self (pp. 206-07).  Commitment 
and salience are “particularized terms” that reflect and specify larger theoretical constructs (e.g., 
social structure) and may be operationalized in sociological studies of stigma, including those 
examining the effects of stigma on the role behavior of Muslim women.  Before delving into this 
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issue specifically, I briefly discuss the relationship of the aforementioned concepts to the stigma 
process, particularly stigma management. 
 For identity theorists, deciding who and how we are in everyday life is a fluid, context-
contingent, and precarious process.  They direct analytic attention to the “choices” people make 
in defining themselves and selecting social roles.  In their view, role-identities60 and the social 
situations in which they arise are “ambiguous in the performance expectations that define them.”  
This matters because the role performances that are chosen and how they unfold in interaction is 
a critical part of constructing the self and social identities in society (p. 205).  These role 
performances also indicate one’s social status and sense of belonging in “organized structures of 
social relationships” (p. 206).  In theory, a person can have as many role-identities as the discrete 
sets of relationships they hold (e.g., son, daughter, student, Muslim) and must organize them in 
order to manage the relative demands of each.  This prioritizing process involves arranging and 
ranking role-identities in relation to societal norms—making choices based on what identities are 
available, accessible, and socially valued.  The result is a system of social identities that together 
comprise and constitute the self.  This approach to the self suggests that members of stigmatized 
groups do have some agency, that “choice assumes a social structure that provides options” (p. 
208), and that being stigmatized does not necessarily mean being passive, that “stigma is as 
much about the resistance of identities as the reduction of identities” (Howarth 2006: 450).  
Thus, how young Muslim women in America organize their role-identities may reflect (and be 
rooted in) their moral careers. 
 These theorists further posit that role-identities are organized into a hierarchy based on 
the probability that they will be invoked in a given social situation or across different situations.  
                                                          
60 Insofar as roles and identities are inextricably linked, Stryker and Serpe (1982) proposed the term role-identities 
to refer to these positional designations; a term I too adopt going forward.   
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In other words, these identities are organized based on their “salience.”  The salience of a role-
identity reflects its location within this hierarchy and, theoretically, represents one way that 
identities influence behavior.  A key prediction of Identity theory, then, is that salience will 
influence how, when, and where a role-identity will be brought into play in daily life, as well as 
what specific behaviors will be associated with it (Stryker and Serpe 1982: 206-07).  Besides, 
whether or not a behavior occurs depends on how a role-identity interacts with (a) the “defining 
characteristics of the situation (such as the degree to which the situation permits alternative 
identities to be expressed behaviorally),” and (b) other dimensions of the self, such as self-
esteem.  In terms of stigma, the reaction of others as well as one’s self-image influence which 
identities will be salient.  This work suggests that prevailing cultural discourses, mixed-contact 
situations, and individual self-esteem are all manifest in the salience of Muslim identities.  This 
may be gleaned in part from the role behavior of Muslim women, especially in and through their 
responses to stigma.   
The concept of salience sheds light on how and why a particular identity may be brought 
to the fore in mixed-contacts, and is related to one’s level of commitment.  Here, commitment 
refers to “the degree to which a person’s relationship to specified sets of others depends on his or 
her being a particular kind of person” (p. 207).  For example, the commitment of Muslim women 
to religious identities is understood in terms of “occupying” a certain status or position within the 
Muslim community (ummah) and “playing” the role.  Commitment is therefore connected to 
one’s social involvements, memberships, and networks, or “the number of others to whom one 
relates by occupancy of a given position” (p. 207).  For instance, individuals are committed to 
gender identities to the extent that their most important roles and relationships are based on being 
men and women (Schwalbe and Staples 1991: 165).  Given the more strict systems of gender 
107 
 
separation in Islam, the standpoints of Muslims are heavily premised on being a man or woman, 
suggesting that greater commitment to Islam entails greater commitment to one’s gender roles 
and identity.  Again, according to Stryker and Serpe (1982: 207), the greater the strength of one’s 
commitment to an identity, the greater the likelihood it will be invoked in a variety of social 
situations.  Such commitment is central to defining who and what we are, and predicting the 
relationships and activities we are likely to engage in.  In conceptual terms, then, “commitment 
affects identity salience which in turn affects role-related behavior” (p. 207).  This process may 
be observed among different individuals in order to gain new insights into social behavior, 
including coping with stigma. 
The concepts of commitment and salience appear relevant, if not integral, to the stigma 
process, and yet few studies have examined to these concepts in relation to stigma management.  
For example, how are they related to the coping strategies of Muslim women?  Such a question 
reflects and extends the review of stigma research by Lebel (2008) that points to “outcomes” of 
stigmatization as important and yet under-explored aspects of the process, especially studies that 
can explain the “tremendous amount of variations” in coping and their impact on psychological 
health and well-being (p. 421).  These explanations may also be bolstered by theories of identity 
(p. 421) that explicate the role and relevance of concepts like commitment and salience.  In this 
regard, a study of how Muslim minorities manage stigma in mixed-contacts represents an 
opportunity to apply and extend identity theory.  Considering the extent to which the social roles 
and involvements of Muslims have been scrutinized since 9/11 (Lyon 2002; Mir 2006; Jamal and 
Naber 2008; Bayuomi 2009; Ghaffari 2009; Peek 2011), this research may show how and in 
what specific ways their choices are contoured by stigma labels.   
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Even though religious identity routinely serves as a basis for stigma, knowledge of how 
Muslims create and negotiate role-identities remains limited.  This is especially the case for 
newer and younger generations of Muslims in the U.S., leading scholars to call for more research 
on the dynamics and experiences of this population (e.g., Hermansen 2003; Leonard 2003; Peek 
2005).  For example, in her study of identity formation among second-generation Muslim-
Americans, Peek (2005), identified various stages of religious commitment and salience.  In 
particular, she described these stages as existing on a continuum, from little reflection about the 
meaning of being Muslim to increasing awareness and acceptance of Muslim identities, and, 
eventually, to complete and open acknowledgement of them.  These stages—defined as 
“ascribed,” “chosen,” and “declared,” respectively—indicated and helped to explain why 
Muslim youth in America are affirming their religious identities, even more so than previous 
generations.  In addition, Peek situates her findings within Identity theory, concluding that 9/11 
“solidified” the commitment and increased the salience of religious identity for most of her 
interviewees (p. 237).  That being said, such studies have not specified the ways in which young 
Muslims show commitment to religious identities, especially in terms of gender.  For instance, 
how do the stigma management strategies of young Muslim women signify, facilitate, and reflect 
commitment?  How and to what extent does gender influence the salience of Muslim identities in 
mixed-contacts?  Answers to these questions will further develop the theoretical claims of Peek 
(2005) and other scholars (e.g., O’Brien 2011), by verifying the constructs and evidence used to 
explain the formation of religious identities, as “spoiled identities” (Goffman 1963), and by 
clarifying the role of gender in this stigma process. 
Considering the potential of Identity theory to further our understanding of coping with 
anti-Islamic stigma, I re-examine a number of predictions put forth by Stryker and Serpe (1982).  
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Specifically, I explore the influence of commitment and salience on the role-related behavior and 
self-esteem of young Muslim women in America.  The significance of this study is threefold: (1) 
it speaks to the “paucity of research” that explains why stigmatized persons prefer certain coping 
strategies over others, especially in different settings and social contexts (Lebel 2008: 420); (2) it 
adds to the limited knowledge of the variability of such coping strategies among stigmatized 
persons (p. 424).  Despite the increased attention on Muslim minorities since 9/11, there appears 
to be many elusive and subtle differences in how Muslim identities are displayed and managed in 
everyday life; and (3), as mentioned above, it is an opportunity to empirically reassess Identity 
theory concepts and claims, and its relevance to stigma management.  In the next section, I 
review one other important facet of social stigma: self-esteem.  
Stigma and Self-Esteem 
 Stigma and identity salience have significant implications for self-esteem.  That is, self-
esteem may vary considerably based on the discrediting information associated with a particular 
identity and its prominence relative to others.  In sociology, self-esteem has been defined as “a 
positive affective response to the self deriving from beliefs that one is competent and moral” 
(Schwalbe and Staples 1991: 159).  In their empirical analysis of self-esteem, Schwalbe and 
Staples (1991) distinguished the key sources as “reflected-appraisals,” “self-perceptions,” and 
“social comparisons.” 61  While there may be other possible sources for self-esteem, these have 
been observed in sociological studies of the self dating back to the work of Cooley ([1902] 1964) 
(also see Mead 1934; Rosenberg 1979; Gecas and Schwalbe 1983).  The socialization process 
informs and influences the value of one source over another and, as a result, these sources tend to 
                                                          
61 Reflected appraisals refer to other people’s reactions toward us and our interpretation of these reactions (p. 159). 
Self-perceptions refer to personal observations of behavior and its various effects (p. 159). Social comparisons refer 




be gendered.  For instance, young men in the U.S. have been found to place more importance on 
social comparisons than young women, who have been found to value reflected appraisals to a 
greater degree (Schwalbe and Staples 1991).  In this sense, self-esteem reflects identity norms 
associated with masculinity and femininity—i.e., what constitutes appropriate and acceptable 
behavior for men and women in society.  It is largely “a matter of culture” (p. 160).  And yet, 
relatively little sociological research has been directed at the gender-based differences in self-
esteem.  This is unfortunate considering that sociologists are particularly equipped to explain 
how gender, race, religion, and other important social structures are associated with stigma, not 
to mention the self.  The course and character of Islamophobia following 9/11 suggests that 
gender ideologies, reference groups, and social settings all affect the self-esteem of Muslims in 
America (e.g., see Zine 2006; Naber 2008; Ryan 2011; Mahon 2014).   
 Sociologists have long argued that self-esteem is related to one’s awareness of others’ 
appraisals and evaluations, and since these aspects of the self are developed in interaction, those 
who receive negative feedback do and will feel worse about themselves.  In this sense, being 
stigmatized is believed to lower self-esteem.  For example, according to the looking-glass self 
idea proposed by Cooley (1956: 184), self-esteem is tied to one’s self-concept or the cyclical 
social process consisting of (a) our imagined appearance, (b) what we imagine others’ judgments 
of our appearance to be, and (c) the ensuing personal feelings, such as “pride and mortification.”  
In this sense, those who are aware of being stigmatized will, to a degree, internalize stigma labels 
and have, relative to non-stigmatized persons, less self-esteem.  Research on gender and self-
esteem has supported this claim, showing how peers, teachers, and media representations are 
apparent in women’s negative attitudes and feelings toward themselves, compared to men (e.g., 
Schwalbe et al. 1991).  In addition, researchers have conceptualized efficacy-based self-esteem 
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that highlights how individuals can “earn” self-esteem through displays of competence and 
assertiveness in interaction (Gecas and Schwalbe 1983; Franks and Marolla 1976: 326).  Since 
members of stigmatized groups presumably have opportunities for such displays “blocked,” this 
theory suggests that they will feel worse about themselves.  In this sense, a lack of power lowers 
self-esteem.  These theories indicate that, owing to more limited opportunities for demonstrating 
competence, Muslim minorities will, as a group, have lower self-esteem than average Americans.  
Whether self-esteem is approached from the looking-glass self or efficacy-based perspective, the 
consensus is that stigmatization adversely affects self-esteem.    
While these earlier theories and conventional wisdom suggest that stigmatized persons 
have lower self-esteem than their non-stigmatized counterparts, this may not always or actually 
be the case.  In an important corrective to these predictions, Crocker and Major (1989) illustrated 
how the use of specific coping strategies can facilitate social and self-acceptance—i.e., being 
stigmatized may not necessarily mean having less self-esteem.  They listed a number of studies 
that either failed to establish the negative impact of stigmatization on self-esteem or found the 
opposite: that members of stigmatized groups exhibited high self-esteem.  Without suggesting 
that stigma is somehow an innocuous or salubrious social phenomenon, these scholars showed 
how stigmatized persons can safeguard or even bolster feelings of personal self-worth in the face 
of prejudice and discrimination.  For example, they might (a) attribute negative feedback and 
personal failures to other’s prejudicial views toward their group, and not themselves personally, 
(b) compare their experiences only to in-group members—i.e., their “own” (Goffman 1963: 27), 
or (c) choose to devalue only those attributes and displays that reflect poorly on their group and, 
at the same time, selectively value those which shine more positively on their group (Crocker 
and Major 1989: 614-18).  Among Muslims, the use of such self-protective strategies might 
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involve re/defining individual experiences of stigma in terms of aversion directed at all Muslims, 
comparing their experience of rejection or mistreatment only to those of fellow Muslims (e.g., 
Muslims who have been severely harassed, involuntarily detained, physically assaulted, or 
killed), and distancing themselves from violent extremists by espousing pro-Western values; the 
net effect of these strategies being the preservation of self-esteem.  In terms of identity theory, 
such strategic responses to anti-Islamic stigma should be influenced by commitment to Muslim 
identity, its relative salience, and its display in daily life.   
Since commitment denotes the number and strength of relationships tied to an identity, it 
is closely tied to self-esteem and the aforementioned sources.  That is, commitment to an identity 
extends in part from an individual’s experience of its “value” for generating positive feedback, 
especially in terms of one’s competence and moral standing (Schwalbe and Staples 1991: 160).  
This suggests, for instance, that Muslims will be committed to their religious role-identities 
insofar as these identities can help them achieve interactional goals and maintain good feelings 
about themselves.  Schwalbe and Staples (1991) believe that the salience of an identity is not just 
contingent on commitment, but also on the kinds of self-evaluations that arise from invoking 
them in social situations.  The salience of Muslims’ religious identities will therefore be affected 
by positive and negative encounters with non-Muslim publics.  These “mixed-contacts” 
(Goffman 1963: 12) thus inform the salience hierarchies and self-esteem of stigmatized persons.  
Despite the potential for such work to explain variations in self-esteem among stigmatized 
persons, studies of the self-protective properties of commitment and salience remain rare (e.g., 
Peek 2005).  So, in order to assess the impact of collective stigmatization on the individual self-
esteem of Muslim women, it is necessary to clarify the role and relevance of these concepts.   
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While Stryker and Serpe (1982: 207-08) suggested more than ten “hypotheses” to pursue 
in future studies of identity formation, a number have yet to be tailored or “tested.”  I focus here 
on adopting, adapting, and addressing the following four as tendencies rather than hypotheses:   
1) The greater the commitment premised on an identity, in this case Muslim identity, the 
more salient will be the identity. 
2) The greater the commitment premised on Muslim identity, the more salient the identity 
will be, and the more positive will be the evaluation of this identity. 
3) The greater the commitment premised on Muslim identity, the more salient the identity 
will be, and the more general self-esteem will be based on this identity. 
4) The greater the commitment, the more salient Muslim identity will be, and the greater 
will be the impact on role-performances, on role-specific self-esteem, and on general self-
esteem. 
 
The choice of these four was predicated on three factors: (1) various findings on the 
weakening and strengthening of Muslim identities in Western contexts, post-9/11, (2) the degree 
to which the predictions “hang together” conceptually and are relevant to the negotiation of these 
identities, and (3) the extent to which they may increase our understanding or otherwise “get at” 
the management of anti-Islamic stigma.  These predictions also reflect my own methodological 
assessment of what could be reasonably extrapolated from the data, interview questions, and the 
number of interviews conducted in this study.  The focus on Muslim women, in this case, also 
heeds previous calls to examine differences in how groups deal with stigma (e.g., Major and 
O’Brien 2005; Lebel 2008: 416).  For example, in reviewing the social scientific literature on 
perceptions of and responses to stigma, Lebel (p. 415) finds few studies that have conceptualized 
the vast differences in coping strategies among stigmatized persons and how these strategies “fit 
together.”  To understand the impact of stigma on self-esteem, for instance, more research is 
necessary, especially from an insider’s perspective (p. 416).  Evaluating the predictions listed 
above is also a way to address a gap in the literature on stigma management by measuring and 
explaining variations in coping strategies and the extent to which individuals internalize stigma 
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labels.  The concept of moral careers informs these levels of commitment to and salience, 
situating them within a range of social ties and affiliative cycles.   
DATA & METHODS  
 Data for this study were based on in-depth interviews with twenty-six young Muslim men 
and women living in the Midwestern United States.  These data were gathered as part of a larger 
project on the construction and negotiation of Muslim identities in Western societies.  The focus 
of this chapter is on how young Muslim women manage stigmatized identities; a similar inquiry 
into the effects of stigma on the self and identities of young Muslim men is made in a separate 
chapter.  Interview participants varied in terms of ethnicity, nationality, and religious affiliation 
(e.g., Sunni or Shi’a).  About half of participant identified as men (14) or women (12) and the 
majority were either second-generation U.S. citizens or 1.5 generation naturalized citizens.  For a 
complete description of study participants’ backgrounds and information, as well as the analytic 
technique used in this study see Chapter 2 and Appendix B.   
THE PROBLEM: Being Hijabi and Facing Stigma 
Once again, this research asks how young Muslim women cope with stigma in everyday 
life, especially in mixed-contacts.  Not surprisingly, the hijab (the Muslim practice of veiling) 
featured prominently in accounts of this coping process.  Nearly all participants pointed to the 
hijab as a fundamental and persistent source of stigma.  Consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Ryan 2011; Khosravi 2012; Kunst et al. 2012), this practice was viewed as both an central and 
consequential expression of commitment to Islam.  In their words, it was a “walking symbol” 
and “a huge political statement” about Muslim women’s status and self-concepts (Khaled, 23).  
In spite of its “beautiful spiritual meaning,” this practice was understood as “representing our 
oppression [as Muslim women]” (Sana, 19).  While none of the main questions in the interview 
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guide were about Muslim women’s attire and appearances per se, the hijab was often mentioned 
as a key constituent of stigma management.  For example, when asked about how Muslims are 
portrayed in Western media, participants often started by distinguishing them in terms of gender 
displays and discussing the controversies over veiling in Western countries.  These controversies 
were seen as most serious and scary in legislative efforts to ban the veil.  Their accounts clearly 
indicated that women’s decisions to wear hijab or “be hijabi” was stigmatized.  For example, as 
Sana, a second-generation Muslim-American of Pakistani descent, recalled: 
I remember when 9/11 happened, I was in elementary school and during recess, one of 
my friend’s moms would come drop her son off in kindergarten.  So I’d always see her 
walking through the playground her son and she wore hijab.  And then after 9/11, in the 
coming weeks we consulted with our ulama about what we should do.  My mom was, 
like, ‘should we stop wearing hijab?  Is it a safety concern?’ He said, ‘you make whatever 
decision you’re comfortable with, but if you are wearing the hijab, God will protect you 
and keep you safe.’ My two older sisters decided to keep their hijab on and so did I.  But 
I remember seeing my friend’s mom after that, she came back to school and she didn’t 
have her hijab on.  It’s weird how that like one of those scenes I will never forget, her 
holding her son’s hand and just walking through the playground without her hijab on  
(Sana, 19). 
Such vivid memories of the post-9/11 controversies about veiling practices reflected 
participants’ awareness of discredited stigma and the ensuing decisions that needed to be made 
about them.  That is, commitment to religious role-identities was an integral part of their moral 
careers.  Statements like Sana’s also indicated how being hijabi invoked the kinds of negative 
feedback detrimental to self-esteem, if not one’s very sense of physical security.  These women 
were presented with a choice: keep or cover the veil.  The visibility or concealability of stigma 
has important implications for self-esteem (Jones et al. 1984) and, as we shall see, was often 
apparent in how participants understood and managed mixed-contact situations.  Although they 
did not have a personal hand in 9/11 or other acts of “Islamic terrorism,” many felt that their 
choices to continue wearing hijab made them seem complicit.  In other words, they were deemed 
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responsible for maintaining a stigmatizing condition, even though they didn’t technically bring it 
on themselves (Brickman et al. 1982).  Being hijabi resolved questions of how, where, and when 
to disclose discreditable information and clearly showed commitment to Muslim identities.  The 
important questions that remained were about whether or not to do so, or be so, and the impact of 
such decisions on the self. 
The hijab was also recognized as a stigma symbol62 by the young men in this study.  In 
the course of discussing the Sunna beard, many of them also brought up veiling as a comparable 
and more detrimental embodiment of stigma.  For example, Ali, a second generation Muslim-
American professed: 
The fact is if you’re a Muslim man, people still might not think you’re Muslim or you 
still might pass off as something else.  Your name can give it away but if you aren’t 
knowledgeable with names then, you know, you can—they won’t know that you’re a 
Muslim…but when you’re a hijabi, that is like flashing a beacon of Islam.  I think they’re 
much more prone to ostracism or these questions, and in terms of that, I think it’s harder 
for the sisters, to be a Muslim hijabi women than it is to be a Muslim man (Ali, 19).  
 
Here, the severity and management of stigma are understood in terms of ability to “pass” 
as normal (Goffman 1963: 61).  Devout Muslim women, by virtue of veiling, are not likely to 
navigate mixed-contacts undetected and were thus seen as more likely to experience the adverse 
effects of stigma than Muslim men.  In Ali’s words, wearing hijab was tantamount to “flashing a 
beacon” and drawing undesirable attention to his Muslim sisters.  In a Goffmanian sense (1963: 
48-49), the visibility or “evidentness” of the hijab clearly conveys commitment to spoiled 
identity.  Such commitment can serve as a basis for social rejection.  As Mohamed, 22, pointed 
out: “They get these ridiculous questions like, ‘What do you wear at night?’  ‘Do you shower 
                                                          
62 Stigma symbols are defined by Goffman (1963: 43-44) as “signs which are especially effective in drawing 
attention to a debasing identity discrepancy, breaking up what would be a coherent picture, with a consequent 
reduction in our valuation of the individual.” 
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with it?’ I mean, come on!”  These types of questions were, in his view, an expression of 
ignorance and not-so-subtle contempt for the decisions of hijabis.  The recognition of stigma 
symbols and the choice to endure them indicated participants’ level of commitment to religious 
role-identities, as well as the salience of these identities relative to others.     
These assertions about wearing hijab reflected participants’ awareness of displays that 
others viewed negatively—what scholars refer to as “stigma consciousness” (Link and Phelan 
2001; Pinel 1990).  Such consciousness informed not just the choices they made in daily life, but 
also the importance of the aforementioned sources of self-esteem, issues previously identified by 
sociologists as in need of clarification (e.g., Schwalbe and Staples 1991: 166; Crocker and Major 
1989; Stryker and Serpe 1982).  Also, in line with the findings in Chapter 3, their assessments of 
the hijab and other signifiers revealed the integral role of gender displays in the stigma process.  
Even as these young women described being hijabi as “a personal choice” (Dara, 23) and a 
decision driven by “inner needs” (Sufiyah, 18), they felt discredited and devalued for such 
displays.  This further suggests that coping with anti-Islamic stigma is a gendered process linked 
to commitment and salience.  In order to specify the bases for such links, I present an analysis of 
how some young Muslim women in the U.S. have created and negotiated their role-identities in 
the years since 9/11. 
SHOWING COMMITMENT TO MUSLIM WOMANHOOD 
 According to the accounts of these young Muslim women, they managed stigmatized 
identities through a combination of (1) allaying embodiment, defined in the previous chapter as 
altering the overt, perceivable manifestations of stigma on the body, and (2) embracing stigma, 
reinterpreting the experience of stigmatization in positive terms or as a “blessing in disguise” 
(Goffman 1963: 11).  With regard to the latter strategy, many of the young women emphasized 
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their commitment to Islam and the special status they held as Muslim women.  For instance, they 
embraced the hijab or chose to “re-veil” in the years since 9/11, and became more active in the 
exclusive (and gender-based) activities of their communities.  They ranked their religious role-
identities higher relative to others identities and eagerly engaged in more role-related behavior.  
As these changes were often discussed in terms of embracing stigma, I address them below as 
sub-themes of this strategy.  Of course, participants employed more than just one way of coping 
(i.e., these strategies are not mutually exclusive), but for the sake of analysis, I distinguish them 
here as distinct forms of stigma management.    
Allaying Embodiment: Livening Up the Veil   
First, like the young Muslim men interview in this study, a number of the young women 
also managed mixed-contacts through allaying embodiment.  For one, they attempted to “liven 
up” their appearance through incorporating Western fashion.  This strategy was often discussed 
in relation to the hijab,63 especially wearing the full length abaya or chador, and their decisions to 
cover in light of normative gender displays in Western cultures.  For example, when asked about 
how she deals with the portrayal of Muslims in the media, Noor, a second-generation Muslim-
American, said: 
I dress up or try to, like, put on colors and things that, you know, so I won't seem 
oppressed or seem intimidating, because I feel like the association people have made with 
Islam.  Like, if someone were to see me walking down the street in a black abaya and a 
black or grey scarf, or something like that, they are going to be like, ‘oh my God, what is 
this, what's going on?’ So I rarely wear abaya.  Most of the time I wear skirts and stuff 
like that, depending on where I am going, because I don't want to seem intimidating or 
like seem oppressed.  Because, I mean, now even women dressed in all black are being 
associated as being like the suicide bombers and things like that and so I don't want any 
kind of association with me and that.  And I feel like people become more angry at a 
Muslim woman who is wearing black or wearing the abaya than a Muslim woman who is 
more Americanized wearing, like, a skirt or jeans or something like that.  So I think my 
                                                          
63 To illustrate by contrast: whereas the men engaged in allaying embodiment by shaving the Sunna beard (see 
Chapter 2), the women did so my making various changes to the hijab.   
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dress is one of my ways of, like, disarming myself and seeming more approachable, and 
trying to not entice people’s negative reaction.  Because, I mean, I am already wearing 
the scarf (Noor, 20). 
Intimidating, oppressed; intimidating, oppressed.  These words were often used to capture 
the negative representations of Muslim women in Western societies.  According to participants, 
such representations not only discredited Muslim identities but particular kinds of dress in Islam.  
The dark, ominous abaya was seen as eliciting the most negative response and was thus viewed 
as very disruptive in mixed-contacts.  At least in terms of clothing, participants saw the bases for 
anti-Islamic stereotypes and sentiment as existing on a spectrum.  A stigma gradient, if you will, 
where some gender displays are more stigmatizing and severe than others.  For young women 
like Noor, managing stigma meant “disarming” oneself in the presence of non-Muslim publics 
by incorporating fashionable styles and colors that reflect the sensibilities of Western audiences.  
This strategy was consistent with other recent studies that have illustrated how religious clothing 
affects Muslim women, making them feel susceptible to “labeling” and “abuse” (Ryan 2011: 10).  
By anticipating that non-Muslim majorities would react more harshly toward women who wore 
the hijab and traditional abaya as opposed to an Americanized appearance, such statements also 
indicated that the level of commitment to Muslim identities somehow made these women more 
“blameworthy” (Lebel 2008: 412; Feldman and Crandall 2007; Corrigan et al. 2003; Falk 2001).  
The quote ends with “I mean, I am already wearing the scarf,” indicating that participants’ were 
not only aware of stigma but also their commitment to Muslim identities.  So, even though 
stigma consciousness contributed to minor modifications to attire, their identification with Islam 
remained intact.   
 The desire of these young women to come across as “approachable” was an invitation to 
others (in this case, non-Muslims) to have an interaction.  They considered covering to facilitate 
this process.  In this sense, mixed-contacts were understood as an occasion to belie stereotypes 
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about Muslim women and engage in role-related behavior.  While it is not surprising that Muslim 
women experience and manage stigma on the basis of their appearances, these were not seen as 
deterrents to role performance.  Their reasons for engaging in what I call allaying embodiment 
were similar to those identified in other studies, including concerns over prejudice and 
discrimination, and negative portrayals of Muslims in Western media (e.g. Khosravi 2012; 70-
75), but none of these young women distanced themselves from Islam.  Instead, they used gender 
displays to reconcile their religious role-identities with others’ expectations.  They “covered,” in 
Goffmanian terms, by subtly mixing in colors and clothing that signified both familiarity with 
Western culture as well as their commitment to Muslim identities.  What was distinct about this 
form of allaying embodiment, then, was its limited scope.  Unlike the men’s decisions to shave 
the Sunna beard, for instance, there was less subterfuge involved or sought-after.  In this sense, 
allaying embodiment was an accepted way of covering and had little impact on commitment, 
salience, and, in turn, role-related behavior. 
Embracing Stigma: The Strengthening of Muslim Identities since 9/11 
Another way participants coped with anti-Islamic stigma was through redefining their 
experience of 9/11 in terms of personal growth and gains.  In retrospect, many of these women 
saw this tragic event and its aftermath as a blessing disguise, an event that has strengthened their 
commitment to Islam and buttressed their self-esteem.  They shared stories and examples of how 
this process unfolded and eventually led them to becoming more devout Muslims.  This outcome 
was surprising and counterintuitive, especially in light of the post-9/11 backlash against Muslims 
in the U.S. (Peek 2011).  After all, wouldn’t sudden stigmatization reduce commitment to spoiled 
identities by compelling reactive strategies?  Or, as suggested by Cooley and company, shouldn’t 
the mere awareness of stigma adversely affect self-esteem?  In this case and in line with the 
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fundamental paradox of stigma,64 not necessarily.  Similar to other young Muslims in America, 
my participants became increasingly committed to religious role-identities since 9/11 (e.g., see 
Schanzer et al. 2012).  The immediate aftermath of 9/11 was so disorienting and deeply painful 
for these young men and women that such commitment seemed untenable.  Eventually, however, 
the sense of turbulence and turmoil that marred their youth gave way to feelings of perseverance 
and pride.  Rather than just resigning themselves to passing and covering, these young women 
reexamined Islam and themselves.  Through this investigative process they developed greater 
self-acceptance and more proactive ways of dealing with non-Muslim publics.  For example, 
Maryam talked about how she spent the years following 9/11 exploring Islam and her place in it.  
She then described her new-found confidence as apparent in a mixed-contact encounter: 
It was one weekend and I was off [of work].  Me and my old roommates, we decided to 
go out…as soon as I get on the bus, as soon as I am walking on, there are these guys and 
one of them yells out ‘all you jihadi women, you are going to blow up this bus,’ and he 
starts laughing.  So, from where I was a decade ago, when September 11th happened, 
when people would say something like that, I would kind of go to a corner and hide.  But 
like now, this time, I turned around and I went up to the guy and started poking his chest 
really hard, just like jabbing a knife into his chest, and I was like ‘who are you to call me 
a terrorist?  Who are you to label my people?’ It is not a joke.  You just called us jihadis, 
you called us terrorists and you said we are going to bomb the bus.  And so for a good 30 
minutes I was arguing with this guy…   
Eventually, she recounted, local security guards were called in to handle the situation on  
the bus. 
And the security cops came up and I was texting my cousin, he was on the phone with 
me, and I was, like, oh my God I shouldn’t get into fights.  This is all my fault.  But the 
security guards, they heard what happened and the Caucasian guy was taken away, 
because he discriminated and said hateful things toward us, a group of girls who said 
nothing to them whatsoever…I mean, I didn’t do anything violent, I poked him, but I 
stood up for myself and I stood up for my people, and I would do it again if I have to.   
                                                          
64 Corrigan and Watson (2002) define the fundamental paradox of stigma as perceptions of stigma that produce 
coping strategies opposite of what we would expect. 
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 First, Maryam’s story shows how coping strategies can and do change over time.  In line 
wine with Siegel et al. (1998), Maryam and others initially used “reactive” strategies—i.e., they 
were more likely to avoid or cower in mixed-contacts than be assertive in them.  However, their 
moral careers eventually developed a confrontational side.  In Maryam’s case, feelings of shame 
and apprehension about being Muslim were no longer strong and no longer prevented her from 
“challenging moral attributions” and using other “intermediate” strategies (Siegel et al. 1998; 
Lebel 2008).  Interestingly, and similar to other stigmatized groups (e.g., Link et al. 2003), such 
challenges appeared to be a means and an end for self-esteem.  There was a palpable sense of 
pride in simultaneously standing up for themselves and fellow Muslims.  The willingness of 
young women like Maryam to resist the stigmatizing behaviors of others demonstrated their 
“voice.”  In this case, strong identification with one’s stigmatized group was an important way to 
maintain a positive self-image and self-esteem.  Aside from the moderating factor of time, the 
personal transformation that Maryam and other women went through revealed a more inverse 
relationship between stigma and self-esteem.  In this case, rather than allowing anti-Muslim 
stigma to lower their self-esteem, participants confronted the appraisals of others directly by 
defining mixed-contacts as opportunities to resist stereotypes and convey in-group solidarity. 
Communicating Commitment 
Maryam’s experience highlighted the degree to which, over time, many of these young 
women embraced stigma and engaged in more proactive strategies in managing mixed-contacts.  
In delving further into the bases for such strategies, it became obvious that they emanated from a 
strengthening commitment to Muslim identities.  For example, Noor stated: 
I think, if anything, it’s definitely inspired me to do like a lot more for the community.  
It’s one of the reasons why I am majoring in Islamic and Arabic studies, so I can become 
a scholar and one day become a real expert.  Because some of the people that they show 
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as experts of Islam in the media, it’s ridiculous.  It’s like, where did you get this person 
from?  I can do that, you know, show what Islam really is about and promote it.   I also 
hope to work with the government as, like, an ambassador for the Muslim community, to 
let them know what Islam is really about. 
 




I think it’s all about becoming a leader and participating more in the community.  If 
anything good has come out of how Muslims like me have been depicted, it’s that I’m 
establishing myself as leader and, like, being active as active as I am in this community.  
And having the confidence to do what I am doing.  I’m able to talk to people now without 
holding back because of whatever reasons, like gender issues and things like that…I’ve 
definitely gained a lot of confidence to show people that I can act as a leader.  I mean, I 
can do this in Islam.  I can be a Muslim woman and I can do this (Noor, 20). 
 
The events and aftermath of 9/11 prompted Noor and other participants to become more 
active in Muslim communities and, as expressed here, focus their careers on representing Islam.  
They embraced stigma by communicating commitment to Muslim identities and attributing their 
personal potential and self-esteem to them.  Noor’s strategy was intermediate (Segel et al. 1998) 
in that it involved resisting stereotypes through direct engagement with non-Muslim publics, for 
example, by using formal education as a way to change people’s attitudes toward Islam and 
Muslim ways of doing gender.  Much like Zoya, a young Muslim woman interviewed by Peek 
(2005: 227), Noor decided to focus on serving the ummah and her faith community, rather than 
pursuing just any degree.  This choice was made in spite of resistance from her parents, who 
encouraged a more practical (read: non-confrontational) career path.  The merits of this strategy 
are not unfounded—educational measures and contact with stigmatized persons have been 
shown to improve public attitudes (e.g., see Brown et al. 2003; Couture and Penn 2003; Corrigan 
et al. 2002; Alexander and Link 2003).  The confidence with which Noor and other participants 
took these measures was also consistent with the observed and associated psychological benefits 
(e.g., see Lebel 2008; Shih 2004; Link et al. 2002; Major et al. 2002).  The self-esteem allied 
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with communicating commitment to religious role-identities (articulated above in terms of “not 
holding back” and developing an “I can” attitude toward achievement) was a recurring theme in 
the interviews.  Later, Noor stated that her standpoint made her particularly well-suited for the 
highest of leadership positions: “I mean, definitely see myself in the White House.  Or, at least, 
as one of the experts that the President is going to have.”  Such assertions indicated that actively 
helping one’s “own” group had a positive impact on the self-concepts of these women.  That is, 
commitment was not seen as a barrier to self-esteem and social mobility, but as a facilitator of 
them.  In turn, these young women defined their strengths, merits, and future trajectories in terms 
of religious role-identities.   
 For other young women, 9/11 was a watershed moment that significantly increased their 
 
commitment to religious role-identities.  For example, Sana stated: 
 
It has made me stronger.  I can honestly tell you, if 9/11 wouldn’t have happened, I don’t 
know where I would be right now.  I don’t know how practicing I would be because my 
aunts and uncles, some of my dad’s cousins, they’re not that religious…I’ve had to gain 
more knowledge because now people ask: ‘Oh, well, are you Muslim by choice?’  Or 
‘Did your parents force you into it or what?’  To answer these questions or to really make 
sure this is my choice, I had to do my research.  I had to be more aware of things going 
on around me because when someone turns around and asks me, “What do you think 
about the attacks of 9/11?”  Or, “Why are men and women always separated?”  So, I feel 
like because of 9/11, so many questions were brought up and if you’re identifying 
yourself as a Muslim woman, you have to know what you’re standing for.  So in order to 
answer these questions, I say, “Hey this is who we are, I know you’ve seen everything in 
the news, but this is who I am.  Let’s talk (Sana, 19) 
 
Similarly, for Fatima, 9/11 was both a blessing and a curse. 
 
I feel like because of 9/11, I really know what my faith is now, because I am representing 
it every single day.  It’s like 9/11 brought me awareness to try to understand quickly, like, 
who I’m trying to emulate and how I’m going to repair this damage that has happened.  
I’m not saying I’m thankful for it, but it really brought light to who I’m going to be and 





Along with social context and timing, such statements also revealed the importance of 
social comparisons and agency in shaping the moral career of participants.  Young women like 
Sana often juxtaposed their experiences of stigma with those of parents, relatives, and previous 
generations of Muslims.  Certainly growing up in the wake of 9/11 has meant facing particular 
kinds of scrutiny and developing distinct standpoints.  This process was evidenced by the relative 
salience of participants’ Muslim identities.  As Sana stated, she is “more practicing” than ever 
before and this stems in large part from her experience of a stigma-inducing event.  Just as Peek 
(2005: 231) found among her participants, the tragedy and aftermath of 9/11 had the “inadvertent 
effect” of getting young Muslims, like Sana and Fatimah, to engage with Islam and ultimately 
strengthen their commitment to religious identity.  The tendency of participants to compare in-
group experiences of stigma was not only used to detail strengthening commitment but also to 
protect their self-concepts from more “threatening comparisons” (Crocker and Major 1989), such 
as with non-Muslim American (read: privileged) women, which they rarely ever made.  Instead, 
they talked about the salience of their religious identities in terms of personal “choice.”  Recall, 
that choice behavior is considered a key component of commitment and salience (Stryker and 
Serpe 1982: 211).  In light of the stereotypes surrounding gender roles and relations in Islam, 
these young women often addressed their choices in terms of gender, such as their understanding 
and acceptance of purdah, the practice of gender separation.  For instance, as illustrated above, 
they talked about eagerly learning Islam and their particular “roles” as Muslim women following 
9/11.  This eventually led to increased attendance of Muslim services, like the Friday Prayer, 
more involvement in peer groups like the MSAs, and greater overall adherence to purdah.   
Whether out of personal desire or the need to repair the damage that has been done to 
Muslim identities, these young women embarked on a journey that involved investigating Islam 
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and their place in it, and considered themselves quite fortunate as a result.  This was apparent 
with respect to understanding gender roles and relations in Islam.  For example, many said they 
discovered that, as Muslim women, they actually had substantial privileges and authority, 
including preeminent positions in the family, a myriad of legal rights (in some cases, more so 
than men), and perhaps most importantly, the unrivaled love, honor, and respect of the ummah.  
They then identified ways in which these advantages empowered them as women, for instance, 
by giving them the confidence to be themselves and handle mixed-contacts.  And so, rather than 
blaming the event and aftermath of 9/11 for their challenges and discomforts in daily life, what 
Goffman calls “secondary gains” (1963: 10), these young women defined 9/11 and their ensuing 
experiences of Islamophobia as a blessing in disguise (p. 11).  Here, coping with stigma meant 
becoming more devout Muslim women—i.e., communicating greater commitment to religious 
role-identities.  
Although the vast majority of participants detailed instances and encounters that signified 
commitment to Muslim identities, there were a few exceptions.  For example, Maryam, pointed 
to negative depictions of Islam and Muslim women as too overwhelming for her to continue to 
veiling.  In spite of having an active role and participation in the Muslim community, she felt 
vulnerable to harassment and abuse in mixed-contacts, and could not bring herself to veil.  In 
comparing her decision to Muslim sisters that wore hijab, she stated: “It takes a lot of courage.  I 
wish I had the courage.”  Much like the Sunna beard dawned by Muslim men, such gender 
displays were viewed in terms of their social consequences.  Of course, as has been well-
established, the visibility or concealability of stigma plays a major role in eliciting the negative 
feedback from others (Lebel 2008: 616; Jones et al. 1984; Goffman 1963: 48-51).  Maryam’s 
admitted lack of “courage” to face such feedback suggested that reflected appraisals remained a 
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key source of self-esteem for some participants.  Still, Maryam’s sensitivity to the effects of 
stigma did not deter her from continuing her involvement in the Muslim community (i.e., 
engaging in role-related behavior).  For example, she talked about speaking at her masjid’s 
Ashura ceremony during the Islamic month of Muharram.  For Shi’a Muslims like Maryam, 
Muharram is a sacred time to mourn the loss and honor the martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala.65  
Ashura, occurring on the tenth day of the month, consists of public displays and storytelling 
(ta’ziyeh) about the massacre of Huseyn and members of his family that resisted the Caliph.66  
“So, now” she said, “I write speeches and it so cool, to sit and read our history, and to recite it.  I 
wouldn’t get to do this if I didn’t practice, and keep researching to find the true Islam” 
Harkening back to Maryam’s vivid memory of her friend’s mother who “unveiled” 
herself following 9/11, such strategies revealed the importance of commitment and salience in 
coping with stigma.  In this case, participants chose to emphasize the positive outcomes of 
sudden stigmatization, including becoming more devout Muslims, being more vocal in mixed-
contacts, refusing to accept mistreatment and abuse, and displaying themselves with pride.  Their 
actions both revealed and reinforced their self-esteem—points I discuss further below.   
Claiming Exceptionality 
 For many of these young women, being Muslim made them “special.”  They were treated 
with the utmost respect by fellow Muslims and had privileges unbeknownst to outsiders.  In their 
view, being stigmatized on the basis of their intersecting identities was not only detrimental and 
confusing, it was inappropriate.  Their power and potential was not only on par with other (non-
Muslim) women, but, in fact, exceeded them.  So, for example, they talked about the exceptional 
                                                          
65 See Aslan (2006: 171-81) for a detailed discussion of Husayn’s resistance of the Caliph and the events of Karbala. 
66 The Caliph is considered the successor to the Prophet Muhammad and leader of the ummah (Aslan 2006). 
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qualities of Muslim women detailed in the Qur’an, they mentioned major female figures in Islam 
like Khadija (Muhammed’s first wife), without whom Islam as a social institution may not have 
survived to present day, and they pointed to the remarkable accomplishments of contemporary 
Muslim women, such as Shireen Ibadi (winner of the 2006 Noble Peace Prize).  These qualities 
and contributions were also part of their moral careers: where once they felt may have felt 
shame, they now felt unique for being Muslim. In this sense, they did not just “lay claim to the 
normal” like other Muslim women living in Western societies (Ryan 2011), they claimed to be 
exceptional.  For example, Dara, claimed:  
I feel like other people wouldn’t comprehend it [being Muslim], not only is it okay, it’s 
awesome!  I mean, I know it’s hard to feel comfortable with who you are when, like, 
people are constantly telling you that it is not okay.  I mean, who you are in your religion 
is not okay.  But it’s something so special and beautiful and if other people actually knew 
that, I feel like they would embrace it.  We just have to show [others] how special it is 
and, how much, like, more we’re respected (Dara, 23). 
 
Similarly, Sufiya, stated: 
I try to be very confident in front of other people, in front of other guys and girls of other 
faiths and religions, so they can see that we Muslim women aren’t oppressed.  And that’s 
a big thing, because you definitely have to show them that, like, hijab or anything like 
that is not oppressing us.  In fact, Islam is one of the few religions that women are held in 
such a high level of respect and dignity.  And our rights are even more numerous. I don’t 
want to brag, but it’s true!  (Sufiya, 18) 
For these young women, being Muslim was a great thing.  It conferred copious rights, 
special status, and positive feelings.  In contrast to outsiders’ ideas about Muslim women, they 
were not oppressed, but liberated; not disenfranchised, but empowered.  As suggested above, 
Islam far from favored men.  This view was often corroborated by the young men, who would 
also point out the important positions and privileges women held, especially in relation to the 
family.  For instance, mothers were discussed as having the most revered and influential role in 
Muslim communities.  Meanwhile, the absence of women in leadership positions in Muslim-
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majority countries and well-known cases of women’s oppression (e.g., under Taliban rule), were 
carefully dismissed in terms of cultural deviance (aib), and not rooted in religious scriptures.  
This is consistent with the selective valuing/devaluing process outlined earlier.  In this case, 
participants selectively valued those qualities that favored Muslim women, or at least gave 
favorable impressions, and devalued those which appeared unfavorably in Western contexts.  
Their focus on being mothers and leaders also corresponded with American cultural values and 
Western ways of doing gender.  They were not forced to place “greater value” on other domains 
(Crocker and Major 1989: 617), such as being a rebel—or, as Sufiyah described, “feeling the 
wind blow throw my hair whenever I want.”  Aside from the important implications of this 
strategy for self-esteem, laying claim to the exceptional meant placing religious role-identities at 
the top of participants’ salience hierarchies.  In turn, they saw mixed-contacts as occasions to 
represent Islam and, if broached on the topic, to discuss its distinct gender-based benefits. 
 Of the three strategies, the claiming of exceptionality most clearly indicated the salience 
and selective valuing of Muslim identities.  Despite the negative portrayals of these identities, 
these young women did not see them as chains of oppression but as windows of opportunity—
i.e., they could do all and be all by virtue of their standing in Islam.  Such variation in what types 
of qualities and involvements were valued by participants seemed strongly related to their self-
esteem.  Nearly all of the young women that embraced stigma and their religious role-identities 
did so with confidence.  Although some did engage in social distancing by selectively devaluing 
performances that reflected poorly on them (e.g., the gender displays of jihadists, see Chapter 2), 
they focused their energies on convincing others, including me as the researcher, how they fared 
well or had advantages relative to other groups of women.  Interestingly, then, commitment and 
salience were not discussed in terms of emotional security, feelings we might otherwise associate 
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with seeking refuge among members of one’s “own” (Goffman 1963: 20), but rather in terms of 
social exclusivity.  This strategic response to stigma was reminiscent of the “Black is Beautiful” 
identity movement (Anderson and Cromwell 1977), in this case, suggesting that being “Muslim 
is Marvelous.”  The implications of this for self-esteem are significant when considering the 
damage that stigma and “othering” have done to the self-images of women of color (e.g., see 
Collins 2000).  The moral careers of these participants were thus defined by post-9/11 affiliative 
cycles, leading to the recognition and espousal of “special” opportunities to be in-group members 
(Goffman 1963: 38).   
Whereas the young men I interviewed used embodiment and accommodating gestures in 
order to manage stigmatized identities, these young women communicated commitment.  In 
particular, they described how the traumatic events of 9/11 had, in effect, drawn them closer to 
Islam and their Muslim communities, and motivated them to reexamine, reassess, and reorganize 
their religious role-identities.  This process was apparent in their stigma management strategies.  
For example, even as Noor acknowledged altering her physical self-presentation to be more 
approachable in mixed-contacts (allaying embodiment), she discussed the invaluable insights and 
strengths she gained because of 9/11 (embracing stigma).  When asked what they considered to 
be the most important roles for Muslim women, Noor and many others eschewed stereotypes of 
passivity/domesticity and instead focused on the importance of Muslim women being “leaders,” 
both in their communities and American society.  It appeared that the length of time since 9/11 
had indeed helped participants adjust and adapt to being stigmatized.  And yet, the specter of 
“Islamic terrorism” made the issue of time a problematic feature of coping.  Many felt that anti-
Islamic sentiment was again on the rise in the U.S. and that every act of mass violence carried 
out by Muslims in Western countries was like hitting a “reset button.”  Still, they believed that 
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their choices and current approach to mixed-contacts was best, at the very least representing a 
culmination of their stigma experiences.  As Sufiya put it, “We know we’re targets, but now, I 
think, we also know what we need to do about it, and that’s getting out there.  You know, being 
seen and being heard…and just not scared to show people but ready to.”  In this sense, 
commitment, salience, and stigma management were inextricably linked.  I now turn to a 
discussion of these links and what they suggest about the self-esteem of stigmatized persons.  
CONCLUSION: Greater Commitment, More Self-Esteem for Muslim Women 
The findings reviewed here indicate that greater levels of commitment to Muslim identity 
corresponded with more salience, role-related behavior, and high self-esteem.  These conceptual 
links were evident in and evidenced by their stigma management strategies, which included both 
allaying embodiment and embracing stigma.  These strategies reflect several sociological claims.  
First, much like those detailed in Chapter 2, these strategies underscore the self process and the 
importance of mixed-contacts in shaping the standpoints of stigmatized persons.  Consistent with 
dramaturgical and identity theories, these young women defined their situations, and ranked their 
role-identities in order to deal with sudden and collective stigmatization.  Second, they suggest 
that being collectively stigmatized does not necessarily result in lower individual self-esteem.  In 
line with Crocker and Major (1986: 612), their strategies suggest how membership in a deviant 
group affords some “special opportunities for self-protection.”  In this section, I further discuss 
these key conclusions, as well as how the social context of tribal stigma contributes to the coping 
strategies of minority women.   
First and foremost, the findings reinforce the reality of the self.  Establishing this reality 
is not only important for theoretical reasons, but also for illustrating, on an empirical level, how 
stigma causes suffering.  Among my participants, the self was evident in how they talked about 
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their experience and management of spoiled identities.  These young women imagined how they 
appeared to non-Muslim publics and associated judgments with 9/11, developing mixed-feelings 
as a result.  They then attempted to control this social process in and through mixed-contacts.  In 
order to move these interactions in a direction they desired, they had to determine and more fully 
understand their commitment to Muslim identities and the salience of these identities relative to 
others.  For example, these young women felt targeted for being hijabi and forced to decide how 
(and how much) to be Muslim.  For many of them, this meant investigating Islam and ultimately 
developing a stronger connection to it.  So, even as the fears and pain following 9/11 initially led 
some to cover and pass, in Goffmanian terms, or distance themselves from Islam, nearly all 
regained and eventually embraced their Muslims identities.  Their moral careers led them to, on 
the one hand, make slight modifications to their physical appearances and, on the other hand, 
display their religious commitment.  In this sense, the findings reflect the very basis of self-
construction—a process that arises in interaction between actors and audiences, and is affected 
by social contexts and resources (Goffman 1959; Stryker and Serpe 1982; Callero 2003).   
While this research does not offer any major empirical surprises, it does support some 
previous claims about religious identity and render some theoretical insights, particularly into the 
process of stigma management and the development of self-esteem.  First, the strategies used by 
these participants to cope with collective stigmatization may be a reflection of commitment and 
the salience of their religious role-identities relative to others.  As I expected, participants were 
committed to being Muslim, which increased the salience of their Muslim identities, and resulted 
in more proactive ways of dealing with anti-Islamic stigma.  This process also suggests that their 
moral careers were marked by transitions toward greater religiosity.  This is consistent with 
recent studies that find stronger identification with Islam among Muslim minorities in the West, 
133 
 
especially the younger generations (e.g., Peek 2005).  The strategies reflect the latter stages of 
religious identity development detailed by Peek (2005), namely, religion as chosen and declared 
identities.  That is, nearly all of these young women responded to the tragic events and effects of 
9/11 by pursuing and taking pride in their Muslim identities.  Also, as was expected, those who 
expressed more commitment to being Muslim exhibited higher self-esteem, manifest in the 
coping strategies they used.  The strategy of claiming exceptionality, for instance, coincides with 
research that finds social and psychological benefits of identifying with a religious community, 
in spite of negative portrayals and feedback from outsiders (e.g., Chen 2002; Hurh and Kim 
1990).  The theoretical take-way being that stigma management can confer self-esteem.   
The social context of anti-Islamic stigma also influences the predictions and findings—
i.e., the social, political, and economic context of the U.S. War on Terror.  For example, the 
strategy of allaying embodiment may reflect a well-established mode of resistance in Western 
contexts: consumption or using consumer practices to cope with stigma (Conrad and Caldwell 
2006).  Specifically, these women co-opted mainstream fashions in anticipation of mixed-
contacts, but few chose to “de-veil.”  As observed in other contexts (e.g., Sandikci and Ger 
2010), consumerism plays a role in the “adoption and transformation” of stigmatized identities 
(p. 16).  As a sub-strategy of embracing stigma, communicating commitment also suggests that 
American society does not place the same types or levels of constraints on Muslims as do those 
in Europe.  These young women did not appear afraid that religious commitment would prevent 
them from finding employment or exercising political rights.  This is a noteworthy implication 
given the degree to which marginalization along these lines is recognized by Muslims as major 
consequences of Islamophobia in European countries (Kunst et al. 2013; Ryan 2011), not to 
mention an expressed cause of radicalization and violence linked to Islam (Sageman 2008; 
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Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005: Chapter 3).  Such stigma management strategies may reflect an 
underlying belief among participants that U.S. societal structures do not harm the self nor hinder 
social mobility in severe ways.   
As anticipated, the salience of Muslim identities was also associated with higher levels of 
self-esteem among participants in this study.  These young women not only prioritized but also 
showed pride in their religion and themselves.  This is consistent with earlier studies that found 
higher levels of self-esteem among stigmatized versus non-stigmatized groups (e.g., Hoelter 
1983; Jensen et al. 1982; Gray-Little and Hafdahl 2000).  The findings also suggest that self-
esteem is not “passively acquired” (Crocker and Major 1989: 610; Franks and Morella 1976: 
326) but “earned” through competent action and effective identity management.  Again, while it 
may seem unusual or paradoxical that the experience of stigma would increase self-esteem, this 
may be explained by the aforementioned research on the sociological sources of self-esteem.  In 
this case, participants placed less importance on the reflected appraisals of non-Muslim publics 
than they did on in-group comparisons and self-perceptions.  For example, although these young 
women recognized the media as a “generalized other” that portrayed them in a negative light, 
they were less phased by it.  What mattered more was their own understanding of Islam, how 
their experience compared to fellow Muslims, and the evaluations of their own peers and faith 
communities.  Moreover, they attributed negative portrayals and feedback as directed at Muslim 
people in general, and not themselves personally.  As surmised by Crocker and Major (1989), 
such attributions and in-group comparisons may actually protect the self-esteem of these and 
other young Muslims.67  As these scholars claim, “felt contentment is relative to the comparison 
                                                          
67 Specifically, this correspond with the claim that “the more an individual has structured his or her self-concept 
around membership in a group that is devalued, deprived, or discriminated against, the better that individual feels 
about him or herself in terms of global self-esteem” (Crocker and Major 1989: 620). 
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standard used” (p. 615).  In this case, participants used a combination of social comparison and 
group-based selective valuing strategies to secure and even enhance their self-esteem. 
A few additional factors to consider in reading the self-esteem of participants are time, 
blame, and visibility.  These moderating factors are related to how persons learn and adjust to 
their stigmatized identities (i.e., their moral careers). The findings further indicate that time, in 
this case the ages of participants when 9/11 happened and the years since, plays a fundamental 
role in the stigma process.  Most participants were in middle school in the U.S. on 9/11 and so 
their moral careers were defined by youth and place.  Not surprisingly, as adolescents, they were 
shocked, scared, confused, and distressed by the attacks.  Even though many felt vulnerable to 
prejudicial treatment and abuse, virtually none abandoned their religious beliefs.  Instead, these 
young women chose to investigate Islam and their roles in it, eventually redefining their 
experience of 9/11, and becoming more devout Muslims.  Whatever self-esteem was lost in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 was recovered and, as suggested by these findings, enhanced.  The 
strategies of communicating commitment and claiming exceptionality, in particular, indicate 
higher self-esteem.  These responses are remarkable when considering that stigmatization that 
occurs suddenly is often much more difficult to endure than those which come on gradually 
(Jones et al. 1984; Malcolm et al. 1998; Falk 2001).  Time may also be defined in terms of “time 
spent in religious role activities” (Stryker and Serpe 1982: 209) and as a function of commitment 
and identity salience.  As illustrated above, these young women chose behaviors, activities, and 
involvements based on religious role-identities.  The strategies of communicating commitment 
and claiming exceptionality speak specifically to this process.  It felt very good (enhanced self-
esteem) to be a good Muslim woman (increase commitment). 
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Participants also did not accept personal blame and responsibility for 9/11 and believed 
that negative feedback in mixed-contacts was not directed at them, personally.  This belief may 
also have contributed to their higher levels of self-esteem.  Indeed, society is much tougher on 
those believed to bring stigma on themselves (Feldman and Crandall 2007; Siegel et al. 1998), 
and so by redirecting the source of anti-Islamic stigma to the group, these young women could 
protect themselves and their feelings as individuals.  To be sure, recognizing you are not at fault 
for an adverse condition can make it much easier to love and accept oneself. 
The visibility of stigma also relates to self-esteem in this study.  This “crucial factor” is 
considered central to the type and quality of feedback that stigmatized persons receive (Goffman 
1963: 48), and yet for these participants, visibility did not sustain feelings of shame, depression, 
and anxiety as observed in other cases (e.g., Goffman 1963: 87; Lazarus 1993; Link et al. 2002; 
Cole and Ahmadi 2003; Couture and Penn 2003; Khosravi 2012).  Their stigma management 
strategies suggest that, for the most part, these women accepted themselves and their situations, 
and were less affected by what Goffman (1963: 111) calls “the contingencies of acceptance and 
disclosure” in mixed-contacts.  Instead, they talked about being more devout than their parents 
and relatives, and how that meant being more visible.  Even though individuals who are able to 
pass off as “normal” are considered more well-adjusted than those whose “blemishes are 
apparent” (Jones et al. 1984: Crocker and Major 1989; Lebel 2008), this research suggests that 
being visible may facilitate self-esteem in part by preventing negative emotions.  Also, were 
these women to be treated unfairly without others’ knowing they are Muslim, they could not 
easily attribute such treatment or feedback to Islamophobia—the problem would be personal.  In 
this sense, being visibly Muslim has more self-protective properties than passing.  
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This research stops short at observing these young Muslim women actually engaging in 
role-related behavior and presupposes further analysis of their daily routines and involvements.  
Such analysis could help explain why young Muslims in America chose to adopt and maintain 
the ecological and religious boundaries of their communities, in spite of the social consequences.  
The relationship between this boundary work and concerns over radicalization and terrorism in 
Western societies means the “choices” Muslim women make—e.g., in managing stigma and 
constructing identities—will continue to be a key and contested issue.  As Aslan (2006: 73) aptly 
points out, both “the traditional colonial image of the veiled Muslim woman as the sheltered, 
docile sexual property of her husband” and “the postmodernist image of the veil as the emblem 
of female freedom and empowerment from Western cultural hegemony” are simplistic, if not 
extreme.  “The veil may be both or neither of these things, but that is up to Muslim women to 





The purpose of this dissertation was to explicate the role of gender in various aspects of 
contemporary Islam, particularly how gender influences the violent acts of militant jihadists, and 
how Muslim men and women manage the stigma placed on them as a result of jihadists’ actions.  
In this research, I asked three main questions: how are martyrdom acts framed in militant jihad?  
How do young Muslims experience and manage anti-Islamic stigma? And what role does gender 
play in these processes?  The data I used to address these questions consisted of a combination of 
statements from leaders and rank-and-file members of jihadist movements, as well as in-depth 
interviews with young devout Muslims living in the U.S.  The statements were derived from the 
compendium In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad (Aaron 2008).  The interview data were 
drawn primarily from MSAs at two large Midwestern universities and collected using snowball 
sampling techniques.  Both sets of data were analyzed using grounded methods.  The choice of 
these data was based on their relevance to the research questions and the recommendations of 
scholars to further study the experiences of Muslims living in the West (e.g., Khosravi 2012; 
Peek 2011; Ryan 2011).  In this final chapter, I synthesize the findings of the three previous 
chapters and introduce an integrative theory of gender that addresses the research questions, and 
situates my studies within ongoing discussions and debates in the sociological literature.  I also 
detail the strengths and limitations of this research and propose a couple of important avenues for 
future study.  I begin by I briefly summarizing the major findings and theoretical contributions. 
In Chapter 1, I examined the framing of martyrdom in militant jihad and found these acts 
to be defined as self-defense, restorative rituals, and honor displays.  For jihadists, such violence 
was deemed necessary for defending the ummah from perceived threats, affirming true Islamic 
identities, and “re”establishing a Salafi-inspired Islamic state.  Again, these martyrdom frames 
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were motivational, a basis for ameliorative action (Benford and Snow 2000).  The findings 
provided qualified support for Blackian theories of collective and self-inflicted violence, 
indicating that martyrdom in militant jihad is a way of handling grievances by unilateral 
aggression.  However, rather than inferring the motivations of martyrs, as Black (1998) and 
fellow pure sociologists have proposed, this research focused on the subjective interpretations 
and aims of these acts—i.e., the meaning of martyrdom.  The findings show support for both 
Blackian scholars and their critics in conceptualizing this violence: the ideological framing of 
martyrdom suggests that these acts are a form of violent self-help.  Moreover, these frames cast 
martyrdom as men’s duty complete with masculine rewards.  Following the theoretical scheme 
advocated by Schrock and Schwalbe (2009), martyrdom acts are, in effect, “manhood acts” that 
enable aggrieved men to resist domination, elicit deference, claim (male) privileges.  Integrating 
Blackian and social constructionist perspectives, I conceptualized these acts as masculine self-
help: a gender-signifying act that expresses a grievance through self-sacrificial and embodied 
aggression.  While theories of martyrdom continue to be debated, especially in the context of 
social movements like Global Jihad, the concept of masculine self-help provides one way of 
understanding why some men come to see themselves as responsible for sacrificing their lives 
along with taking the lives of others.  This conceptualization of martyrdom may help explain 
men’s violence in other social contexts and conflicts. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I moved the analysis to those acutely affected by the violent actions 
of jihadists: Muslims living in the West.  I examined how and in what ways these individuals 
managed stigmatized identities, especially in mixed-contacts.  I drew on the scholarship of 
sociologist Erving Goffman, particularly the dramaturgical theories put forth in The Presentation 
of Self in Everyday Life (1959), Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963), 
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and Interactional Ritual (1967).  The decision to engage these texts was threefold:  First, these 
are considered seminal works in the sociology of the self and thus provided a proper framework 
for exploring the creation and negotiation of Muslim identities.  Second, the course and character 
of stigma surrounding these identities, and the strategies used to manage them in mixed-contacts 
further develop Goffman’s original works.  Lastly, the decision to take this approach reflected 
my own belief in the power of dramaturgical theory to make sense of the plight and problematic 
situations of Muslims minorities.  Focusing on how the self is sustained through dramatic and 
strategic performances offers a way to understand how young devout Muslims reconciled their 
incongruent and “spoiled” identities, interpreted the prevailing norms of Western cultures, and 
managed the expectations and reactions of others (e.g., non-Muslim publics).  I discovered that 
these men and women used certain strategies to mitigate the effects of stigma in mixed-contacts, 
including allaying embodiment, benign accommodation, claiming normality, embracing stigma 
through communicating commitment and claiming exceptionality.  These coping strategies were 
conscious and collective, and, as I discuss next, involved normative gender displays. 
Gender was integral to stigma management among my participants.  That is, each of the 
observed strategies entailed displays of Muslim manhood and womanhood.  To make sense of 
this pattern, I drew on the overlooked and yet revelatory essay Gender Advertisements (1979).  
Here, Goffman illustrated how gestures, poses, and other social signals are used to define the 
“essential nature” of men and women, and normative masculinity and femininity in American 
society.  Such “gender displays” serve as social scripts, reflecting and reinforcing ideas about 
how men and women ought to be.68  This inquiry thus offered a way to theorize the relationship 
                                                          
68 For instance, he observed that American men “tend to be located higher than women” in scenes depicting intimate 
relationships and family life, “thus allowing elevation to be exploited as a delineative resource” (Goffman 1979: 
146). That is, they were displayed in terms of the privileged roles and expectations associated with manhood in 
American culture.   
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among cultural representations, norms, and performances of gender in Western societies.  The 
findings further illuminate the interplay between such displays and societal notions of “normal” 
and “natural” behavior, showing how stereotypes about gender in Islam develop and are dealt 
with by young Muslim men and women.  My participants shared many opinions and feelings 
about Islamophobia, including the significant role gender plays in mitigating the adverse effects, 
but their responses also indicated some important differences.  For example, the young men more 
often engaged in covering and passing compared to the young women, who preferred shows of 
commitment.  Although this difference may be attributed to many factors, the findings suggest 
that Muslim men feel more vulnerable to the consequences of stigma than Muslim women, the 
latter feeling more secure and emboldened to challenge stigma on behalf of themselves and their 
communities.  To place such patterns of similarities and differences in greater context, I now turn 
to interpreting the main findings. 
What to Make of Beards and Headscarves? 
The finding that Muslim beards and scarves serve as stigma symbols is not surprising, but 
the specific ways in which my participants perceived and managed these symbols during mixed-
contacts was.  The variation in coping strategies indicate a gender gradient in stigma.  That is, 
the acute experiences and effects of stigma are related to normative patterns of gender in society.  
Social stigma has an inevitable impact on the lives of every individual, but the course and extent 
of the impact depends in part on the complex interplay of in-group and out-group gender norms.  
In the U.S. context, this gender gradient has been apparent for Black men (e.g., Anderson 1998), 
Black women (e.g., Collins 2000), and other minorities stigmatized in part on the basis of gender 
(e.g., Kenny 2006).  Young Muslim men and women are just the most recent group subjected to 
stigma in this way.  The gender gradient is also apparent in the difference responses to stigma.  
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Although the strategy of allaying embodiment was discussed by many participants, the young 
men I interviewed were less adamant than the young women about the special significance of 
their Muslim identities—e.g., the former focused on normativity while the latter focused on 
exceptionality.  The particular role and consequences of gender displays, then, may account for 
the choice of coping strategies, what may be described in this case as passing-versus-purdah 
responses to stigma.  The self-esteem exhibited by women that belong to similarly stigmatized 
groups may also be related to this gender gradient.   
 This research also qualifies and extends the literature on stigma management, especially 
in terms of the contextual dimensions of Islamophobia.  Again, most studies of Muslim identities 
in Western contexts have taken place in Europe and few have theorized the specific and strategic 
role of gender.  For example, the strategy of claiming normality is in line with Ryan’s (2011) 
conceptualization of coping among Muslim women in Britain.  Along with traditional religious 
clothing, I distinguish embodiment and gender-signifying gestures as symbolic communications 
that “impact one’s experience and negotiation of stigma” (p. 10).  However, other strategies, 
such as communicating commitment and claiming exceptionality, were about challenging stigma 
openly and directly—often by emphasizing the power of Muslim women as “mothers” of the 
ummah.  That being said, these participants articulated their strategies primarily on the basis of 
everyday exclusion rather than structural discrimination.  That is, they feared shaming, not job 
loss.  At a glance, such findings suggest that being a young Muslim in America, man or woman, 
is “better” than in Europe.  This is, of course, an arguable suggestion worth pursuing: are the life 
chances of young Muslims in the U.S. comparably greater than in other Western countries, and if 
so, why?  Based on my interviews, I argue here that “feeling hated” (p. 5) is perceived as a more 
mundane matter for Muslims in America than in other Western contexts.   
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 Similarly, this research further develops the ethnographic work of Peek (2011, 2005) and 
others (e.g., Hermansen 2003; Ghaffari 2009; Mishra and Shirazi 2010; Mahon 2013) that have 
explored the formation and negotiation of social identity among younger Muslim-Americans.  
For example, the stigma management strategies identified in this study suggest that some these 
young Muslims have progressed to later stages of religious identification, distinguished by Peek 
(2005) as “chosen” and “declared” identities, respectively.  My participants reflected little on the 
meaning of being Muslim prior to 9/11 and have since come to see their religious identities as 
something achieved rather than ascribed.  Much like the Muslims interviewed by Peek (p. 230-
231), most of my participants expressed a strengthening of their religious identities in the wake 
of 9/11.  And yet, the stages of religious identity formation proposed by Peek and the levels of 
stigma detailed by other sociologists do not explore or delineate the role of gender.  My research 
does by showing how gender displays serve as both an impetus for religious violence and a basis 
for stigma management and self-esteem.  These displays are thus a significant mediating factor 
through which aggrieved and stigmatized individuals signify and secure their identities. 
This research has a few implications for current sociological debates.  First and foremost, 
it affirms the explanatory power of social constructionist perspectives and methods for theorizing 
gender.  For example, the masculine self-help concept can help to explain the violent repertoires 
of contention in global jihad and other militant movements.  Of course, violent acts carried out 
by members of Christian fundamentalist and White nationalist movements also “take the veneer 
of restoring manhood” (Kimmel 2005: 416).  Aside from particular religious and political 
distinctions, these “martyrs” appear to be disaffected and marginalized men attempting to restore 
their “lost” privileges and place in society.  Therefore, developing effective interventions for 
preventing violent radicalization of these and other groups of men means deciphering how their 
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subjectivities are conditioned through gender socialization and male-peer culture, collaboration 
and competition (especially in terms of access to resources and recourse), a well as the contested 
definitions of exploitation and empowerment.   
Specifically, the conceptualization of gender put forth in this study is situated within the 
sociological framework outlined and advocated by Schrock and Schwalbe (2009).  Again, these 
scholars contend that the prevailing multiple masculinities approach or “men and (fill-in-the-
blank) pattern” of studying gender, has yielded diminishing theoretical returns (p. 278).  For new 
insights to be gained, sociologists must refocus attention on what males actually do to construct 
identities as “men” and claim the associated privileges.  This dramaturgical process starts with 
distinguishing the signifying practices through which these identities are affirmed in interaction.  
In other words, males must learn and convey a “convincing manhood act” (p. 279).  My research 
explicates this process in two ways.  First, the framing of martyrdom by militant jihadists shows 
not only the significance of the male body in carrying out such violence, but also the subjective 
aims: to resist domination, elicit deference, and claim gender-based rewards.  Second, the 
specific stigma management strategies used by young Muslims shows how central manhood acts 
are to the daily lives of stigmatized persons, both as controlling images and methods of coping.  
In order to manage stigmatized identities, these men and women must also put on a convincing 
(read: normative) gender performance, one that facilitates acceptance and gains approval.  For 
Muslim minorities, shaving and veiling are part and parcel of this process.  In this case and way, 
gender constitutes an avenue of power. 
Strengths & Limitations 
There are some limitations to this research, most of which pertain to the data sources and 
standpoints of participants.  Chapter 1 illustrates the importance of jihadists’ subjective views for 
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understanding martyrdom acts, but must also be viewed in light of RAND Corporation objectives 
and affiliations.  RAND, which published In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad, is a non-profit 
organization that receives part of its funding from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).  The 
DOD lists jihadist groups, like al-Qa’ida and ISIS, as threats to national security and American 
interests abroad.69   The trustworthiness of these data and the knowledge extrapolated from them 
must therefore take into account RAND stakeholders and the editor’s decisions regarding the 
organization and content of the text—e.g., what quotes to include.  A second limitation is that the 
compendium includes quotations from both Islamists and jihadists, groups which have distinct 
grievances and goals (e.g., see Aslan 2009; Khosrokhavar and Macey 2005).70   Again, unlike 
Islamist groups, like Hamas and the Taliban, militant jihadists view martyrdom operations as 
part of an overall strategy to establish a transnational caliphate that encompasses much of the 
Muslim world.  In other words, such operations are not simply a means of defending territories 
or fighting for independence, but a means for conquest.  These operations are thus directed at 
both near and far enemies.  Bearing these important differences in mind, I was careful to parse 
the quotes and claims of self-identified jihadists or espoused the ideologies of Global Jihadism 
(Gerges 2009; Aslan 2009).  This sorting process had a marginal effect on the amount of data 
that was eventually excluded from the analysis.   
In spite of these limitations, the RAND data are arguably more substantial and reliable 
for analyzing the framing activities of militant jihadists than works which rely on biographical 
information and/or psychopathological inferences (e.g., Kimmel 2005; Lankford 2012).  Many of 
the quotations included in the compendium were drawn from Sawt-al Jihad, Al-Battar Training 
                                                          
69 U.S. Department of State. 2014. Foreign Terrorist Organizations: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (Retrieved July 6, 2014). 
70 See Aslan (2009) for more detailed discussion of the differences between Islamists and jihadists.  
146 
 
Camp, 39 Ways to Join Jihad, and other primary sources of jihadi literature.  The full text also 
included statements from historical figures, current leaders, and rank-and-file members of the 
movement.  This inclusivity is important because framing has primarily been studied as a top-
down process and “intentional activity of movement entrepreneurs at the organizational level” 
(Oliver and Johnston 2001: 8), and these data provided a broader set of viewpoints for examining 
martyrdom frames.  The constructivist methodological approach taken in this study also places 
the data and findings in further context.  Again, the point of this inquiry was to offer a way of 
understanding martyrdom in militant jihad, not to claim generalizability or an assertion of “truth” 
about these acts in Islam and/or other religions.   
It is also important to note that although researchers have tried clarifying and highlighting 
the roles of women in violent jihad (e.g., Davis 2013; Von Knop 2007; Skaine 2006; Schweitzer 
2006), martyrdom remains almost exclusively a male enterprise.  To be sure, the participation of 
women in suicide bombings belies an androcentric impetus for violence, not to mention the strict 
system of gender separation espoused by many Islamic extremist groups (Aslam 2012; Kimmel 
2005).  Media attention directed at Muslim women who carry out suicide missions, so-called 
“Black widows” (CNN Newsroom 2014), is both excessive and misleading.  For instance, of the 
462 suicide attacks carried out between 1980 and 2003, only 59 (roughly twelve percent) were 
successfully carried out by women, and none of these involved al-Qa’ida (Pape 2005).  Their 
role in more recent movements like ISIS continues to be ancillary, nurturing a culture of violence 
rather than directly participating in it (Abdul-Alim 2015).  This difference appears related to 
boundary work on the part of jihadi men.  Scholars have found that women tend to play more 
symbolic and supportive roles in militant movements, such as luring potential recruits in chat 
rooms and inspiring them to carry out violent acts, as well as being careworkers and doing 
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traditionally feminized tasks.  The exclusion of women from participating in violent jihad is “not 
because of religious proscription,” Sageman (2008: 111-12) has observed, “…but because of the 
masculine conception of heroism” among jihadists and fear that “a more active role for women 
might lesson the repute of men’s actions.”  This also corresponds with literature on gender and 
war (e.g., Hutchings 2008; Goldstein 2001; Morgan 1994) in that martyrdom conjures notions of 
manhood and soldiering.  This gendering process may explain why so few women commit these 
acts, and how incidents of female suicide bombing may simply reflect cases of women engaging 
in other forms of violence—alarming and yet novel.  In this case, men maintain a monopoly on 
martyrdom. 
This research also concedes some limitations based on the characteristics and collection 
of the interviews.  Again, study participants were identified through the non-probabilistic method 
of snowball sampling.  Although this method is well-established and well-suited for research on 
sensitive topics and hard-to-reach populations, it does present some “inherent dangers” (Penrod 
et al. 2003).  Among these are potential biases with respect to site selection and the social 
network of participants, both of which have implications for the application and theoretical scope 
of the findings.  For example, initial informants were drawn from a pair of MSAs and an Islamic 
Center and mosque, and the immediate referrals were also linked to these organizations.  These 
were primarily devout Muslims and, as such, may have been less likely to engage in covering 
and passing to cope with stigma to begin with.  To overcome the limitations associated with 
narrow sampling frames and improve upon snowball sampling methodologies, Penrod et al. 
(2003: 102) have proposed a chain-referral method of sampling that “permeates multiple social 
networks in which the phenomenon of interest occurs.”  This method involves “multiple 
snowballs” from various settings and thereby reducing biases and increasing the scope and 
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richness of the findings.  In terms of exploring the stigma experiences of Muslim minorities, 
such an approach could yield a wider variety of coping strategies and more nuanced accounts 
going forward.  That being said, this form of sampling also presents methodological challenges 
(Harry 1986).  My use of selective and theoretical sampling methods reduced these problems, for 
instance, they did not impede or interfere with the conceptualization of the study population and 
identifying participants.  Also, to reiterate, my focus was on stigma management among young 
Muslims who considered themselves to be devout.  This focus insured that location and network 
biases would not convolute the sampling frame nor undermine the reliability of the findings. 
In addition to the site selection and sampling process, the actual interviews can also 
introduce biases that impede the trustworthiness and implications of the findings.  As noted by 
Ryan (2011: 8), “the interview situation is also a performance during which the interviewees 
sought to positively present themselves and their faiths to the non-Muslim researcher.”  In the 
Goffmanian sense (1959: 238-239), this situation was more likely part of the “front stage” where 
participants represented themselves and their actions in ways that are difficult to verify without 
direct observation or triangulation.  Team techniques for “saving the show” (p. 212) may also 
influence responses to certain questions, such as the extent to which the young Muslim women 
support the assertions of young Muslim men about negative portrayals in Western media.  In this 
regard, the interview process is also an occasion for impression management, where participants 
strive to be “disciplined performers” (p. 216), both aware of stigmatizing discourses and able to 
project impressions that belie them.  The potential for these biases are considered common and 
unavoidable aspects of interview research, and self-report data more generally.  That being said, 
it is worth noting that several participants recommended others that they thought might have 
alternative or even opposing perspectives during the referral process, rather than just suggesting 
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others that shared their views and opinions about the issues at hand.  To me, this was an 
indication of their genuine stake in the prospective findings, as well as the seriousness with 
which they took their roles as research participants.  Such sincere investment in presenting a 
range of accounts surely helped the trustworthiness of the findings. 
Aside from these general limitations, there are a couple of gender-specific issues that are 
also important to consider in interpreting these findings.  First, being a man or woman not only 
influenced the coping strategies of these young Muslims, but also their interaction with me as the 
researcher—and me with them as participants.  Even though I may be seen as a member of the 
“wise” based on my more intimate knowledge of participant standpoints, I am also an embodied 
male imbued with androcentric biases and pre-conceived notions that could very well influence 
the meaning and analysis of the data.  Gender has been identified—even more so than race and 
ethnicity—as impacting the interview process in ethnographic studies (Song and Parker 1995; 
Ryan, Kofman, and Aaron 2011).  Though I followed up with participants regarding key themes 
(e.g., member-checking) and routinely questioned my conceptualization of stigma in this case 
and context, it is necessary to acknowledge the influence of (my) gender-based assumptions in 
this research.  The interpretation and implications of the findings must therefore be situated 
within the (complicated and consequential) historical context of men interviewing women for 
research purposes (Bell, Caplan, and Karim 1993; Warren 1988).  To mitigate the effects of 
gender in this regard, I followed the suggestions of Padfield and Procter (1996) by recognizing 
gender as an important factor in shaping the expressed views and perspectives of participants (a 
factor that continues to be taken for granted in the production of knowledge), elucidating their 
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definitions of masculinity and femininity, and making them feel heard and at ease.71  The audio 
recording and repeatedly listening to the interviews also helped to clarify the emergent themes, 
in part by juxtaposing them with my notes and initials thoughts during the actual interviews.    
Recognizing my positionality in terms of gender, ethnicity, nationality, age, generation, 
and religious affiliation was also influential in how I identified and built trust with participants.  
In other words, my standpoint affected how and why I defined the study population as a “stigma 
category” (Goffman 1963: 23-24), and related to their experiences of stigma.  Compared to other 
qualitative studies of Muslim identities in Western contexts (e.g., Ryan et al. 2011; Peek 2005), I 
also identified and collected the interview data without having to rely on peer researchers.72  As a 
result, I was more intimately connected with aspects of the research process than other studies of 
Muslims in Western societies (e.g., see Ryan et al. 2011: 56).  While researchers have attempted 
to overcome such limitations through focus groups and other methodological techniques (pp. 56-
58), my direct involvement at each stage of data collection conferred greater confidence in the 
validity of the findings.  As Mahsa, 18, put it, “We need someone like you to tell our stories” 
Future Research Directions 
 While these findings suggest several questions for future study, I highlight two that I 
believe are significant and worth pursuing: (1) What constitutes the social structure of anti-
Islamic stigma in American society?  And (2) how are the lived-experiences of Muslims in 
                                                          
71 For example, in closing, I also asked all interviewees if there were any questions they would like to ask me.  Aside 
from more general questions about the direction of the research, a number of participants used this time to give me 
positive feedback, such as telling me how “easy” I was to talk to and how well I appeared to listen.  Such comments 
were not just personally validating, but, I believe, lessened the degree to which my gender performance interfered 
with their willingness to share more intimate details about themselves and their experiences.   
72 Peer researchers are defined as people who would normally be the subjects of study, but due to their “insider” 
positions and knowledge, are enlisted as part of the research design—e.g., helping to recruit subjects, conducting 
interviews, administering questionnaires, organizing and participating in focus groups, and taking part in research 
training (Lushey and Munro 2014).  According to Ryan et al. (2011: 51) such researchers are “frequently used by 
researchers to carry out fieldwork involving hard-to-reach populations.  The enlisting of peer researchers arguably 
strengthens the research process by overcoming distrust and other barriers in studies of these populations. 
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America shaped by intersections of privilege and oppression?  Beginning with the first question, 
researchers have identified certain individuals and organizations that have contributed to the rise 
of Islamophobia by documenting their rhetoric and activities (e.g., Wajahat et al. 2011).  They 
include public intellectuals, conservative news media, and talk shows, politicians, pundits, and 
wealthy donors.  For example, Wajahat et al. (2011) have shown how media outlets like Fox 
News, the Washington Times, and the National Review, along with popular media programs, like 
those run by Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck, and Pamela Geller, “amplify harmful, anti-Muslim 
views to wide audiences” (p. 85).  Goffman (1963: 71) recognized the power of mass media to 
transform one’s personal identity into a stigmatized social identity.  This power is arguably 
greater and more pervasive in the Internet age.  My interviews included questions about the 
portrayal of Muslims in the media and many participants raised the issue even without being 
asked specifically about the media’s role in initiating and perpetuating anti-Islamic stereotypes.  
Their accounts alongside the apparent “echo chamber” of anti-Muslim discourse (p. 5) suggest 
there is an Islamophobia network that remains unstudied and yet central to the daily lives of 
Muslims in America.  Comparing the views of my participants and other young Muslims with 
the activities and objectives of this network can help to place anti-Islamic stigma in a larger 
social, cultural, and political context.  This research may show stigma labels, levied against 
Muslims and other minorities, to be political products with a specific purpose and outcome: the 
creation “others” through conscious and collective action.   
Although the findings indicate that gender, race, religion, nationality, and age intersected 
in a particular way in the lives of these participants and shaped the stigma management strategies 
they used, this process also requires further investigation.  For instance, how and to what effect 
have the subject positions young Muslim men and women living in the U.S. structured their daily 
152 
 
lives and contoured their experiences of stigma?  As indicated by my findings, the gender 
identities of stigmatized persons are defined (and become meaningful) in relation to other social 
categories, including race, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, ability, and age.  Much like the 
depictions of Black manhood in U.S. society (Anderson 1998; hooks 2004: Chapter 4), Muslim 
manhood has been cast as volatile, violent, and dangerous.  The findings detailed in Chapters 2 
and 3 indicate that one’s location within intersecting social structures also influences self-esteem.  
In this sense, “stigma and intersectionality are very much intertwined” (Rolston 2012: 289).  
Intersectionality perspectives provide another analytical framework for exploring Islamophobia 
and linking everyday encounters to larger social structures and inequalities in American society.  
I believe these types of inquiries are important for understanding anti-Islamic stigma in Western 
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APPENDIX A:  
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
As I mentioned, I am interested in understanding the experiences of being Muslim, post-9/11.  
First, I will ask you a few questions about your thoughts on Muslims in the news media.  After 
that, I will ask you to respond a few vignettes/examples about the U.S. response to 9/11.  I will 
then ask you a few questions about your daily life and about gender differences.   
 
MUSLIMS IN THE MEDIA, POST-9/11 
 
1. What do you think are the most influential news media sources to Americans? 
a. How about for you, personally? 
 
2. Could you talk about how the news media portrays Muslims? 
a. What do you think about this? 
b. Probe: What do you think about the news media coverage of the different military 
aspects of the post-9/11 response (for example, the invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the use of drone missiles in Pakistan)? 
c. Probe: What, if any, impact do you think media coverage has had on how other 
Americans view Muslims 
d. Probe: What, if any, differences to you think there are in how Muslim men and 
women are portrayed in the media?   
 
3. How do you think someone like you was portrayed in the U.S. mainstream news media 
before 9/11? 
a. How about immediately after?  
b. And now, ten years later? 
 
U.S. RESPONSE TO 9/11 & VIGNETTES 
 
4. What do you think about the ways the U.S. has responded to the events of 9/11? 
a. Probe: How do you think these actions are viewed by other Americans? 
 
5. How do you think that someone like you, from (ethnic background, religious affiliation 
and nationality) is viewed by the U.S. government?  
a. Probe: What, if any, differences do you think there are between how Muslim men 
and women are viewed? 
b. Probe: Why do you think this is? 
 
6. Vignette A: Excerpt about Islam in the context of the U.S. War on Terror. 
READ  QUOTE: “I’ve made it clear, that the war against terrorism is not a war against 
Muslims, nor is it a war against Arabs. It’s a war against evil people who conduct crimes 
against innocent people…Islam is a vibrant faith. Millions of our fellow citizens are 
Muslim. We respect the faith. We honor its traditions. Our enemy does not. Our enemy 
doesn’t follow the great traditions of Islam. They’ve hijacked a great religion.” Former 
U.S. President George W. Bush 
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READ QUOTE: “The United States is not and never will be at war with Islam. In fact, 
our partnership with the Muslim world is critical … in rolling back a fringe ideology that 
people of all faiths reject.” Current U.S. President Barack Obama. 
a. What do you think about these statements? 
b. How do you think other Americans perceive the “War on Terror?” 
 
7. Vignette B: Excerpt from Muslim Radicalization Hearings:  
READ QUOTE: “Unfortunately, we have too many mosques in this country.  There are 
too many people who are sympathetic to radical Islam. We should be looking at them 
more carefully.  We should be finding out how we can infiltrate them.” --Peter King, U.S. 
House Representative (R), New York. 
a. What do you think about this quote? 
b. What do you think about conducting these hearings? 
c. Probe: What, if any, impact do you think these hearings have had on someone 
like you?  
d. Probe: How do you think these hearings are perceived by other Americans? 
 
STIGMA EXPERIENCES IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
Now, I would now like to ask you a few questions about your experiences in daily life. 
 
8. How would you describe your daily interactions with people in your community? 
 
9. What, if any, impact do you think media portrayals of Muslims have had on your day-to-
day life?  
 
10. What, if any, acts of prejudice or discrimination have you experienced because of who 
you are? 
a. Probe: When did you first experience this?  
b. Probe: What do you think of these experiences?   
c. Probe: How, if it all, have you experienced such problems with people in your 
community? 
d. Probe: How, if it all, have you experienced such problems at work/at 
school/elsewhere? 
e. Probe: What makes it easier or more difficult to deal with experiences of 
prejudice or discrimination for someone like you?   
 
11. How, if it all, have you changed your behavior to avoid harassment because of who you 
are? 
a. Could you give me an example of this? 
 
12. What do you think are the most challenging aspects of daily life for young Muslims 
living in the U.S.?  
a. Probe: Do you see any differences in these challenges for young Muslim women 
and men? 






Now, I would now like to ask you a few questions about gender. 
 
13. What do you think are the most important roles for a man [and woman] to play in their 
community? 
a. Probe: What about the relations between men and women in Muslim 
communities? 
 
14. Could you tell me how you think Muslim men and Muslim women are portrayed in the 
media? (Circle back) 
a. How do you think other Americans perceive these portrayals? 
b. Probe: How would you compare and contrast these portrayals with your identity 
as young Muslim man [/woman]? 
c. Probe: How concerned have you become with how you interact with women 
[/others] because of the way Muslim men [/women] have been portrayed?    
 
15. What did you think when you first learned that those who orchestrated the 9/11 were 
young Muslim men? 
a. How about now, ten years later? 
b. What do you think these men were trying to achieve?  
c. Probe: How important do you think ideas about “honor,” “bravery” and “glory” 
were to these men? 
 
16. Vignette C: Excerpt on depictions of Muslim manhood in the media and by the state.  
READ QUOTE: “In the post September 11th context…Western popular cultures have 
seen their demons, and they are Muslim men.”--Shahin Gerami, Professor of Women’s 
Studies, San Jose State University.  
a. What do you think about this quote? 
b. How do you think these portrayals of Muslim men are perceived by other 
Americans? 
c. Probe: What, if any, impact have these portrayals of Muslim men had on 
someone like you? 
d. Could you give me an example? 
 
ENDING QUESTIONS   
 
Now, I would now like to ask you a few questions in closing. 
 
17. As you look back on 9/11, how, if at all, have your views of being Muslim changed?  
a. Tell me about some of the strengths you’ve discovered about yourself through 
experiencing 9/11?   
 
18. What have you learned that you think would be important for others to know about being 




19. Would it be possible to contact you if I have any additional follow-up questions?  
 
20. Is there anything you would like add to the things you have told me, or is there anything 
that I haven’t asked you about that you thought I would? 
 
21. Can you recommend a person for me to interview, like yourself, who may share you 
background and experiences of 9/11? 
 












Gender ___ Man ___ Woman 
 














___Employed for Wages 
___Self-Employed 
___Out of Work for Less than 1 Year 




___Unable to Work 
 
Occupation, If Applicable____________________ 
 
Education 
 ___Less than 12 years 
 ___Some College 
 ___Bachelor’s Degree 




___U.S. Naturalized Citizen 
  If yes, how long have you lived in the U.S.? ____ 
 ___ Permanent Resident 
 Other (Please Indicate): ________________________________ 
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